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




THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.

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THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA:
ITS ORIGIN,
AND
AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF
LORD RAGLAN.

BY
ALEXANDER WILLIAM KINGLAKE.

VOLUME VI.

FROM THE OPENING OF PÉLISSIER'S COMMAND
TO THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN.

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FROM
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CHAPTER I.

THE NEW FRENCH COMMANDER AND THE PROSPECTS OF VIGOROUS ACTION WHICH HIS LEADERSHIP SEEMED TO BE OPENING.—THE STRENGTH OF THE BELLIGERENTS.—THE PROBLEM AWAITING SOLUTION.—THE RESOLVES OF PÉLISSIER.—THE IMPENDING STRIFE BETWEEN HIM AND THE EMPEROR.

I.

ON the 19th of May, the command of the now great French army was assumed in due form by Pélissier. This short, thick-set, resolute Norman had passed his sixtieth year; but the gray, the fast whitening hair that capped his powerful head, and marked the inroads of Time, wore a strange, wore an alien look, as though utterly out of true fellowship with the keen, fiery, vehement eyes, with the still dark and heavy mustache, with all the imperious features that glowed, or seemed to be glowing in the prime, or fierce mid-day of life. His mighty bull-neck, strongly built upon broad, massive shoulders, gave promise of hard, bloody fights, gave warning of angry moods, and even of furious outbursts.

He however, it seems, could at pleasure unleash or control his fierce rage, thus treating wrath as a power that he knew how to wield, and not suffering the strong, useful demon to have a real mastery over him. He was capable of choosing and loyally pursuing a policy. He had Norman-like gifts that well fitted him to throw his antagonists in many a wrestle for power, and to make him a chief strong

in war. His accustomed manner of speech, though so forcible, and so freely unbridled as to be in a sense dramatic, was after all—not a mask, but—the genuine, though boisterous utterance of a violent, absolute man. When first meeting in conference one who, though only then commanding a corps, still expended a huge force in speech, Lord Raglan was apparently startled, if not even a little repelled, and could not help telling his Government that Péliissier ‘talked ‘a good deal;’ but he even then said, that the general so eager to speak seemed also eager to act, and he happily found before long that the Norman was ‘as good as his ‘word.’

In one respect, it is true, Péliissier’s demeanor and speech tended strongly to mislead an observer; for, whether owing to whim or to exuberant strength, he greatly liked putting on what—apparently by a sort of convention—is accepted as the ‘roughness of camps,’ though all the while in reality he was a man of high cultivation, and, moreover, one versed in those duties—the duties, I mean, of ‘staff’ service—which try the brain-power of officers engaged in the business of war. With the aid of such training as this, he had become fully capable of having or quickly acquiring the kind of statesmanship needed by one in the exalted position of commanding a splendid French army assembled in the enemy’s presence, and, for instance, understood, to begin with, how best to maintain honest concert with the English allies at his side.

Without speaking, except by mere reference, of his achievements in Algeria, or recurring by more than allusion to even the caves of the Dahra, or repeating what already we have seen of his victorious self-assertion maintained against what was then lawful authority, one can say of this stubborn commander that, whether pressing hostilities by a normal exertion of power, or straining his warlike prerogatives to a questioned extreme, or bringing new life to an army benumbed by want of sound leadership, he never ceased to disclose a strong and persistent will.¹ He was specially apt for those trials which have to be borne by a general engaged in an obstinate siege, since he knew how to make cruel sacrifices for the attainment of many an object small enough at first sight in itself, yet forming one in a series of steps leading up to the end.

¹ A passing mention of the ‘caves of the Dahra’ appears *ante*, vol. i. pp. 319 and 320. The last allusion in the above sentence is to Péliissier’s wilful and victorious course of action, recounted *ante*, vol. v. chap. vii. pp. 139 *et seq.*

He was by nature so manful, and—with justice—reposed in himself so unstinted a confidence, that—now in his sixty-first year—he could not apparently learn to become a respecter of persons set up in authority over him, and indeed had the air of regarding them with feelings scarce short of disdain. Untainted by any complicity in the plot of the 2d of December, and brought honestly up to the front by the strength of his warlike repute, he, when only commanding a corps, had been bold enough, as we saw, to begin protecting the army from Louis Napoleon's strategy;¹ and there well might be good hope that now, with his vastly extended power, he would firmly pursue a like course. Thus the man and the occasion were meeting. What France beyond all measure needed for the honor of her arms was a general (otherwise competent) who could and would push on the war without deferring unduly to her troublesome Emperor, and Pélissier fulfilled the condition.

II.

Upon acceding to the command, he thus addressed the War Minister: 'I have already seen Lord Raglan. Upon our general course of action we are in perfect accord. In common with the whole army I have entire faith in the future. I thank the Emperor for the confidence he reposes in me. I have measured the extent of my great duties; but in order that I may fulfill them with success for any length of time, you must ask the Emperor to give me the latitude and freedom of action that are indispensable under the conditions presented by this present war, and especially necessary for preserving the close alliance between the two countries.'²

While Pélissier and Lord Raglan agreed on the questions then needing solution, there was also a well-founded hope that such differences of opinion as might afterwards spring up between them would be easily prevented from marring their power to act in due concert. To begin with, the new French commander, when acceding to power, seemed to hang on the words of his English colleague with an eagerness and a kind of devotion that he rarely if ever vouchsafed to any one other man; but, if swayed and won over (as, indeed,

Accord between Pélissier and Lord Raglan.

Full discretion demanded.

Prospect of the two generals being able to act in full concert.

¹ See *ante*, vol. v., his letter of the 5th of May, p. 186.

² Rousset, ii. p. 183.

all men more or less were) by the personal ascendant of Lord Raglan, Pélissier had, moreover, convictions in harmony with the feelings he showed. He had the wisdom—State wisdom—enabling him to see the vital conditions on which the blessing of concord could best be attained and secured.

Lord Raglan, we know, on the other hand, was richly endowed with the faculty—the noble, the generous faculty—which enables one man to appreciate the rights, the fair claims, the natural feelings of others. From the first, he had well understood that, supposing the French army to be ably and honestly led, its chief (from the nature of things) might fairly claim more sway in council than one who only commanded a much less numerous force; and common-sense also showed that in conference between the two chiefs, he to whom any project might tender what men call the ‘laboring oar’ would have a better right than his colleague to govern the joint resolve. Thus, for instance, Lord Raglan conceived that (along with the Ottoman army) French cavalry and other French troops might advantageously operate from Eupatoria against the enemy’s rear; yet, because the proposal was one which sought to choose a new enterprise for some of Pélissier’s troops, he, Pélissier, had a right to expect that any distaste for the measure which he might avow would be suffered, as of course, to prevail.

Both the chiefs, one may say, or the whole understood the true kind of relations that ought to be subsisting between them; and the time had now seemingly come when, unless our French allies should be hampered by the interference of Louis Napoleon, the armies of the two Western Powers might be acting as though they were one.

The spirit of concord thus ruling the French and the English Head-quarters carried with it the co-operation of the Sardinian contingent (placed, we saw, under Lord Raglan’s guidance), and was destined besides to insure the willing aid of the Ottoman forces in the Crimea; for by use of his mighty ascendant at Constantinople, Lord Stratford would soon be restoring the good-humor of Omar Pasha, and inclining him to act in smooth concert with the English allies, of the Sultan.⁽¹⁾

III.

Exclusive of non-combatants, the forces that might thus be expected to act together harmoniously in the south of the Crimea comprised (with the ‘Corps of

Strength of
the Allies;

Concord also
to be expected
with the Sar-
dinian contin-
gent;

and with
Omar Pasha.

Reserve' ¹) 100,000 French, 28,000 English, 15,000 Sardinians, and 45,000 Turks, making together 188,000.²

To—not merely collect and dispatch from afar, but to—throw forward into the presence of a distant enemy, and firmly establish in front of him 188,000 good troops, while also supporting this host by fleets of great strength that held absolute command of the seas, and could cover the landing of troops on any chosen part of the coast—this was bringing to bear on Sebastopol a mighty exertion of power; and, on the other hand, it would seem that in

the whole of the Crimea, exclusive of its Kertchine Peninsula, where 9000 troops were assembled, the enemy could now only reckon some 80,000 infantry, with 12,000 cavalry, and 214 pieces of field artillery.³

IV.

So, if only the Allies at this time had been free from the knot which still tied them to their siege of Sebastopol, they would seemingly have been able at once to reinvade the Crimea, to fasten upon it in strength from east to west, and with ease, or comparative ease, to reduce a fortress so weak on its northern front as to be there almost powerless against them, whilst lying besides at their mercy, because altogether cut off (by the supposed reinvasion) from its vital communications with Russia by either the land or the sea. But no such freedom belonged to the powerful yet fettered Allies. They had not yet expiated the fault of sitting down as besiegers before the south front of Sebastopol. Irresistible reasons, we know, forbade them all thought of enduring that their siege-works or their ports of supply should fall into the enemy's hands.⁴ Yet, fitly to guard these possessions was a task, as we saw, ascertained to require 90,000 men, of whom all were perforce to be French, or French and English combined.⁵ Hugely changed by this exigency, the problem no longer asked

¹ Which had partly come up from Constantinople, and would be all on the Chersonese within a few days.

² Niel's calculation, given by Rousset, ii. p. 190, but with a correction adding 3000 to his estimate of the English combative force. The 'Situation' of the French army (20th May, 1855, Niel, App., p. 491), puts its gross numbers at 120,000, and shows a strength of 100,426 'disponibles.' With their 'indisponibles,' the French in round and gross numbers had 120,000, the English 32,000, the Sardinians 17,000, and the Turks, under Omar Pasha, 55,000—making up altogether for the Allies a gross number of 224,000 men.

³ Todleben, ii. p. 258.

⁴ As shown *ante*, vol. v. p. 185.

⁵ See *ante*, vol. v. p. 191.

simply how best to conquer Sebastopol, but how best to do this concurrently with the furnishing of 90,000 men for another imperative task.

To answer the problem thus put, widely different solutions were offered.

With the bulk of the 98,000 men that would still be left after furnishing the guard of 90,000, and also leaving a garrison at Eupatoria, it was possible to undertake field operations which might force the enemy to relax his hold of Sebastopol; but every such project involved a more or less widened severance of the Allied forces.

It also was possible to avoid all such severances by simply pressing the siege, and this plan had the evident merit of compressing, as it were, into one the heavy task of defense and the less heavy task of conquest; so that under a project thus ordered the whole mass of the 188,000 men (saving only a garrison for Eupatoria) might be kept together in an assembled state. To accept that alternative, however, was to make a distressing choice, for it involved the continuance of a siege to be pressed at cruel sacrifice of life against the now immensely strong front of an uninvested fortress, with all Russia at its back; and it sanctioned what, under one aspect, might pass for a huge waste of power, since, as long as the siege might endure, an enormous proportion of the 188,000 Allies, though gathered and ready for battle, would still be so circumstanced on the Chersonese and the neighboring plain as to be able to do little or nothing towards bringing the strife to a close.

V.

Yet with all its repulsiveness Pélissier preferred this last plan. He declined to undertake operations against the Russian field army, whether hazarded (as the Emperor urged) by effecting an advance from Aloushta, or attacking from ground further west, or again (as Lord Raglan had counselled) by directing a movement from Eupatoria against the enemy's rear. He determined to go on waging war against the south side of Sebastopol by the simple though bloody expedient of resolutely pressing the siege; and, finally, he meant or desired that, till after the end of this siege, the bulk of the four Allied armies should remain held together like one. It is true that (in concert with Lord Raglan) Pélissier determined to resume the Kertch expedition, and (for many good reasons) agreed that — employing for the purpose their cavalry, and other bodies of troops not

Pélissier's
resolves.

engaged in the work of the siege—the Allies should take ground to their right in the valley of the Tchernaya ; but the first of these operations was to be one of only brief duration, and the other one harmonized perfectly with that part of Pélissier's design which required—however anomalously—that, although so placed and confronted as to be unable to bring the enemy to the ordeal of a general action, the bulk of the vast Allied army should still for the time remain concentrated. Having laid it down peremptorily in his letter of the 5th of May that the field operations imagined against the enemy's rear must all be put off till the fortress should be reduced to a strict defensive, the new French commander now carried his principle further, and declared that the Allies must adventure on no such enterprises until after effecting the conquest of the whole south side of Sebastopol.

Though immediate resort to the field operations had been urged—was still urged—by the Emperor, Pélissier extended no mercy to any such projects, denounced them as 'widely 'eccentric,' called them even in his scorn mere 'adventures,' and declared that, instead of the knowledge required for the invading the mountainous region of the Tchatir Dagħ with an enemy gathered behind it, there was hardly any knowledge at all, not even any trustworthy map.

Pélissier laid it down that the conquest of the south side of Sebastopol must be effected by grappling fast with its defences, and carrying them one after the other at all costs. Exactly as Lord Raglan had counselled, Pélissier, to begin with, insisted that all those counter-approaches in the Karabel Faubourg to which Canrobert had so long been submitting must be forcibly wrested from the enemy.

In this stern design against the 'South Side' there was nothing that allured (like a battle) the rapt imaginations of men by opening a vision of glory attainable, perhaps, before sunset after going through only the ordeal of fights fought out in hot blood. Far from thinking that the path he had chosen was an easy or a swift way to victory, Pélissier saw in it a course beset with evils and troubles, one involving cruel sacrifices, and after all not even promising to compass without further efforts that long-pursued object of objects for which the Allies were in arms. It was only from that future campaign which would open, he took it for granted, after the fall of the 'South Side' that Pélissier hoped to educe a not unworthy result. What he said for his plan of first pushing war to extremity against the 'South Side' was simply

this:—that its execution, however difficult, however costly of life, was still in his judgment ‘possible.’¹

In a powerful letter addressed to General Bosquet, Péliissier declared his resolves, and did this, one may say, in the language of one who gives final judgment, as though it were matter of course that what he (in accord with Lord Raglan) had determined to do must and would be accordingly done. He did not, he could not, say that his plans had been approved by his sovereign, nor again did he—even for form’s sake—write any word tending to show that his resolve would be submitted to the Emperor. On the contrary, he wrote as a man whose word was perforce to be law. ‘I am ‘firmly determined,’ he said, ‘not to launch into the unknown, ‘to avoid adventures, and not to act without knowledge of ‘what I am doing, or without the documents and the information necessary for the rational leadership of an army.’ Speaking of the counter-approaches in the Faubourg still held by the Russians, he said in four words: ‘We must ‘have them ;’ and then, after giving his reasons for this decision, he said: ‘All this may be painfully difficult, but it is ‘possible, and to undertake it I am irrevocably determined. ‘Such also is the opinion of the other Commander-in-Chief.’²

Here, then, was the will of Péliissier declared to be fixed as Fate.

On the other hand, Louis Napoleon was violently, indignantly adverse to all these resolves; and it might seem that the authority of an absolute sovereign would perforce govern one of his generals; but the Emperor, as we know, always lived under that peculiar dread of offending his army which from time to time overrode what—only the moment before—had been his settled decisions, and was destined to involve him in ruin, along with not only his ‘Empire’ but even that very army which he had feared to displease.⁽²⁾ He apparently knew or believed that, to depose Péliissier would be giving offence to his army on the Chersonese, and to his army in Algeria, but also—this above all—to his sensitive army at home; and accordingly we shall soon have to see him commanding, commanding, commanding, without being therefore for a moment obeyed, yet may, after all, not find him ready to vindicate his outraged authority by any ulterior steps. There are signs that Marshal Vaillant, the Minister of War, perceived, nay, recognized, this as the actual state of

Prospect of
violent strife
between
Louis
Napoleon
and Péliissier.

¹ Rousset, ii. p. 184 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*

what purported to be the governing power;¹ and perhaps some such light reached Pélissier; for while steadily setting at nought the Emperor's orders, he had the air of obeying some esoteric authority which showed him his path of duty—which taught him that he—he alone—must bear the whole burden of commanding the French in this war, and could not hope to excuse himself for any disastrous fault by alleging instructions received from his sovereign, Louis Napoleon.

Be all this as it may, the French Emperor at the time we have reached was about to be plying his distant and strong-willed general with censure, with indignant reproaches, with peremptory words of command; so that, while we are observing the conflict between the Allies and the Czar, we also shall have to be witnessing the interior strife going on between Napoleon the Third and Pélissier.

The Emperor, as we saw, had in Niel a delegate long since established at the French Head-quarters whose obedience to his master was supported by his own real convictions, and a strenuous desire to press, to force their adoption on him who now ruled the French army; but it would seem that this aid on the whole did not bring a real strength to the Emperor; for the presence of a general undertaking to criticise and even oppose the measures of the Commander-in-Chief was beyond measure exasperating to the fiery Pélissier, and by acting thus on his temper may plainly have strengthened his will.

CHAPTER II.

NEW COUNTER-APPROACHES AND CONSEQUENT FIGHTS ON THE WESTERN FLANK OF SEBASTOPOL.

I.

THE march of the siege where it threatened the western front of Sebastopol was all at once brought to a crisis which called on the new French commander to open his reign with some fights.

General Todleben had already established a chain of lodgments extending along the Cimetière Ridge; and the French on their part, by this time, had brought their approaches close up to the southernmost wall of the graveyard from which the ridge took its name.

¹ See *post*, chap. ix., Vaillant's use of the impersonal 'on.'

Now, because having relative height, and besides running parallel with the enceinte of Sebastopol at a distance of but 500 yards, the Cimetière Ridge, thus held lightly by the enemy's lodgments, and thus approached by the French, was a position of great military value. If seized by the French, it would enable them to operate formidably against the Central Bastion; while again, if the fortune of war should leave it in Todleben's power, he might be expected to plant on it batteries destructive of the French approaches, and indeed, one may say, would be able to stop the advance of the siege as then pressed against western Sebastopol.

It might well have been therefore conjectured that, to secure the advantages offered, one or other of the opposing forces would very soon pass into action; but what happened was that they both by chance took their measures on the same night—the night of the 21st of May. It was then that our Allies pushed forward a trench by which they hoped, in due time, to be able to envelop the lodgments. It was then that the Russians began their boldly imagined enterprise.

II.

General Todleben, in truth, had projected a new and great counter-approach which was to establish a fortified 'Place d'Armes' on all the great tract of ground which divided the enceinte of Sebastopol from the furthest or western slopes of the Cimetière Ridge. He at once, to begin with, would carry a trench along the front of most (not quite all) of the Cimetière lodgments, and besides, at its southern extremity, would connect this new counter-approach with the enceinte of Sebastopol by a gabionnaded way.

General Khrouleff, too, had his project, and desired that some lodgments established near the head of the Quarantine Bay should be also connected by trench-work. The chiefs in Sebastopol saw that plans such as these were well calculated to provoke bloody fights, and might entail heavy sacrifices; but—although not unanimously—the proposals of both Todleben and Khrouleff were adopted by a Council of War.

Accordingly, in the night of the 21st of May, the two systems of projected trench-work were successfully executed, and, before morning came, the 'two chains of lodgments' had been already fore-trenched by continuous lines of defence. The Cimetière

Measures for securing it taken by the French and the Russians.

Todleben's project;


and Khrouleff's.

Both the projects adopted;

and executed in the night of the 21st, resulting in

SCENE OF THE FIGHTS MAINTAINED BY PÉLISSIER
AFTER ACCEDING TO THE SUPREME COMMAND

THE COUNTER-APPROACHES TOWARDS THE CEMETERY
DOWN TO THE 22ND OF MAY.



The Cimetière counter-approach; and the Bay-head entrenchment.

trench alone could hold two battalions of troops; and its southern extremity was now duly linked to the fortress by a well-covered line of way.

So, at dawn on the 22d, our Allies saw the fortress expanding, nay already expanded, before them; since, where yesterday there had only been strings of the lodgments our people called 'rifle-pits,' there now ranged—however deficient in point of room and solidity—continuous lines of defence which 'annexed,' as it were, to Sebastopol a new and great tract of ground.

III.

Now Pélissier—intent on the Faubourg—had no mind to carry Sebastopol by breaking in through its town front; and he well may have seen with regret that this Russian challenge invited him to conflicts on ground lying far from the principal path by which he would march to his object; but alive to the value of a mighty diversion, he, at this time, was plainly resolved that, short of storming Sebastopol, he would always carry on the 'old siege'—the siege of Sebastopol town—with unrelenting vigor; and perhaps, after all, he may even have hearkened a little to that fiery temper, to that warlike spirit of his which threatened him with the pains of self-scorn, if he brooked any counter-approaches.

At all events, he determined that on the following night—it was only at night that he could act so close under the guns of Sebastopol—both of these two new counter-approaches should be resolutely attacked. The Russians became aware of the onslaughts impending, and on each side the day of the 22d was passed in preparing for the strife, but especially in making beforehand such use of the artillery power as—in one direction or other—might help to govern the issue. For example, the French siege-guns raged against the Central Bastion, because the work was so placed that—not silenced perhaps by the darkness—its guns might interpose in the fight.

IV.

It was with bodies of infantry some 6000 strong on each side that the French and the Russians respectively undertook to contend for the mastery of these two counter-approaches. General Paté, with under him General Beuret and General Motterouge, was to be in command of the French undertaking these night attacks.

Strength of the troops about to be engaged.

At about half-past nine in the evening, General Beuret led out a force of between three and four battalions against the counter-approach near the head of the Quarantine Bay, and wrested it without serious difficulty from the very few Russians who were there for the moment in charge ; but the enemy soon brought up some troops fully equal in strength to the French, and then there ensued a hard fight, the ebb and the flow so alternating that, for a time, not computed by any at less than two hours, the issue seemed hanging in doubt. The French, however, at length made good their ascendant, drove the enemy out of the work, and—reversing its parapet—soon made the entrenchment their own.

But the principal seat of the conflicts ordained to be raging this night was the counter-approach which had fastened along the Cimetière Ridge. The relative position of this encroachment was such that, if Russian, the forces defending it would lend their flank to French troops advancing from the nearest approaches, and would stand in great danger of being completely rolled up ; while, supposing its defenders to be French, they would be lining a rampart that fronted in what was—for them—the wrong way.

The Central Bastion with its adjoining batteries was so circumstanced that it could not but be a partaker in the fights for this counter-approach, and was therefore, of course, a fit prey for such of Péliissier's siege-guns as might be able to ply it with fire.

At half-past nine o'clock in the evening, battalions commanded by Motterouge advanced on this counter-approach ; and, the Work being then only occupied by about 70 men, was easily seized by the French, who thereupon established themselves in front of the lodgments, thus covering those of their working parties which had begun to transform the entrenchment ; but 'formidable masses of Russians' (it is Péliissier who speaks) came up from the ravine below, and, fighting with an extraordinary obstinacy, proved able to recapture the Work.

Then the French artillery raged with so great a power against the batteries of the Central Bastion and the adjacent works that they were, some of them, silenced, and all, it seems, brought to a nearly helpless condition ; but Todleben in person came up to the Bastion, caused the dead and the wounded gunners to be re-

Attack and capture of the Bay-head counter-approach.

The Cimetière counter-approach.

Power of the Central Bastion to take part in the fight.

Attack and first capture of the Work ;

its recapture.

The Central under fire of the French siege-guns.

placed by fresh men, caused the choked embrasures to be cleared, and in short restored to the batteries some at least of their fighting capacity.

Then, however, advancing once more with numbers increased, and with resolute purpose, the French threw their strength on the flank of the counter-approach; approach, swept the enemy out of its precincts from end to end, and drove him down the acclivity of the Zarogodnaia Ravine. The Russian losses were heavy, and included General Adlerberg, who was killed.

Then Colonel Gardner (an officer of the Russian Engineers¹) disclosed an inborn capacity for swaying an infantry fight. Dispatched with a fresh battalion, he rallied the fugitives scattered in the Zarogodnaia Ravine, restored them to order, inspired them with fresh warlike ardor, and intrepidly led the whole body, then gladly accepting his guidance, to another attack on the Cimetière counter-approach, and delivered this return onslaught with so great a vigor that the French once again were driven out of the Work, and even pursued in their flight along the trench they had opened on the night of the 21st.

Without waiting for the need that might be occasioned by the next alternation of fortune, General Khrouleff reinforced his battalions while still victorious with a fresh body of troops not less than 600 strong.

Not shaken, however, in purpose, the French brought up their reserves—troops including the Voltigeurs of the Guard—and executed a determined attack on the long-disputed counter-approach. The onslaught, however, was met with strenuous resistance, with strenuous counter-attacks; and the strife that resulted was maintained on each side with rare obstinacy. ‘The bayonet *mêlées*,’ says Pélissier, ‘were terrible. Two other battalions of Voltigeurs of the Guard, the 9th Chasseurs à pied, and the 8th of the Line, were called to the ground.’

The strain put on the French raised a need for, as sea-captains word it, ‘All hands!’ Till now, held in readiness to ‘transform’ the entrenchment when captured, the men of their ‘working-parties’ were swift to lay down their tools, to stand to their arms, and thenceforth—not sparing their labor—to labor only as combatants. To the Russians new

¹ I felt prone to infer from his name that this brilliant officer must be of Scotch or English extraction but I learn that he was of Teuton descent, and born in one of the Baltic provinces. He, however, was thoroughly Russian.

fire was imparted by the example of some freshly acceding troops which—panting to show their true quality after having been under a cloud—fought on and on and on with a zeal and a courage that won the hearts of their comrades.

The fierce, bloody, hand-to-hand strife was from time to time interrupted when—receding perhaps a few feet—the masses in conflict sometimes left open spaces between them great enough for exchanges of fire; and then of course, for a while, their cartridges blazed through the darkness, but again and again the closer fighting recurred, and again and again was maintained by French and Russians alike with a valor that seemed nearly equal. Preceded as we have seen by four conflicts, and no less a number of captures alternately changing the ownership of the hotly contested prize, this, the fifth of the fights for the counter-approach, was, it seems, the most stubborn of all, and already the night was far gone, when the French at last made good their mastery, and overthrew all the Russians before them, and once more recaptured the Work.⁽¹⁾

and its recap-
ture by the
French.

V.

When this combat had ended, the night was already far spent, and the French soon perceived that they had not time left for the process—impossible without cover from darkness—of securing themselves in their prize against the guns of the fortress. Therefore, after first doing their best to ruin or damage its trench-work, they withdrew from the counter-approach thus long and fiercely contested, but not without a firm purpose on the part of their chiefs to attack it again the next night.

Course
afterwards
taken by the
French.

VI.

On the 23d, the Russians learned from deserters that the Allies had received great reinforcements, and their watch-tower (Volokoff) began to make signals. These signals announced that bodies of troops had been seen landing at Kamiesh, but they also declared that on the previous evening and afterwards in the early morning that followed, other bodies—apparently from ten to fifteen thousand—had been seen to be there embarking.

Signals from
the Volokoff
tower;

This last announcement gave rise to various conjectures; and, among them, to one which suggested that the Allies might intend to effect a landing on some part of the coast, with a mind to operate thence against the Russian field army. Prince Gortcha-

their effect
on Prince
Gortchakoff's
determina-
tion;

koff, on this ground, considering that he ought to concentrate troops on the 'Old City Heights,' and in the neighborhood of Mackenzie Farm, reckoned also that, if doing so, he would not be able to replace any further heavy losses which the garrison might sustain by drawing troops from his field army. He therefore resolved to abandon this difficult struggle—already so costly to life—for the Cimetière counter-approach.¹ To make sure before yielding, however, his decision.

that the French remained firm in their purpose, he left two battalions in the Work with orders to fall back when gravely attacked, and he directed that the troops thus withdrawing should not be supported by others.²

On the night of the 23d, the French renewed their attack on the Cimetière counter-approach; and, though Night of the 23d; the Cimetière counter-approach carried by the French; meeting, it seems, more resistance than Prince Gortchakoff had consented to sanction, they very soon made good their conquest. Then reversing the parapet, and making the other fit changes, they so well transformed the work that what had been a counter-approach stretching out like a shield to cover the heart of Sebastopol was, before morning dawned, a new parallel confronting the Fortress, and established moreover on heights so near and commanding that siege-guns there planted might shatter some all-precious links in the enemy's chain of defence.

The conquest was thus complete, but it cost the French dear. Altogether, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, they lost 2303,³ and the Russians 3061.⁴ Losses on each side.

VII.

The losses thus incurred by the French made a heavy addition to those they before had sustained when—Ground on which the sacrifices made by Pélissier were justified. with similar objects—assailing the obstinate Soudal Counter-guard; and, it having been long since determined that the real attack on Sebastopol should be made through the Faubourg, an adverse critic might say that Pélissier was making his sacrifices in the wrong part of the field. Pélissier, however, was one who accepted the teachings of science, and authoritative science assured him that, whatever might be his design for ultimately attacking the fortress, he perforce must uphold the

¹ This decision of course gives support to those of the Allies who desired a resort to field operations.

² These directions were made an 'order of the day.'

³ Niel, pp. 255, 357.

⁴ Todleben, ii. pp. 246, 249.

ascendant of a firm, unrelenting besieger, and uphold it along his whole front by all the fighting required for securing the end thus enjoined. Still, observers with minds not high-strung, and not sufficiently braced by the cogent precepts of Vauban, might well feel pain in reflecting that all these distressing sacrifices offered up on the west of the Chersonese could be only indirectly conducive to what had become the real object—the object of reducing Sebastopol by first reducing the Malakoff.⁽²⁾

CHAPTER III.

PÉLISSIER FIRMLY PURSUING HIS CHOSEN PLANS OF ATTACK IN DEFIANCE OF LOUIS NAPOLEON.

THE fighting thus brought by the French to a victorious issue was induced, as we saw, by the stress of the enemy's challenge, and could not have well been arrested by any orders from Paris; but Pélissier had already made choice—made choice, as he stated, 'irrevocably'—of a well-defined plan of attack; and this, it was only too certain, his sovereign would forbid, or obstruct.

There followed sharp strife. On the one side, contended an Emperor—an Emperor armed by new laws with authority to direct from afar the commander-in-chief of his army, and not only served by the magic of the electric wires, but also by a strong, zealous envoy established at the seat of war. On the other side, he who contended was only a general; but the general was Pélissier; and already we know the strength of his fiery, resolute nature.

Marshal Vaillant, the chief of the War Department, placed 'absolute' confidence in Pélissier; but not being the Minister of a constitutional State, he could hardly exert his official power in any strong, peremptory way. He however did good, immense good. Marshal Vaillant had not passed in the world as a gentle, complaisant man; but he acted in this conjuncture with propriety and excellent sense, striving always to moderate, and turn away the wrath of the disputants, and entreating the angry general to soften his letters in form, yet not wishing, it would seem, that in substance Pélissier should yield to the Emperor.

So early as the day when Pélissier announced his accession to the command at the English Headquarters, he freely declared himself minded to renew the attack upon Kertch; and this design was matured at a conference held the next day. General Niel being one of those present, stated fully the grounds upon which he thought fit to oppose the measure; but his counsel produced no effect.¹

Strong, however, in his natural self-confidence, and besides in his conviction—his really well-founded conviction—that in this he represented the Emperor, Niel addressed to the French commander a deliberate remonstrance in writing, not only against Pélissier's refusal to sanction any field operations for the purpose of investing Sebastopol, but also against his resolve to concur with Lord Raglan in sending a new expedition to Kertch; but Pélissier, growing savage upon this provocation, made haste to accentuate the language in which he conveyed his resolve, and by telegraph at once said what follows to the Minister of War: 'The march of two *corps d'armée*, one from Aloushta on Simferopol, the other from Baidar on Baktchi Seräi, is big with difficulties and risks. It is the Kabyle country over again, and unknown. The direct investment effected by carrying the Mackenzie Heights would cost as dear as the assault of Sebastopol, and the result would be very uncertain. I have come to an understanding with Lord Raglan for the carrying of the counter-approaches, for the occupation of the ground on our right home down to the Tchernaya, and finally for an operation against Kertch. Our allies attach great importance to the measure, and I acknowledge that the operation is a good one. All is advancing: the movements are already in progress.'²

The next day Pélissier addressed to Marshal Vaillant a letter in which he requested that 'sufficient latitude' should be granted to him; but—read with the context—those words carried mockery rather than prayer; for an earlier part of the letter made it plain that the willful general had already seized and used the broad freedom for which he professed to be asking. He already had written thus: 'Lord Raglan has asked me to renew the operation against Kertch, to which the English army and Government and the two fleets attach so high a

Pélissier's determination to renew the attack upon Kertch.

General Niel at the Conference;

his written protest.

21st May. Pélissier to Minister of War.

22d May. Same to same.

¹ Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 22, 1855.

² Telegram of the 21st May.—Rousset, ii. p. 191.

'value. It has seemed to me that it would be good policy 'in reference to the future of our operations concerted with 'the English to make a beginning of my relations with them 'by an act which would heal the wound they received from 'the recall of the former expedition, would end the very 'grave trouble which it brought upon the relations between 'the French and the English, and restore that harmony which 'is, in one word, the great necessity of the time. The expedition has therefore been determined upon, and the troops 'embark to-day.'¹

Accentuated by such an announcement, this language might well be astounding to the Emperor Louis Napoleon, since he not only found himself extruded from the command of his army in the Crimea, but even, as we saw, overruled in a matter concerning high policy and the maintenance of friendship with England. He by telegraph said to Péliissier

Louis Napoleon to
Péliissier.

on the following day: 'I have confidence in you, 'and I do not pretend to command the army from 'hence.'² Still, I must tell you my opinion, and 'you must respect it. It is absolutely necessary to make a 'great effort and beat the Russian army in order to invest 'the place. To be looking for space and for grass does not 'now suffice.'³ If you scatter your forces instead of drawing 'them together, you will do nothing decisive, and, besides, 'will lose precious time. The Allies have in the Crimea '180,000 men. With such a force anything can be done; 'but it is necessary to manœuvre, and not take the bull 'by the horns. To manœuvre, is to threaten the weak sides 'of the enemy. It has seemed to me that the weak side of 'the Russians is their left wing. If you send 14,000 men 'to Kertch you weaken yourself uselessly. It is confessing 'that there is nothing serious to be attempted; for one does 'not willingly weaken one's self on the eve of a battle. 'Weigh all that carefully.'⁴

The next day, Louis Napoleon wrote thus to Péliissier:—

Louis Napoleon again
to Péliissier.

'The course to take is easily indicated: 1st, to 'defeat the Russian army in order to invest the 'place; 2d, the place being invested, to take Se- 'bastopol; 3d, the place being taken, to evacuate the Crimea,

¹ Telegram of the 21st May.—Rousset, ii. p. 191.

² This disclaimer was retracted by even the two next sentences, and again by the Emperor's two next messages to Péliissier.

³ This taunt was an allusion to Péliissier's plan of taking ground to the Tchernaya.

⁴ Rousset, vol. ii. pp. 192, 193.

'and blow up the fortifications, or leave there only the
'Turks. The means of arriving at this result are of course
'more especially within your province, and I leave you free
'in your choice of the means ; but, as for the general course
'of action, you must follow the precise orders that I give
'you. They, moreover, are orders similar to those which
'Lord Raglan has received. . . . I explain to you, General,
'what are my views and my intentions. I reckon on your
'experience, your talents, and your patriotism to carry them
'into effect, and force Lord Raglan to help you.'¹

The Emperor had hardly despatched this letter when he
Pélissier to
the Minister
of War. found laid before him this telegram of the pre-
vious day from Pélissier to the Minister of War :

'A strategic discussion by telegraph with all the
'reasons for and against such or such a plan seems to me im-
'possible. The detailed reports that I send you by every
'mail will convince his Majesty, I hope, that if I have not
'applied his plan, this is because it does not seem to me
'possible to do so immediately without danger.'

Thereupon the enraged Emperor telegraphed to Pélissier :

Louis
Napoleon to
Pélissier. 'It is no question of discussion between us, but
'of orders to give, or to receive. I did not say to
'you, "Execute my plan;" I said, "Your plan
'"does not seem to me adequate." It is an absolute neces-
'sity to invest the place without loss of time. Tell me what
'means you will employ to attain the object.'²

Though Pélissier was himself, as we have seen, a fiercely
choleric man, he yet seemingly knew how to meet the angry
raging of others with a manful composure. In answer to

Pélissier to
the Minister
of War. the Emperor's missive, but addressing himself, as
usual, to the Minister of War, Pélissier fenced

briefly enough with the imperial notions by re-
verting to the arguments he had used in his famous letter
to Canrobert,³ and added, 'My first duty was to restore that
'understanding [with the English] which had been greatly
'compromised. I have completely restored it. I can't
'specify future operations without exposing myself to the
'risk of having my words falsified by the course of events.
'Be trustful. Let his Majesty also deign to be the same.'⁴

When the Emperor thus found himself baffled in all his
persistent attempts to direct a campaign from the Tuileries,
it was natural, of course, that his emissary should fall from
the height he had reached in the palmy days of the 'Mission.'

¹ Rousset, vol. ii. pp. 211, 212.

³ See *ante*, vol. v. p. 185.

² *Ibid.*, p. 212.

⁴ Rousset, p. 213.

Position and
lamentations
of General
Niel.

General Niel soon began to write piteously of the treatment he was receiving from the fiery commander-in-chief : ' At a meeting which took place yesterday he, Péliissier, ordered me to be silent with a harshness not to be characterized, because I spoke of the dangers attendant upon vigorous actions attempted by great masses at great distances. We were in presence of English officers. I saw his anger, and determined at all costs to avoid a scene which would have made my relations with him impossible. This morning at a similar meeting General Beuret of the Artillery, for making a perfectly innocent observation, was so grossly ill-treated that his eyes filled with tears, and he asked me whether he could remain with the army. . . . Here is now a man who is going to become a 'raging madman.'¹ . . . The English have drawn him, Péliissier, to them, and he has adopted their system of war—a system, in my opinion, the most imprudent of all—which consists in pushing straight forward from the old positions.'

After expressing the grief inflicted upon him by the change of plan, and showing that Péliissier was angry with him for writing letters to the Emperor, General Niel continued :

'The army in the Crimea is excellent, and asks but to fight. What is wanting to the army is a chief to lead it. God grant that the army may have one !'²

Under the vigorous sway of Péliissier, Niel retained not so much as a shred of the baneful power he had wielded in General Canrobert's time.

Niel had aided his sovereign in doing grievous harm to the French and their allies by paralyzing their action against Sebastopol ; but it must not be imagined that he was only a servile man striving for mere obedience' sake to execute the will of his sovereign. On the contrary, his ceaseless insistence on the policy of completely investing Sebastopol by means of field operations was the natural and direct result of his own strongly rooted opinion.

To thoughtful men rendered anxious (as was, we know, Marshal Vaillant) by the antagonism of opinion established between the Emperor and Péliissier, any hope that this gulf-wide difference might be treated as a 'misunderstanding' removable by patience and words could hardly have failed to prove welcome ; but no

Antagonism
between Louis
Napoleon and
Péliissier.

¹ 'Fou furieux.'

² Rousset, pp. 209, 210.

such outlet lay open. Each, Emperor and General alike, asserted his strongly fixed will with so great a precision that the antagonism between the two men became, and remained, clear as day. Upon all the five questions that had Pélissier's five resolves; to be solved, their two judgments—I might say, their ‘decisions’ (for each of them thought to be master)—were, not simply differing, but opposite. Pélissier determined—determined, as he said, ‘irrevocably’—that by stress of close siege operations he would carry the south of Sebastopol. He determined that, till after achieving his purpose against the ‘South side’ of Sebastopol, he would order no field operations with a view of investing the place. (1) He determined that, without more delay than was needed for due preparation, he would attack and reconquer every one of the counter-approaches to which Canrobert had submitted. He determined that, with troops not required for the toils of the siege, he would occupy ground extending to the left bank of the Tchernaya. He determined that, along with the English, he would renew the Expedition to Kertch. To every one of these measures the Emperor opposed Louis Napoleon opposed to each of them. his authority. One or other—the Emperor or the General—would have to give way, or else to be forcibly vanquished.

But which?

There are signs, though not proofs, that the need of arresting wild, hazardous efforts to direct a campaign from the Tuileries was felt to be painfully cogent by more than one man in authority; but, whether he acted in circumstances implying something like concert, or was singly obeying the call of a duty he owed to his country, or whether again he was ruled by the sheer force of judgment, or in part by temper or temperament, Pélissier at all Pélissier's resistance. events guarded France, and the honor of her army, from the meddling hand of a sovereign who, not being either a trained, or by natural gifts a born soldier, or even a soldier at all, and not acting under the guidance of any responsible Ministers, still supposed himself fitted—by wisdom—to conduct from Paris a war carried on under novel conditions against the empire of Russia; and how, when driven to words, Pélissier used them as means which helped His method. towards averting the mischief we have partly been able to see; but it was not by words alone that he kept the perturber at bay. He often used ‘golden’ silence, and from time to time answered with deeds more convincing than all worded arguments.

With before him his Emperor's message decrying any resolve to take ground towards the Tchernaya, Pé-
 Occupation by the Allies of fresh ground towards the Tchernaya. lissier promptly made bold to set the measure on foot; and—concurrently with troops of all arms supplied by the other allies—he carried it into effect. It was on the 25th of May, at the close of a march begun before midnight, that, supported by not only English and Ottoman forces, but also by the newly acceding Sardinians (whose appearance and bearing seemed excellent), two French divisions under Canrobert (the late commander-in-chief) moved down to the Tractir Bridge, and—after sweeping the enemy from the opposite bank of the Tchernaya—took up a position which, starting from the base of the steep at the right rear of the Inkerman battle-field, extended thence down to the river.

And again, when Péliissier saw that imperious words from the Tuileries were condemning the movement to Kertch, he none the less ordered or suffered the denounced expedition to sail, and hold on in its prosperous course.

On all the five warlike resolves he had made in the teeth
 Péliissier having his way. of his Emperor, this stronger, more hot-headed man was destined to have his way.

Péliissier had a great, mighty will; but he seemingly gathered new strength, as strong-willed men oftentimes do, from what some would call 'the dark passions'—from anger, from hatred, from scorn.

In writing to the Minister of War, Péliissier did not even deny himself the luxury of a little sharp satire directed against the Emperor. He contrasted the strategical dreamer in Paris, his 'general maps' and his 'geometric lines,' with the real commander engaged at close quarters against the real enemy and on the real ground. Whilst persevering in absolute, explicit resistance to the Emperor upon every question then raised, he coolly said that he would separate himself from the Emperor's views as little as possible, and, besides, wrote almost as one who belonged to a constitutional State, saying that he hoped to justify the confidence reposed in him by—not the Emperor but—the Minister to whom he was writing.¹ Towards the end of one letter he wrote:—'I feel my shoulders strong enough for the burden with which I am laden, but I shall carry it all the better if feeling that I have a certain freedom of action.'

By the stroke of Fate thus oddly busied with its last imp-

¹ Rousset, p. 218.

Allusion to the Directory of 1796-97 and the great Buonaparte.

ish freak of inversion, a metamorphosed 'Napoleon' was all at once left in the plight of that unhonored Directory of 1796 and the following year, which thought it could dictate in war, or dictate at least in State policy to the great Buonaparte, and was answered from over the Alps with resistance, with scorn, and with victory.⁽²⁾

CHAPTER IV.

THE RENEWED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH, WITH ITS SEQUEL
IN THE SEA OF AZOF, AND ON THE CIRCASSIAN COAST.

I.

IN even its stage of preparatives, the second armada despatched to open the Cimmerian Bosphorus had already, by fortunate accident, achieved a great good, and apparently saved many lives. That which—signalled from the Volo-koff tower on the 23d of May—put a stress on the enemy's counsels, and brought him, however reluctant, to accept defeat from the French, was a movement of vessels and troops going on in the port of Kamiesh for some purpose he could not divine. The activity he then thought mysterious was the stir of embarkation importing a renewed expedition to Kertch.

Much of what I premised when recounting the abortive Expedition begun on the 3d of May must be now borne in mind, or recalled by those who would have clear ideas of the subsequent invasion pushed home through the Kertchine Peninsula to the shores of the Sea of Azof.¹

In the interval between the two expeditions the Russians had mounted some guns on the Cheska Spit, and had also continued their efforts to block the way through the Straits by sinking vessels charged with explosives; whilst also it is true on the other hand that (designing them for garrison purposes) the Allies brought with them, this time, a body of 5000 Ottoman troops, and varied by other less changes the original structure of their armada as prepared for the first expedition; but in other respects, speaking generally, the

¹ See especially *ante*, vol. v. p. 169 *et seq.*

conditions attending this second advance, and any attempt to oppose it resembled those we saw operating nearly three weeks before, when—not having been yet overtaken by Canrobert's words of recall—the armada had sighted Cape Takli, and was smoothly approaching the coast.

The renewed expedition embarked in the evening of the 22d and the morning of the 23d of May. The attendant fleets, English and French, were commanded, the one by Admiral Lyons, the other by Admiral Bruat.

Commanded by Sir George Brown, the land forces of the Allies were, this time, 7000 French under the immediate command of General d'Autemarre, 3000 English, and 5000 Turks under Redchid Pasha (in all 15,000), having with them five batteries, a few Engineers, and (for escort duty) a body of some fifty English hussars.

Soon after daylight on the 24th of May, the armada gained its place of rendezvous off Cape Takli, and then at once moved on at speed towards the bay of Kamish Boroune, in which the troops were to land.


The strength of Baron Wrangel was still, as before, a little short of 9000, and included nearly 3000 cavalry.

Judging roughly of the numbers against him, Baron Wrangel considered himself placed in exactly the same predicament that had threatened him on the First Expedition.

As before, so also this time, and still for the same cogent reason, he judged that he could not defend that precious chain of coast batteries which had given him his control of the Straits. He succumbed to the power (of which the world will learn much in times yet to come)—the power an armada can wield when not only carrying on board a force designed for land-service, but enabled to move—to move swiftly—whether this way or that, at the will of the chief who thus, so to speak, can 'manœuvre' against an army on shore with troops not yet quitting their ships. The power would be one of great cogency, under many conditions, but especially so if it happen that the defender of the coast has in charge two highly valued possessions divided the one from the other by several miles of ground.

Of those two tracts of ground, far disjoined from each

THE KERTCHINE PENINSULA.



Scale
MILES 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Scale

30

40 MILES

other, which Baron Wrangel, if able, would have anxiously sought to defend, the one towards the east comprised the Coast batteries fraught with the absolute control of the Straits, and its retention he might well deem momentous, since only to that very end was he there with horse, foot, and artillery; but then he could not forget that the command of free access to the Isthmus and the roadway along its whole course was something more than 'momentous' to him and his forces—was in truth rather what men call 'vital,' because involving his all-precious communications with the main army under Prince Gortchakoff to which he belonged, and the Government of the country he served.

In common land-warfare a distance of some seventy miles between two tracts of ground that have to be guarded may not be a circumstance hampering to plans for defending them both; but it grievously baffled resistance to squadrons with troops on board, and propelled by steam-power at a rate vastly greater than any that battalions of Foot can attain by marching and countermarching along the weary miles of a road. To mistake a feint for the opening of a real attack might be to incur a disaster; yet how to distinguish between the two operations by merely watching ships out at sea? The Allies made no feint; but by simply advancing straight forward to what, as we know, was their object, they did not prevent Baron Wrangel from thinking that the movement was or might be a feint; and, although resting simply on inference, his belief was no whit less distracting than a feint really made. The sight of an armada approaching the landing-place of Kamish Boroune did not even for an instant make Wrangel believe himself safe against a descent on the shore some seventy miles to the westward, because he well knew that a signal run up in a minute by one of the flag-ships might, like magic, arrest and reverse the whole eastward movement, and swiftly send back the armada to waters off the known landing-ground in the neighborhood of the town Theodosia, where its presence would all at once challenge his command of the Isthmus, and, with it, the very existence of all the force under his orders.

It was under these painful conditions—conditions deserving the study of any maritime Power which has
Baron Wrangel's retreat. coasts at home to defend or coasts abroad to attack—that Baron Wrangel abandoned his defence of the Coast batteries, determined to have them destroyed, and drew off to Sultanoffka at first, but afterwards towards the

great Road—the Imperial Road through the Isthmus which connected him with the main Russian army.

Accordingly it was without opposition, though not, of course, without guarding against any chance of attack, that (under the cover of guns disposed on board the steam frigates and other less vessels) the Allied troops with horses and batteries and all their train of appurtenances began to fill the boats of the squadrons, and move towards the landing-place chosen in the bay of Kamish Boroune. Under the immediate direction of Admiral Houston Stewart (whose arrangements were held to be perfect) the process continued all day and throughout the following night without being delayed or obstructed by any kind of mishap. The French and the English infantry were the first to land, and Brown placed them in position, the French on the right, the English on their left, and provided that, when disembarked, his Turks should take the ground he assigned them in support to the other allies. Soon afterwards, General d'Autemarre, at the request of Sir George, moved forward towards the Coast batteries established near the Cape of St. Paul.

Exactly as he had intended to do when the first expedition was threatening, Baron Wrangel soon began to destroy his Coast batteries by blowing up their magazines and spiking their guns. Beginning with those near Cape Paul, the Baron went on—at intervals—with this work of destruction, and by his orders sooner or later, though not with precipitate haste, and not in every case with such promptitude as to prevent the discharge of some shots, his Coast batteries were, all of them, ruined.

Followed by the gunners of the Paul batteries then already destroyed, that part of Baron Wrangel's land-force which he called 'the Detachment of 'Kertch' retreated in a westward direction by the great Theodosia Road. These, however, with most of his troops in the east of the Kertchine Peninsula, were soon gathered round Sultanoffka (where Head-quarters at first were established), but his ultimate current of retreat was towards the all-precious Isthmus. The small garrison of Yeni Kalé was left to escape by sea.

Whilst making free havoc of his master's batteries, the Baron likewise sought to destroy all such other Government property as he could not remove, and, besides, every sort of possession thought likely to

Unopposed
landing of
the troops.

Sir George
Brown's
measures
on shore.

Baron Wrangel's
destruction of his
Coast batteries.

Retreat of
Russian
troops.

Destruction
of food by
Baron
Wrangel.

serve an invader. He destroyed more than four million pounds of corn and half a million pounds of flour.¹

With the singular keenness these people seemed almost always to show when destroying the possessions of their own fellow-subjects, some Cossacks alertly spread out over part of the steppe, and hastened to burn down the farmsteads.

With respect to the Russian war squadron assembled in the bay of Kertch, Baron Wrangel, it seems, did not order Rear-Admiral Wulff, who commanded it, to undertake any defense of either the town or the Straits, nor even to oppose any craft, whether English or French, trying singly to push through the Straits; but he desired that, before making off, the vessels composing this squadron should take on board Government property; and from this cause it happened that they were not all moved out from the bay at an earlier time.

One of these small vessels of war, that is, the steam-schooner 'Argonaut,' had at length got her cargo on board, and was already making off for Yeni Kalé, when Lieutenant M'Gillop (commanding a gunboat, the 'Snake,' not employed in the landing of troops) conceived the idea of trying to stop her flight. Dashing past some guns not yet destroyed, he first opened fire on the fugitive 'Argonaut,' and then also on the war-steamer 'Goëts,' which the Russian Admiral Wulff had sent out to aid her, and then also on a third war-steamer, the 'Berdiansk,' which by that time had come out from the bay with all the archives and chests of the local administration on board. The commander of the 'Berdiansk' did all he could to quicken her speed; but M'Gillop, by the exceeding skill and rapidity of his movement, outmanœuvred the fugitive, and—firing with shell—undertook to bar the passage against her. Two of her men were wounded by explosions effected on board her, and her commander convinced himself that she could not make good her escape. He therefore ran her on shore, and burned her with all her cargo on board. The other two vessels (the 'Argonaut' and the 'Goëts') which M'Gillop had engaged, were also, it seems, prevented by his skillful manœuvres from making good their escape, and the enemy with his own hands destroyed them.⁽¹⁾ The 'Snake' was struck by a shot which passed through the vessel, but she did not lose a man. Altogether, as may well be supposed, M'Gillop's ex-

¹ More exactly, 4,166,000 lbs. of corn and 508,000 lbs. of flour. The figures are taken from entries made in the Russian Government books.

plot was enchanting to the numbers of eager seamen collected on board the two fleets.

Rear-Admiral Wulff, the same day, burned down other vessels belonging to his unhappy squadron, and went on with the work of destruction till out of the fourteen vessels which had composed it there remained, it seems, only four. The four vessels preserved were all of them, however, war-steamers, and comparatively powerful.

With these, at 7 o'clock in the evening, Rear-admiral Wulff moved out through the Straits, and got off into the Sea of Azof; but the escape, if so one may call it, brought, after all, only a respite soon followed by utter destruction.¹

The Allied navies toiled all night long at the work of landing not only men, but horses, guns, stores of all kinds, and had hardly completed their task, when at 4 o'clock, on the morning of the 25th, Captain Lyons of the 'Miranda' dispatched Mr. George Williams, the master of the ship, with orders to endeavor to find and buoy a channel through the Straits. This service the skilled, fearless officer achieved in the ship's gig and cutter under fire from the Russian battery still left on the Cheska Spit, 'and between exploding and 'burning vessels which had been sunk in the fairway and 'set on fire by the enemy.' By the channel thus found, Mr. George Williams passed through the Straits, and was the first officer of the Allied forces to enter the Sea of Azof. At 10 o'clock the same morning Mr. Williams returned to the 'Miranda,' and reported to his Captain that he had found and buoyed a channel of 16 feet. Captain Lyons immediately weighed, accompanied by the other vessels under his orders, and with these before long reached the goal of long expectation—the entrance of the Sea of Azof.

At 6 o'clock in the morning of the same auspicious day, Sir George Brown pushed forward the land forces, and marched upon Kertch, a remarkably clean, well-built town of about twelve thousand inhabitants. In 'ordinary column of route' the Allied forces marched through the place, maintaining a great regularity and committing not the slightest disorder. Sir George felt it his duty to destroy an iron foundry which had cast guns and shot for the Czar; but no other harm was done at that time in the town.

¹ See *post*, p. 53, and pp. 55, 56.

It was many days later that, under a strong sense of duty, and with great reluctance, Sir George Brown destroyed a great quantity of corn provided for the enemy's troops.

The Allied troops continued their march, and to Yeni Kalé. by one o'clock reached Yeni Kalé.

This otherwise well-omened enterprise against the Kertch-ine Peninsula was unhappily marked by a stain Disorders that followed the invasion. which, though hardly discerned at the time by the more Western nations of Europe, must not be here screened from the light. The invasion gave rise to disorder, and disorder was followed by crime.

For this the Allies, as I think, became justly open to censure, and the subject, though painful, is one that must not be shunned.

We cannot excuse the Allies by alleging that stir of the blood which comes with the clash of arms; for, whether in the process of landing, or in taking their rest on the shore, or in afterwards pursuing their march, the invaders from the first to the last encountered no sort of resistance; nor again can our country at once deliver herself from the charge by saying (as with truth she could say) that few, very few of our people were guilty of disorderly acts, and none of violent outrage; for he who commanded the troops of the three invading nations was an Englishman, and accordingly England stands challenged to answer the question which asks how the conquerors wielded their power.

In fairness towards the memory of Sir George Brown, it must always be borne in mind that of the 15,000 The limited authority of Sir George Brown. men he commanded 3000 only were English, the rest consisting of French to the number of 7000, and of 5000 Turks; that, except by making representations to General d'Autemarre, he could not interfere with the discipline of the French troops; that, when busied in mischief, the soldiery of our excited Allies could be hardly restrained by their officers; and, finally, that the traditions and instincts of the Frenchmen, the Turks, and the English collected under Sir George were far from being the same, or even, indeed, at all similar on the theory of license in war.

Upon seeing the approach of the armada, the people of Kertch. Kertch had been frightened, and the bulk of them fled from the place, taking refuge in the neighboring villages.¹

When Sir George Brown marched through the town on the

¹ Todleben, vol. ii, p. 283.

Its prayer to Sir George. morning of the 25th, he was met by a deputation of the principal inhabitants then left in the place, including the consuls for Austria and Naples. They declared to Sir George that the Russians had all of them fled from the town without leaving there any authority that could shield its deserted inhabitants from foes they described as 'the Tartars'—men intending to come down upon them from the near country-side; and they implored Sir George Brown to leave some troops in the place for the protection of their lives and property.⁽²⁾ This Sir George refused flatly to do, protesting that he was not Governor of the country; and for any other protection than such as might be rendered appropriate by the conduct of his troops, he told them they had no claim upon him. Recommending the deputation to form a municipal council which might administer the police of the town, he continued his advance on Yeni Kalé.¹

In the course of the march 'our allies,' as Sir George Brown distinguished them, spread out over the country for miles, and busied themselves with the 'sport' of shooting pigs, sheep, fowls, ducks, and—supremely amusing!—tame geese. Such indulgence on the part of invaders might perhaps be called trivial, but it weakened the bonds of discipline. After occupying Yeni Kalé, our allies, Sir George says, 'broke away in their old style;'² and, most of the inhabitants having fled, forced open the houses, and not only gutted the town, but set it on fire in two places. Unhappily, some of our soldiers—not any, however, of these who were under the eyes of their officers—permitted themselves for a while to follow the example in part, and prove guilty of conduct pronounced to be far, 'very far from blameless;'³ but though erring on that first afternoon, when the instinct of 'sport' was awakened, they did not again go astray.⁴

The next morning Sir George Brown concurred with General d'Autemarre in appointing a French officer to act as commandant of Yeni Kalé for police purposes, with support from an English provost-marshal and assistants, and having at his disposal three companies of infantry, two French and one English.

¹ Sir George Brown at Yeni Kalé to Lord Raglan, 27th and 28th of May.

² From one 'Peninsular officer' to another this phrase expressed a good deal.

³ By Sir George.—Sir George to Lord Raglan, 27th and 28th May. ⁴ Ibid.

Commanding the means thus provided, the French, says Sir George, showed great zeal in repressing the sins of the Turks ; but for the task of restraining their own men the French officers seemed wholly powerless. It was 'pitiable,' wrote Sir George, 'to see their faces' when asked to undertake such a duty.¹ The Turks were not undeserving of the keen efforts made to restrain them. They, day after day, proved guilty of committing horrible outrages.²

On the same day, the 26th, a second deputation from Kertch came before Sir George Brown at Yeni Kalé, informing him that the dread expectation of the day before had become a reality, that the town was in a state of anarchy, and that 'the Tartars,' as they called them, were plundering and destroying everything. In the face of this appeal Sir George again refused the place any garrison ; but a vessel of war, at his instance, was promptly moved into the bay. The unfortunate people of Kertch found means to arm for their protection a body of fifty men of various nationalities ; and this small improvised force proved firm and courageous in dealing with isolated outrages committed by stragglers ; as, for instance, when they promptly shot down several Turks whilst resisting attempts to arrest them for knocking out the brains of a child ;³ but—weak in numbers—these guards did not seemingly try—and, so far as I know, were not ordered—to drive out the plundering Tartars.

When the Kertch deputation had left his Head-quarters, Sir George was informed that some boats'-crews, both English and French, had been getting into the town, and doing there even more mischief than the people called 'Tartars.' He therefore determined to send—on the morrow—an infantry regiment, accompanied by twenty Hussars, to the Quarantine Station near Kertch, with orders to send detachments patrolling into the town, and, if possible, to restore order by giving countenance and support to such provisional authority as might be established.⁴

On the same day, however, Sir George received a letter from Captain Loaring, commanding the 'Furious'—the vessel sent into the bay—which stated that the uproar in the town was worse than ever, and called for immediate assistance.

¹ Sir George to Lord Raglan, 27th and 28th May.

² Ibid., May 29th.

³ Ibid. They, it seems, killed one, and seriously wounded the rest.

⁴ Sir George to Lord Raglan, 27th and 28th May.

Sir George thereupon sent off a body of twenty Hussars, with orders to go to Kertch, and there 'see what was the matter;' but he had conceived the idea that the attack by the so-called 'Tartars' was almost 'a revolt of the Tartar population,' with which he ought not to meddle; and this so much the more since he thought that the aggressors—described to be 'Tartars'—were—not enemies to the Allies, but—their friends, who, indeed, more than once had captured and brought in Russian prisoners from even great distances; and he determined not to interfere 'further than to protect the weak from outrage.'¹

The exception, it seems, applied only to the case of an outrage attempted in sight of the Hussars when patrolling; for, in any larger sense, 'to protect the weak from outrage' was substantially, of course, the same thing as maintaining peace in the town, and that last course of action was one which Sir George had resolved not to take. 'I distinctly said,' he informed the inhabitants, 'that they must take care of themselves, and were not to look to me for protection. . . . I declined to furnish any guards.'²

Sir George Brown's expedient of patrolling into the town twice a day from the precincts of the Quarantine Station must have brought fitful intervals of relief to the fear-stricken people of Kertch, who, at each of the times for patrolling, and whilst in sight of the horsemen, might believe themselves safe for at least a few minutes, or perhaps half an hour, but the measure did nothing towards either expelling the Tartars or putting an end to their outrages. All that seemed to be needed for restoring order was the voice of authority, and authority resting on force—for the 79th was at hand—Sir George Brown amply possessed; but, for reasons we have heard him disclosing, he resolved not to use the spell.

Most of the houses deserted by Russian occupiers—and these formed the main part of the town—were plundered and gutted;³ as were also, indeed, we are told, nearly all of the other buildings.⁴ From some houses the roofs were torn off, and their timbers used for firing. The hospitals even were pillaged.⁵

Sir George Brown had at one time agreed with General d'Autemarre to place a guard over the Museum in Kertch;

¹ Sir George to Lord Raglan, 27th and 28th May.

² To Lord Raglan, 10th June.

³ Sir George to Lord Raglan, 4th June.

⁴ Todleben, vol. ii. p. 284.

⁵ Ibid.

but he afterwards abandoned the project, because convinced that, if small, the guard might not be secure; and that one of sufficient strength could hardly be spared for the purpose.¹ The Museum, thus left to its fate, was gutted, was plundered; and, unless General Todleben erred, or for once wrote in irony, the plundering of the institution was perpetrated by hunters after 'antiquities'—men who also, he says, pushed their search down to even the tombs of the dead.²

By whom were these outrages perpetrated? They were perpetrated, it would seem, in the main by the native marauders called 'Tartars;' but in part by 'boats'-crews' from both fleets, and in part too by straggling soldiers—some French and some Turkish—who, despite the commands of their officers, had found their way into the town.

The commander of the expedition proved happily able to say that amongst all the 'stragglers' engaged in these crimes and outrages not one English soldier, as far as he knew, had been seen.³

So late as the second week of June, when Sir George Brown at length was preparing to quit the invaded peninsula, he still could not say that in Kertch the reign of disorder had ceased. People there, he indeed plainly wrote—so late as the 10th of June—were 'in terror of their lives for the Tartars.'⁴

Lord Raglan heard with warm indignation of the earlier disorders afflicting a part of the conquered territory; but when he had read the two first of Brown's letters on this painful subject he thought well of the orders Sir George appeared to have given, pronouncing them to be 'very good;' and accordingly he cherished a hope that they 'would prevent all further excesses;' but the hope, we know, was not fulfilled; and a criticism rendered complete by basing it on the later as well as the earlier letters was averted by the stress of events.

For not having repressed the disorders of the French troops, Sir George Brown, in common justice, could hardly have been treated as answerable by even the strict-

The commit-
tee of out-
rage.

Further con-
tinuance of
the disorders
in Kertch.

Lord Raglan's
indignation.

His approval
on 31st May
of Brown's
measures.

His complet-
ed criticism
averted.

Sir George
not blamable

¹ Sir George Brown to Lord Raglan, 10th June.

² Todleben, vol. ii. p. 284.

³ Sir George Brown to Lord Raglan, 10th June.

⁴ To Lord Raglan. If not strictly orthodox English, Brown's use of the 'for' is good Scotch.

⁵ Lord Raglan to Sir George, 31st May.

for omitting to repress the disorders of the French;

otherwise

because virtually unable to do so.

est of judges; for, although he indeed on this subject could freely make representations to our Allies, his authority as the chief in command did not include any power to meddle at all with the discipline of General d'Autemarre's troops; and the expedient of remonstrating against their offences with either General d'Autemarre himself or any other French officer was a tender matter, and dangerous, whilst also in general likely to prove, as we have seen, wholly barren. Sir George did not, of course, deserve blame for omitting to use a power with which he was not really armed.

The Quarantine Station of Kertch was not only well separated from the rest of the town, but so spacious as to be capable of holding some 5000 men; and Brown's plan of posting in it a foot regiment with a score of Hussars was good so far as it went; but in mercy to the unfortunate inhabitants, no less than for the advantage of the invaders, it ought to have been rendered effective by establishing authority in the town, and promptly restoring order.

Comment on Sir George's course of action with respect to the disorders in Kertch.

It is true that Sir George's idea of regarding the violent Tartars as people in arms against Russia was not without a semblance of warranty; for the coming of War—beloved War—to their long-conquered, Czar-ridden steppe had roused in these men grand emotions deriving from the blood of their ancestors; so that—touching, pathetic recurrence to forefathers great in the saddle!—a band of them, all poorly armed, yet mounted, every one of them, on ponies, if not bigger horses, came riding over the steppe, came enlisting themselves, they imagined, for war to the knife against Russia, with before them the rapturous prospect of recovering their old independence. They were men in a dream, but their dream was coherent, and not altogether unshared by the English commander. As already they had given an earnest of their simple, rude 'foreign policy' by bringing in Russians as prisoners to the camp of the invader, so now—in arms, and on horseback—they offered him a warlike alliance with the once mighty Golden Horde.

Friendly disposition of some of the Tartars.

Sir George apparently thought they might prove to be in some sort the Spaniards, or even the tried Portuguese of his early and glorious days; but ought he to have purchased the friendship of even the Golden Horde at so heavy, so painful a cost as that of allowing a town within easy reach

¹ Instructions of 2d May incorporated by reference with those of the 21st.

of his camp to lie seething day after day, and even week after week, in the agonies of a slow, doubtful strife with bands of men—not perhaps murderous, but—intent on destruction and pillage?

The enemy's forces had vanished without attempting resistance; and, there being therefore no prospect of fights on the Kertchine Peninsula, it is hard to see how an alliance with its Tartar inhabitants could be of more worth to the invader than peaceful, friendly relations with a well-ordered seaport town (lying midway between his Head-quarters and his works near Fort Paul) which was yearning to receive at his hands the blessings of protection and government. If only for the sake of withdrawing irresistible temptations to crime from the reach of the Allied forces, there was seemingly reason enough for repressing disorder in Kertch; for the town, as we know, was within a short walk from the camps, within a pleasant row from the ships, and could not but prove attractive to many young soldiers and sailors when known to be in the throes of a conflict involving such tumult as would offer them adventures and license.

From the pillaging of the hospitals at Kertch, from the flight of the Russian inhabitants, and finally from the state of anarchy which long afflicted the town, it resulted that the sick and wounded Russians who had been brought thither from Sebastopol were exposed to the sufferings caused by not only want of appliances, but also want of due care.¹

It was in favor of those hospital patients that, when about to retreat, Baron Wrangel had addressed an appeal to the commander of the invading force, recommending them to his kindness and humanity;² but of course, when taking that step, the Baron had assumed that the Allied troops would be in the occupation of Kertch, and in point of fact, as we have learned, no such occupation took place. It was therefore antecedently probable that the letter would find no recipient, and I am led 'on other grounds to believe that it never in fact reached Sir George.³ Whether brought to its destination or not, the letter remained unanswered.

It would be miserable to have to believe that any English

¹ Instructions of 2d May incorporated by reference with those of the 21st.

² Ibid.

³ There is no mention of it in the correspondence; and Sir George was so full a writer that the absence of any such mention is scarce short of actual proof that the letter was never received.

Sufferings
entailed on
the sick and
wounded
Russians by
the pillaging
of the
hospitals.

Letter on
their behalf
from Baron
Wrangel

commander proved deaf to such an appeal; and this all the more since we know that the Russians were habitually treating our prisoners of war in their hospitals with careful and generous kindness.¹

By one o'clock in the afternoon Sir George Brown reached
The meeting Yeni Kalé (at the mouth of the Straits), where
at Yeni Kalé. the admirals joyously greeted him.

First results The first gains that accrued to the Allies from
of the Kertch their newly acquired dominion in the Kertchine
expedition. Peninsula were :

1. The capture of all the enemy's Coast batteries in the neighborhood of the Straits, and of the 62 guns which had armed them—guns throwing a weight of metal which reached in one salvo to 2376 pounds.²

2. The capture of guns not in battery, amounting with the 62 above mentioned to upwards of one hundred, many of them of the largest calibre and of the best construction.³

3. The ruin of the squadron of Kertch—ruin prompt as regarded the fate reserved for ten of its vessels, and, as to the four still afloat, ruin only staved off a few hours. The squadron thus brought to destruction by the hands of its own people carried guns of which three were 68-pounders, but the shot it threw in one salvo had only a weight of 1026 pounds.⁴

4. The acquisition by the Allies of several enemy's merchant-vessels, and of vast quantities of corn which the captors either appropriated or destroyed, and of 17,000 tons of coal secured for the use of their squadrons.

5. The destruction by the enemy himself of a vast amount of property belonging to the Russian Government, and conducive to its service in war.

6. But the great advantage of all was of course the one
The main sought from the first by those who had planned
object gained. the expedition—the opening of the Straits of Kertch, and the free way thus won to the Sea of Azof with all the consequential results of which we are going to hear.

These advantages were, all of them, gained without the loss of a man.

¹ Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, 19th May, 1855, a published dispatch, p. 167 in Sayer's Collection.

² Todleben, vol. ii. p. 269.

³ Sir George Brown to Lord Raglan, 27th May, correcting his former dispatch.

⁴ Todleben, vol. ii. p. 267.

II.

A few hours only had passed after the opening of the Straits, when a joint flotilla of French and English steam-Admirals entering the vessels with the two Admirals on board moved out Sea of Azof. into what till that day had been the 'closed' Sea of Azof, and so, as it were, took possession of the waters then all at once added to the dominion of the Maritime Powers.

On the same afternoon, the flags of the Admirals were hauled down, and the command of the flotilla then passed to Captain Lyons of the 'Miranda,' the son of our naval Chief, for he was the senior officer; but the immediate command of the vessels which composed the French part of the flotilla belonged to M. Sédaines, an excellent chief of whom the senior (Lyons) wrote always in terms of warm praise.

The operations that followed must not, of course, be regarded as so many acts of proud war undertaken in pursuit of a conquest, but rather as measures required for enforcing those new rights of ownership which the passage of the Straits had conferred. The task of Captain Lyons in the Sea of Azof and the tangible part of its shores was analogous to that of a colonel or major-general who, having been appointed the governor of a lately conquered province, must bring it under subjection to the newly acceding authority.

Still, it seems fit on public grounds to show how a sea newly opened in what till the day before had been the interior of Russia was taken in hand by the squadrons.

The shoal at the mouths of the Don forbade hope of flight for all vessels with more than a small draught of water; and the sight of hostile flags in this sea—so lately a sure sea of refuge—sufficed to make the enemy's Admiral run ashore, and burn down his four surviving war-steamers—surviving, as we saw, out of that which, until dispersed by M'Gillop, had been 'The squadron of Kertch.'

After this hastened act of despondency the Russians had no vessel left with which to watch, much less oppose, the advance of their naval invader. Young Lyons found himself master—the undisturbed, unchallenged master—of what a few hours before had been a fast-closed Russian lake surrounded on all sides by Russian provinces, and affording them a natural outlet, a privileged highway of their own.

Long accustomed to have it imagined that they could not be assailed with impunity in the trunk of their empire, Russians bitterly felt the sharp thrust which a new irresistible power was now—with strange ease—driving home. How deep the thrust went, people easily saw when observing that the easternmost of the provinces coerced by the Maritime Powers, and unable thenceforth to send out so much as a sail or a boat from the mouths of its own famous river, was the one that furnished to Russia her Kozaks, or 'Cossacks of the Don'—men deemed so transcendently Russian that—although, as I think, without justice—the figurative diction of many (including the great Napoleon) has made the name of their race an equivalent for Russia herself. By the French more especially, who had heard what their mothers could tell them of 'The Cossacks! the Cossacks! the Cossacks!' there well might be felt strange emotions when—along with a now friendly England—outstretching the long naval arm, and touching the westernmost nests of that once notorious horde which, however disregarded as combatants, had as plunderers startled the France of an earlier and horrible time. Those were men who, not quitting their saddles, would trot up the stairs of the palace or the house they were going to despoil, and ride straight into a drawing-room on horses well used, like themselves, to the piteous screaming of women.⁽³⁾

What Lyons disturbed on the Sea and the shores of the Azof was a vast seat of industry, but industry plainly devoted to the business of war. The shipping engaged, it is true, was but lately the shipping of commerce bearing corn to foreign ports; but it had been brought into the service of the Czar for commissariat purposes, and was busied in transporting supplies for the use of Prince Gortchakoff's army. To this end alone were corn-stores lining the beach, and unarmed vessels plying in hundreds. It was the right and the duty of Lyons to destroy, if he could, the foundations of all this hostile activity.

The Allies having no troops on board, and the enemy having no war-ships, there could not, of course, well take place any great engagement between them; and no one reading what follows must hearken at all for a battle, but rather think of the task committed to some naval officer who is ordered to tear out the nest of inveterate contrabandistas, and seize their forfeited goods.


With regard to those unarmed vessels busied in the trans-

Access thus obtained to the interior provinces of Russia;

as, e.g., to the country of the Don Cossacks.


The seat of industry that Lyons disturbed.

His task not one leading to battle.



THE
AND NEIGH

MILES 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 100



His task
against ves-
sels found at
sea ;

port of food that could be caught by war-steamers at sea, the task, of course, was an easy one; but Lyons and M. Sédaiges, and the officers and crews of both the united squadrons agreed to make it easier still. At the sacrifice of their pecuniary interests, they agreed to forego their clear right of bringing the craft before prize courts, and to substitute destruction for capture.

and those
that had fled
towards land.

It was only when applied to those vessels which had fled towards the land for shelter, or else to the ranges of corn-stacks and other Government property disposed on some parts of the shore, that the task of destruction left room for the skill and the daring of seamen.

26th May.
Operation off
the Spit of
Berdiansk.

From an anchorage it found off the light-house on the Spit of Berdiansk the united flotilla commanded the harbor as well as the beach; and—covered by the fire it delivered—the boats of both the squadrons effected a landing under Commander Sherard Osborn. The men who had landed destroyed the vessels in port, and afterwards other craft found at a distance of nearly four miles. They also burned a Government store.

Several steamers detached from the squadron were meanwhile chasing such vessels as could be descried out at sea.

The wrecks of
the four war-
steamers that
had escaped
from Kertch.

When off the beach of Berdiansk, Captain Lyons there found run on shore, and burned down to the water's edge, those four Russian steamers of war which had escaped—for a while—from Kertch with their leader Rear-Admiral Wulff. It is dismal, after all, to be seeing the very, very end, and last obsequies of even an enemy's squadron. The unhappy Rear-Admiral's flag was still flying from the wreck of the 'Moloditz.'

27th May.
Off the town
of Berdiansk.

From a position commanding the town and also the beach some small-armed men and marines from both of the squadrons were landed under Commander Lambert, and they destroyed many vessels as well as some Government corn-stores. Steamers also meanwhile intercepted the craft that were seeking to escape by flying for the mouths of the Don.

28th May.
Lyons en-
gaging the
port of
Arabat.

From a position off Arabat, Captain Lyons engaged the fort and blew up a caisson of ammunition. The vessels caught outside the Straits were all destroyed.

Plan of sum-
moning the
authorities.

In so far as they could without derogating from the performance of their duty, Captain Lyons and M. Sédaiges were intent on the avoidance of measures that might harm the peaceful inhabitants in either

person or property; and, before undertaking to execute the works of destruction ordained at Genitchi, at Taganrog, at Marionpol, and at Gheisk, they summoned the authorities in each place to surrender the vessels and the Government property which they meant to destroy; but in every instance (except that of Gheisk) they were met by what, judged from its words, was a thoroughly decisive refusal, and driven therefore to execute the forcible measures required for enabling them to compass their object.

The rejections they elicited.

Judged, I have said, from its language; but, none must therefore imagine that the acts of these men in authority corresponded with their words of defiance. Because valiantly sounding, those words were perhaps for the moment delightful to the ear of the much-deceived Czar, but we shall see that they were not followed up by the manful resistance they promised. Of all the three local commanders who successively hurled defiance one certainly attempted resistance, but only of the most feeble kind, which did not cause a loss to the allies of so much as even one life; and the other two, when danger came, simply marched off their troops, without fighting, to distant places of safety.

These compared with the acts of the authorities professing defiance.

Genitchi was a town on the straits called after its name which connect the Sea of Azof with the inner waters of the Sivache. Apprehending that, if the Allies should prove able to enter those waters, they might operate against his communications by the north of the Crimea, Prince Gortchakoff, but a few days before, had not only reinforced the garrison of Genitchi, but had also sent into the place a new governor, Colonel Prince Lobanoff-Rostoffsky, with instructions to organize the defense of the Straits. When the new governor found himself summoned to abstain from all defense of the vessels and Government property at Genitchi, he rejected the demand in high-spirited language, which, supposing it about to be followed by corresponding action, was right and becoming; but the sequel of his warlike response seems beyond measure strange. Though he did not recall the defiance, Prince Lobanoff-Rostoffsky 'not choosing to expose his troops to useless losses, 'withdrew them to a distance of five versts from the town;'¹ thus leaving the unarmed inhabitants to face the dangers created by him who had rejected the summons, and to see a chief follow up his proud words of defiance by marching off the whole garrison to a place of safety!

Operations at Genitchi, 29th May.

¹ Todleben, vol. ii. p. 289.

It may well have been fitting to refuse the demanded surrender, or—under a contrary view—to withdraw the troops without fighting; but how the man could—with honor—adopt both the courses of action, and leave unarmed people to suffer for all his vainglorious words, I have not been able to see.

By shelling a part of Genitchi, the squadrons opened a way through the Straits for the boats sent in under Mackenzie. The lieutenant and his men soon pushed through to the place of imagined safety which the fugitive vessels had reached, and set fire to them all (they were 73 in number) as well as to the great stores of corn there collected by the Russian Government.

The boats had returned to the ships, when men saw that other, though more distant vessels were within reach, and that—turned by a change of wind—the fire was losing its hold on the range of the enemy's corn-stores.

Thereupon Lyons resumed his fire on the place, and once more sent in the boats under Lieutenant Mackenzie, who destroyed the more distant vessels which had previously escaped destruction.

The service of landing on a part of the beach out of gunshot from the squadron, and there refiring the corn-stores in the teeth of the Russians there seen to be gathered, seemed one of a desperate kind; and, supposing the enterprise to be attempted by a considerable body of men, it promised to involve a painful sacrifice of life; but three fearless officers—Lieutenant Buckley of the 'Miranda,' Lieutenant Burgoyne of the 'Swallow,' and Mr. John Roberts, gunner of the 'Ardent,' volunteered to achieve the object with their own unaided hands; and Captain Lyons accepting their offer, they not only accomplished the task, but then happily made good their way back in spite of all the Cossacks endeavoring to cut them off from their boat. That day 90 merchant-vessels and corn-stores supposed to be worth £100,000 were destroyed.

Those shoals off the mouths of the Don which had forbidden all hope of escape for the enemy's squadron of Kertch now seemed to be defending Taganrog and the adjacent shore from the enterprises of Captain Lyons and M. Sédaiges; for in even its 'Inner' roadstead, the flotilla of the Allies (as a whole) was kept far out at a distance of nearly 10 miles from the shore.¹

1st to 3d June.
Operations at
Taganrog and
the mouths
of the Don.

¹ At first only 8½, but increased to 10 miles by a change of wind and a consequent fall of 3 feet in the depth of the water.

There existed, however, some channels lying open to the incursion of vessels with a very light draught, such, for instance, as the English 'Recruit,' or the French 'Mouette;' and although, as might well be expected, the enemy had taken good care to remove the lights and the beacons, it was possible for the skill of the seamen to rediscover (by sounding) the veins of deeper, though still shallow water, that found their way through the shoal.

This Taganrog, we know, was a place where the vast supplies brought down the Don lay stored on the beach; and the problem requiring solution asked how to effect the destruction of these warlike treasures whilst defended from naval aggression by a shoal ten miles broad, and by more than 3000 troops.

The resources for this purpose owned by Lyons and M. Sédaiges consisted only as yet of those vessels both few and small which, like the 'Recruit' and 'Mouette,' could make their way over the shoal. They brought with them, of course, their ships' companies, each including its share of marines, but had otherwise no troops on board.

In the night of the 1st of June, Lieutenant Day found a channel for his craft, the 'Recruit'—a vessel that drew little water—and, the next morning, going on board her, Captain Lyons reconnoitred the town.

Since (with only the stated exceptions) the vessels composing the squadrons were—because of the shoal—lying off the town and port of Taganrog at a distance of nearly ten miles, the question was how, without them, to provide such a fire as would cover the landing of men. The seamen bent their minds to the problem; and Commander Cowper Coles of the 'Stromboli' contrived a raft which would pass over the shoals with a gun of 42 cwt. well planted in battery; whilst Lieutenant-Commander Horton of the 'Ardent' imagined, and constructed with hammocks, what the men called 'a bed'—a bed so disposed on board the pinnacle of his ship that it furnished the needed support for a 32-pounder in action. Due experiment afterwards proved that the raft and the pinnacle thus planned would, each of them, answer its purpose; and, with only those means of attack which have now been sufficiently indicated, the French and English captains agreed that their endeavors to burn down the stores which the Czar had collected at Taganrog should begin the next day, the 3d, at 3 o'clock in the morning.

But at sunset—dispatched opportunely by Admiral Lyons—there hove in sight three river steamers, light enough to

move over the shoal, and carrying each one or more guns, with also twelve launches withdrawn from the line-of-battle ships. This welcome reinforcement supplied the exact means of action required for closing upon the enemy's stores in spite of the shoal which protected them.

From the way in which these welcome means were about to be used, it resulted that launches and other less boats would, this time, be expected to render the same kind of service as that which a fleet any day undertakes when, by pouring down fire on a beach, it covers a landing of troops. The measureless inferiority of any mere boats as compared with a man-of-war was to be compensated by the power they had of coming to much closer quarters with an enemy arrayed on the shore.

On the morning of the 3d of June (after duly concerting his measures with M. Sédaiges) Captain Lyons, on board the 'Recruit,' advanced to an anchorage only 1400 yards from the mole-head, having with him the other light-draught vessels, both English and French, which were all of them towing their launches. On board one of the French light-draught vessels thus brought through the shoal to the front M. Sédaiges was present in person.

With the boats all collected astern of their vessels, Captain Lyons and M. Sédaiges awaited the Governor's answer to their summons.¹ The answer came after a while from General Krasnoff—an answer importing that he rejected the terms, and that, having troops at his disposal, he meant to defend the place.⁽⁴⁾

Then down ran the flag of truce which, since the dispatch of the summons, Captain Lyons had shown from the mast-head of the little 'Recruit,' and off moved the launches and boats which till then had been lying astern. Cowper Coles of the 'Stromboli' commanded them, and in company with them, under the immediate orders of Captain Le Jeune, the French boats also moved forward. When all had reached the chosen position, the tow was cast off, and 'the boats' 'heads,' as Lyons expressed it, 'pulled round to the beach.' If borrowing land-service diction, one might say, I suppose, that from column the boats opened out into line. They began to deliver their fire against the enemy's troops, now seen to be on the alert, and desiring, if they could, to defend the vast range of the Government stores.

The Russian troops, or their leaders, appeared to under-

¹ What the terms of each summons were has been before shown. See *ante*, p. 56.

stand very well that, in order to defend the stores, they must come down towards the beach in the teeth of the fire from our boats; and, though feebly, they made several efforts to effect this advance. From time to time some of the bolder of them came down near to the Government stores, but never in numbers sufficient to make good their attempted defense; and accordingly it resulted that, from the first to the last, the enemy remained fended off from the strip of ground under dispute.

By thus fending off the Czar's troops, Captain Lyons and M. Sédaiges laid open a way for the second stage of their enterprise.

With a separate division of light boats carrying rockets and one gun on board, Lieutenant Mackenzie covered the approach of Lieutenant Cecil Buckley, who in a four-oared gig, accompanied by Mr. Henry Cooper, boatswain, and manned by volunteers, repeatedly landed and fired the stores and Government buildings. By 3 o'clock in the afternoon all the long ranges of stores of grain, planks, and tar, and the vessels on the stocks, were in a blaze, as were also the Custom-house and other Government buildings.

The destruction included a Russian war-schooner, with also a Russian guardship; but it was by the enemy's own hands that that last vessel perished.⁽⁵⁾ So great was the skill exerted by the seamen, both English and French, that though operating for three days amid shoals of vast extent, they did not from the first to the last encounter a single mishap.

The good seamanship manifested by the French and the English.

From the feebleness of the Russian defense it resulted that the Allies were enabled to achieve their whole object without either inflicting any serious loss, or themselves losing even one life. They only lost one marine wounded; the Russians losing one soldier killed, and twelve more or less slightly wounded. The enemy's rejection of the summons had been proudly, defiantly worded; but the sacrifice it involved was left to fall much more severely on hapless non-combatants than on that newly reinforced body of from three to four thousand soldiers which had feebly resisted the landing, and had hardly, if at all, interfered with the steady work of destruction effected under their eyes.

Of the peaceful inhabitants eleven were killed, and forty-seven otherwise stricken.¹

The defense, from its weakness, afforded, of course, a poor sequel to those high-toned words of rejection with which

¹ Todleben, vol. ii. p. 291.

the summons was met, and seemed even to annul the whole warrant for a course of proceeding which subjected the peaceful inhabitants to losses of life and property. None could say that the victims were sacrificed to the exigencies of a valiant defense.

Marionpol was a place on the only high-road then left to the enemy for effecting his communications between the country of the Don and the Crimea; and Colonel Kostrukoff, there commanding, affected to defy the summons brought him from Lyons and M. Sédaiges; but the Allies quickly landed some men, and thereupon the whole garrison, consisting of some hundreds of Cosacks, was at once marched off, without fighting, to a place of safety. The town thenceforth remained for five hours in the hands of the Allies. The Allies took care to destroy the great stores of grain in the place, but did no harm to the town.⁽⁶⁾

Operations at
Gheisk, 6th
June.

At Gheisk the authorities yielded to the exigency of the summons, and a vast quantity of hay and corn was destroyed.

By a skillful manœuvre of his vessel, the 'Ardent,' in deep water found near the shore, Lieutenant Horton proved able to land from Kiten Bay Mr. Roberts the gunner; and he, with but two men to aid him, destroyed sacks of flour collected for embarkation to the number of about 30,000.

9th June.
Operations
on the shore
of Kiten Bay.

It was not within the time limited by the bounds of this Narrative that Sherard Osborn and Hewett completed the work of destruction or obtained (as they did before long) the control of the Arabat Spit—that singular natural causeway thrown up between the two seas which, with scarce room for anything else, still carried the imperial post-road a distance of some eighty miles, and therefore seemed precious to Russia.

From all these operations recounted in the Sea of Azof, there resulted a loss to the enemy's combative forces of a few score men killed or wounded, and to the Allies a loss of two men wounded.

Losses of the
Russians ;
of the Allies.

This happy immunity from serious loss proved superbly the seaman-like qualities of young Lyons and M. Sédaiges and the officers and men acting under

Causes of
their immu-
nity.

them — sailors charged with duties which aimed at firm repression, not conquest, and at what was rather forcible government than flagrant war between equals. The immunity, we can see, was obtained by unfailing presence of mind, by a naval skill ever ready for each successive emergency, and withal by the well-applied daring of particular men. Thus, when Lieutenant Cecil Buckley and John Roberts (gunner) at Genitchi, and Cecil Buckley again with Henry Cooper (boatswain) at Taganrog, volunteered to undertake special services of a hazardous kind, they effectually compassed their objects, but they did something more. By dispensing with the aid of numbers, they plainly averted the evil of having to risk many lives.

The Allies put themselves to the pain of destroying these vast stores of food, because they had ventured to hope, on what at the time seemed good grounds, that the check which their measure imposed on the flow of supplies to the enemy would impair, if not bring to an end, his protracted defense of Sebastopol; but Russia, as was afterwards known, had already provisioned her army engaged under Gortchakoff for the whole of the then pending year, and was not therefore brought to extremities by losses which rather affected the great reserve magazines than any immediate wants.

The havoc, however, was great. In the first four days of the operations in the Sea of Azof, it already included the destruction of 246 vessels, a number soon augmented to one which our admiral pronounced to be 'nearly 500;' and on the 2d of June (a day long antecedent to the close of the destructive operations) he officially stated that the destructive operations conducted in the Sea of Azof had already overtaken a quantity of flour and corn which, if added to what was destroyed by the hands of the Russians themselves (as shown by their Custom-house books), would have furnished rations for four months to an army of 100,000 men.¹

Of the vessels destroyed very many were Greek; and supposing, as I do, that the Czar was not without just, kingly pride, this bare fact must have touched to the quick his sense of honor and dignity. He had welcomed these gifted people, then warmly disposed towards his cause, making use of their toil and their property in what I have—not wrong-

Many of the destroyed vessels Greek; the bearing of this circumstance on the Czar's sense of dignity.

¹ Admiral Lyons to Lord Raglan, 2d June, 1855.

ly—called the interior of his empire, and yet there, even there, he had found himself unable to shield them from the power of his naval invaders.

The moral stress put on Russia by taking the Sea of Azof.

The merely physical losses sustained by the Czar were as nothing when put in comparison with the moral torture applied by carrying a naval invasion straight into the trunk of his empire.

If—fermenting in the midst of a people good, kindly, humane, and still (in the mass) truly loyal—an outburst of truculent doctrine has of late seemed to hedge round the

Did the Czar's incapacity to defend his subjects tend at all to shake their old loyalty?

Czars with assassins instead of adorers, it does not, of course, at all follow that the origin of this hateful wickedness can safely be traced up to causes in force at the time of the war; but, in spite of its Byzantine taint, what people call the 'Czar-worship' is not, after all, quite so slavish, so utterly

abject a posture of trembling humanity as many believe when they hear of the grandiose prayers and thanksgivings which Moscow offers up to its idol. Much, in that respect, like other loyalty to other sovereigns, the 'worship' of the Czar rests, in part, on the floating idea that its votaries are accustomed to form of his power—his genuine power on earth, and, not least, his power to defend them from enemies with whom he has quarrelled.

In so far as the creed was thus based, it lay open, of course, to a shock, when young Lyons (with Captain Sédai-ges) began to touch the empire at home.

The 'Miranda' had broken a spell. Till she passed through the Straits with her following, on the 25th of May, the Azof had been a real province—a sea-clad province of Russia; and, for men on its shores to be witnessing the severance of such a possession from the Czar's inner territories, to be under a ban for the crime—the strangely new crime—of being his faithful subjects engaged in actual service, to see how Russian commanders, with infantry under their orders, comported themselves in those hours when mass after mass of carefully harvested wealth was in course of being burned to the ground because it belonged to their sovereign, but moreover to know that the Czar's lieutenants (including Prince Lobanoff-Rostoffsky) were men who could act in the way we were painfully forced to observe—all this, if at first only startling, may perhaps have begun before long to disenchant some of the votaries who long had been steady enough in the practice of humble Czar-worship.

It was natural that the change should be slow. Men

might long go on dimly imagining that their old faith was sound; but, whether conscious or not of the change coming over their minds, they were plainly dragged far on the road which leads from darkness to light when forced to see, as they did from the shores of the Azof, that their Czar, if, as always, divine, was still for the moment, at best, an unsuccessful Divinity.

In proportion to its disturbing effect on the mind of the humble Don Cossack, or any other poor shores-man, the loss of the Sea of Azof was tormenting, of course, to his rulers, and all the more since they knew that its severance from the Czar's dominions was so far definitive that perforce it would have to be borne, until the Invaders at last should choose to grant Russia a peace.

III.

The forces, both naval and military, which had opened the Straits of Kertch lay assembled at no great distance from Soudjak-Kalé and Anapa, then held by Russia on the Circassian coast; and a prompt attack on these strongholds was eagerly counselled by Lyons.

First, Lord Raglan, then General Péliissier, adopted our admiral's project; and, to carry it into effect, a body of 3000 infantry—two thirds of it French, one third English—with a detachment of English artillery and fifteen 32-pounder battering-guns, was quickly dispatched to Sir George Brown.

Divining apparently the purpose of the Allies, General Khoumatoff determined that, without awaiting the expected attack, Soudjak-Kalé should be abandoned, and, accordingly, on the 28th of May, after first destroying its batteries (which comprised sixty guns and six mortars), the garrison withdrew from the place, but Anapa still held out; and upon the reduction of this latter and much greater fortress the desire of the Allies became concentrated.

All at once, under orders from Paris, the attack upon Anapa, by either French ships or French troops, was forbidden in terms the most peremptory that language could furnish.

It may well be supposed that attributing to himself all the powers of a thoroughly absolute sovereign, and sincerely convinced of his skill in the art of waging war from a distance, the French Emperor had suffered acutely on finding

Attack on
Soudjak-Kalé
and Anapa
recom-
mended.

Troops dis-
patched for
the purpose.

Fall of Soud-
jak-Kalé.

Attack of
Anapa per-
emptorily for-
bidden by Lou-
is Napoleon.

himself set aside in the way we have seen by the stern, unbending Pélissier; and—as though to recover his self-respect, and his sense of being really an Emperor—the bitterly mortified sovereign clutched hard at what seemed an occasion for asserting himself once more as a potentate that even strong men must obey. Having heard of the resolve to make an attack upon Anapa, he ventured to come down on Pélissier with an imperial message, commanding him on no pretext whatever to allow an expedition to Anapa.¹

Pélissier's determined resistance to the prohibition. Pélissier fiercely met the prohibition by determining that it should not be obeyed; but he varied his plan of resistance. He showed Lord Raglan the draft of a letter from himself to Admiral Bruat, in which, after stating the purport of the Emperor's order, he directed the admiral, 'notwithstanding, to pass by Anapa on his return and to take part in the naval bombardment of the place.'²

The letter, Pélissier said, was afterwards modified, and perhaps he, still later, determined to refrain altogether from sending it;⁽⁷⁾ but at all events, Admiral Bruat—unassailed by any real countermand—went on with the planned expedition.

Lord Raglan was angered by this new attempt of the Emperor to interrupt the business of war. 'I Lord Raglan's censure on the French Emperor. 'fear,' wrote the English commander, 'that much inconvenience may arise if his Imperial Majesty pursue the system of forbidding operations that may have been determined upon.'³

While thus running dead counter in action to Louis Napoleon's orders, Pélissier, it seems, was vouchsafing no other kind of reply to his sovereign's imperious mandate;⁽⁸⁾ but fate meanwhile interposed with the magic touch of a fact. Persuaded that if left to face the approaching armada its garrison would be simply annihilated, the enemy, under Khoumatoff's orders, withdrew on the 5th of June from the fortress of Anapa, and passed at once over the Kouban, thus abandoning, with the last of his strongholds in that cherished part of the empire, the whole Circassian coast.⁴ He left in the place, as I count them, from our admiral's detailed report, 114 pieces of artillery.

¹ 3d June: 'Sous aucun prétexte ne permettez d'Expédition à Anapa.' —Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, 12th June, 1855.

² Ibid.

³ Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, 12th June (No. 89).

⁴ Ibid.

Sir George Brown left the 5000 Turks supported by a thousand French troops, as well as by a thousand of English, to guard the Straits of Kertch, and with the rest of his forces returned at once to the Chersonese.

Troops left
to guard the
Straits ;
the rest
brought back.

IV.

The fortunes of this brief campaign (lasting only about twenty days) were in contrast at more than one point with those of the main undertaking. In the course of their strife for Sebastopol the Allies had won glorious victories ; but (after sustaining great losses) had as yet conquered nothing at all except the ground under their feet ; whilst by this smoother Kertch expedition they had not tempted the enemy to face them in battle, and of course therefore had not been able to gain any victories, but still they achieved signal conquests.

A contrast.

The easy, untroubled invasion of the Kertchine Peninsula, the seizure of all the ground needed for the object in hand, the coercion that forced the enemy to destroy his whole chain of coast batteries, and burn down, vessel by vessel, his war squadron formed and assembled to guard these precious waters of Kertch, the opening of the famous straits of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, the armed occupation of the Sea of Azof excluding all other flags, the hand of Authority laid on the shores of every province of Russia that bordered on what until then had been a 'closed' Russian lake, the enforced withdrawal of Russia from Soudjak-Kalé, from Anapa (the last of the strongholds she owned on the south of the Kouban), her immediate abandonment of the whole of the Circassian coast, the infliction, besides, on the Czar of such minor forfeitures as that of some 340 pieces of ordnance, of nearly 500 vessels engaged in his great commissariat tasks, and of supplies in enormous quantities all amassed for his army engaged on the Sebastopol theatre of war—these indeed, one may say, were results which, if purchased by battles and victories, might well have seemed more than sufficient to compensate serious losses ; and yet the whole string of conquests scarce cost the Allies any sacrifice, did not cost them even one single life.

General re-
sults of the
Kertch expe-
dition.

Nor can any man say that the conquerors attained their end by surprise ; for since even so early a time as the spring of the previous year (1854), the Russians had been actively engaged in endeavoring to

These not
attained by
surprise ;

secure both their Straits and their Kertchine Peninsula from the much apprehended attacks;¹ whilst, so far as concerned the advantage of being newly put on his guard, Baron Wrangel was specially blessed; since but three weeks before he had seen and studied the lineaments of the then approaching Armada not as yet overtaken at sea by Canrobert's words of recall.

Nor again can the main of what followed be fairly said to result from the faults or defaults of the Russian commanders. Baron Wrangel was plainly unable to defend the Kertchine Peninsula, and warranted therefore in yielding. Rear-Admiral Wulff, on the whole, could hardly perhaps do much better than destroy, as he did, his own squadron. General Khoumatoff, when abandoning the Circassian fortresses and the whole Circassian coast, acted under the painful stress of what—perhaps rightly—he judged to be hugely superior force; and, although it may be that, if led with a valor in action proportioned to the valor in words displayed by the officers summoned on the shores of the Sea of Azof, the troops under Prince Lobanoff-Rostoffsky, under General Krasnoff, and under Colonel Kostrukoff might have saved a good deal of their sovereign's property, and subjected the Allies to some loss, they, even so, could not have met the full stress of the naval invasion, or altered at all its main issue.

Granting this, there stands out a phenomenon unexplained by assigning 'surprise' or error of counsel—one inviting us to say why it was that Russia—a great Military Power—could be quietly stripped of possessions very dear to her—possessions by sea and by land, and this with such masterful ease that from the first to the last she only wounded three of her assailants and did not kill even one.

The simple truth is, that in regions where land and sea much intertwine, an Armada having on board it no more than a few thousand troops, but comprising a powerful fleet, and propelled by steam-power, can use its amphibious strength with a wondrously cogent effect; and—engaged as he was at the time in defending Sebastopol, the troubled Czar, after all, was not a potentate strong enough to withstand such an engine of war.

The merit of perceiving this truth, and enforcing it with passionate eagerness, belonged to our Admiral Lyons,

¹ Todleben, ii. pp. 267 *et seq.*

Lyons the originator and eager advocate of the Expedition.

Carrying with him Admiral Bruat and Lord Raglan.

Pélissier ;

and — approved by Admiral Bruat — his measure received from Lord Raglan a warm, never-failing support ; but, if we ask who in this business was the conqueror of the greatest obstacles, the palm must go to Pélissier. Concealing under his violence of speech and of manner the gifts that made him well able to shape and maintain a wise policy, he had plainly divined that, whether the English were right or whether wrong in their eagerness for the Kertch Expedition, they could hardly be brought back again into that state of confidence and good-humor which a cordial alliance demands unless the recall sent by Canrobert at one o'clock in the morning of the 4th of May could be expiated, if so one may speak, by renewing without loss of time the joint expedition to Kertch.

his propulsion of the measure against the Emperor.

Pélissier brought to bear on the object that will of his — always strong — which seemed in him to be steeled by the fierce heat of anger. He had need of his strength ; for of late, as we know, the French Emperor had become more than ever an active, rampant opposer of all that the generals on the

Chersonese believed to be their best means of effectively conducting the war.

With the letter of the law on his side, though not, of course, its true spirit (for he did not act like a king in full concert with the high State Authorities), this dream-ridden Louis Napoleon was still as before insistent on his actual, personal right to be playing the great game of war from St. Cloud or from Paris ; whilst Pélissier, believing it plain that surrender to such pretensions would inflict grievous harm upon France, and would even put in dire peril the honor of her arms, was brought perforce under the sway of principles higher and broader than those which in general serve to guide the conduct of officers. Resorting freely to action as a means of thwarting interference, and writing but little to Paris, he firmly maintained his own will against the will of his sovereign, and — without bringing on any rupture — proved able to set him aside.⁽⁹⁾

The severity of the contest which ended in this good result may well have been masked by Pélissier's fierce, scornful way of alluding to any opposers like Niel and the Emperor ; but in reality the struggle was arduous, was full of danger, and must have cost the strong man anxious moments. This is why I have said that amongst the chiefs, naval and military, who firmly pressed to an issue this Kertch Expedi-

tion, Pélissier was the one who conquered the gravest obstacle.

It was scarce possible that the thorough success of an expedition undertaken against the set will of Louis Napoleon should give him immense, unmixed joy. He, of course, had to say, as he did in six or seven cold words, he was glad the expedition had succeeded, but he hastened in the very same sentence to protest against every such measure.⁽¹⁰⁾

The tidings of what had been achieved by the Kertch Expedition produced a great moral effect. They on the camps of the Allies; spread joy in the camp of the Allies, where Pélissier and Lord Raglan commanded;¹ and proportionally afflicted and disheartened the forces defending Sebastopol.² on the Russians.

Those who know where the Czardom is weak, and therefore know where it is tender, will say, I believe, that, if executed with like success some weeks before, when Lyons and Lord Raglan first urged it, this eastward invasion of Russia would have governed the issue of the Vienna negotiations, and brought the war to an end.

CHAPTER V.

OPENING OF THE THIRD BOMBARDMENT.—VICTORIOUS ASSAULTS OF ALL THE COUNTER-APPROACHES BY FRENCH AND ENGLISH TROOPS.—CONCLUSION OF THE THIRD BOMBARDMENT.

I.

THE French and the English commanders had been meanwhile resolving in concert to attack all those counter-approaches that guarded the Karabelnaya. These included not only the White Redoubts and the Kamtchatka Lunette, which had sprung, as it were, out of darkness to challenge and mock at the French in the months of February and March, but also the Work of the Quarries—directly opposed to the English—which had since been thrown up by the enemy in front of his Great Redan.

¹ Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, 'These gallant exploits of the Navy have spread joy to our camps.'—June 5, 1855.

² 'Impression défavorable.'—Todleben, ii. p. 295.

The concord at this time established between Péliissier and Lord Raglan was not the result of agreement attained by any mere compromise. Each chief thought exactly alike on the questions then ripe for decision; and having worked out his conclusion at a separate time, had also apparently reached it by a separate process of thought. With all its other priceless advantages, the concord thus happily reigning between Péliissier and Lord Raglan was plainly a shield of great strength that well might be used in resistance to any further dictation attempted against them from Paris; and, as though to prepare their agreement for service in that special way, the two chiefs reduced it to writing by a fitting exchange of letters.

The shield this afforded against Louis Napoleon's interference.

Clinging fast to his much-beloved doctrine, General Niel continued to urge that the investment of Sebastopol—in other words, a campaign fought out with success in the Open—should precede any action attempted against the counter-approaches;¹ but the power—the baneful power—he had wielded in Canrobert's time rested then on the authority of the Emperor, and the Emperor himself, as we know, had by this time proved wholly unable to obstruct the fiery Péliissier. 'Knowing nothing of 'what is going on'—so Niel wrote to the Minister of War—'I abstain from all reflection. I asked leave to offer some 'observations on the state of the siege, and was told that it 'was not the time.'²

Though the deputy of the far-distant monarch was thus almost fiercely repressed, the monarch himself might still try to assert his authority. Undeterred by the series of rebuffs and defeats to which we saw him exposed, the French Emperor ventured once more to try the flat 'letter of the 'law' against his resolute general. On the 5th of June he allowed himself to assail Péliissier with this message, sent by telegraph:—'For the happiness of France, and 'for the glory of our arms, you are at the head of 'the finest army that perhaps has ever existed. 'An immortal reputation is assured to you, but you must do 'great things. Indeed the conduct of the siege is more a 'business within the sphere of the commander of the Engi-

The French Emperor's prohibition.

¹ Rousset, ii. p. 215.

² Ibid., p. 216. Apparently sorry for his rudeness, Péliissier afterwards sent for Niel, and received him with marked kindness, but did not let him give counsel.

'neers than of the Commander-in-Chief. Now, the general of Engineers has addressed to you these observations: "If you choose to continue the siege without investing the place, you will only obtain after bloody and desperate struggles, which will cost you the sacrifice of your best soldiers, that which would come to you of its own accord after the investment." In accord with the English Government, which is writing in the same sense to Lord Raglan, I give you the positive order to abstain from throwing your strength into the business of the siege before having invested the place.¹ So concert measures with Lord Raglan and Omar Pasha for taking the offensive and operating whether by the Tchernaya or against Simphéropol."²

Proceeding on the same day towards action of a kind strictly opposite to the course thus enjoined, Persistence of Pélissier. Pélissier thus telegraphed to Paris:—"I am to see Lord Raglan to-day (with whom, by the way, I am in perfect accord), in order to make the final dispositions for the assault which is to put in our power the White Redoubts, the Green Mamelon, and the Quarry in front of the Great Redan. According to my present reckoning, I shall commence this operation on the 7th, and I shall push it on unrelentingly with the utmost vigor."³

This telegram from Pélissier was dispatched, it would seem, at an hour when Louis Napoleon's peremptory orders of the same day had not reached the French camp; but their subsequent arrival wrought no change at all in the purpose of the stubborn commander; and defying the imperial command, he, in concert with Lord Raglan, made haste to deliver the attack he had planned.

By compassing that part of the project which aimed at The contemplated attack. the two White Redoubts and the Kamtchatka Lunette, our allies, after a long and mortifying interval of submission to hostile encroachments, would assert themselves at last as besiegers no longer repressed by the garrison; and one attractive feature in the plan was the proposed attack of 'the Quarries;' for in that field of action, though separated by an interposing ravine, the English, at no great distance, would be fighting on the left of the French.

¹ 'Je vous donne l'ordre positif de ne point vous acharner au siège avant d'avoir investi la place.'—Rousset, ii. p. 232.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

II.

The Allies of course meant that the intended assaults should be preceded by a bombardment, and it therefore may be right to say that their siege-batteries at this time counted 588 guns, whilst the guns of the Russians were in number 1174, of which 571 were of great calibre.

Besides the troops assigned to the coast batteries, the Russian garrison now comprised 57 battalions, 22 of which guarded the Faubourg; but dissension at this time was troubling the Russian defense, so that, contrary to the insistence and solemn warning of Todleben, the works destined to be attacked were left in an undermanned state. For the defense of the two White Redoubts the Sclinghinsk and the Volhynia, as well as of the five-gun Zabalkansky battery which had been constructed in their rear, there were only assigned six weak battalions, and five of these during the daytime were kept in somewhat distant reserve (one in and near the Troitsky Ravine, and four in the Ouchakoff gorge, so that, to occupy the two White Redoubts, there remained only one battalion, 450 strong, which, accordingly, furnished them garrisons of no more than 225 men each. Ten battalions—one forming its garrison, the other nine held in reserve—were assigned for the defense of the Kamtchatka Lunette, and six for the defense of the Quarries.

From the 31st of May until a late hour on the 7th of June, General Jabrokritski commanded the troops in the Faubourg, and to him, in conjunction with General Timovieff (who had advised a like reduction), there specially fell the blame of leaving the defense of the works to insufficient forces; though of course the discredit of not repressing the pretensions of generals who presumed to be hampering the measures of the great engineer, would rest with the Commander-in-Chief—with General Michael Gortchakoff.

On the 7th of June, at an hour when assault was impending, Jabrokritski gave up the command, and was succeeded by General Khrouleff. Khrouleff thereupon gave orders for reinforcing the garrisons of all the counter-approaches with the utmost dispatch, but he was baffled by the stress of events then almost immediately following, and it resulted that not only on the 6th, but also down to the evening of the 7th of June, the strength and disposition of the garrisons continued to be such as we have seen.

III.

In the afternoon of the 6th, at about three o'clock, the siege batteries of the Allies opened fire against most, if not all, of the works which defended the Karabel Faubourg. Well answered at first by the garrison, this third and most powerful of all the yet delivered bombardments was unrelentingly pressed until the day closed.

When Pélissier not long before night-time had left the Victoria Ridge, and was riding back towards his head-quarters, he encountered a happy surprise. Our soldiery knew, although vaguely, that after acceding to the command of the French army, its new Chief, refusing to shrink from even terrible sacrifices, had peremptorily met the encroachments attempted from Western Sebastopol by hard, victorious fighting, that he had placed himself in full concert with the English Commander, taking part in that Kertch expedition which had brought mighty joy to the camp, that he and the English Commander had already begun a new enterprise, that so early as even the morrow his troops and those of Lord Raglan would storm all the counter-approaches then left to affront the besiegers; and, if our soldiers divined that any French marplot was trying to resist, or to thwart the new Chief, their feeling towards him of course gathered all the more heart. Riding westward across Cathcart's Hill in the evening of that 6th of June, Pélissier found himself greeted by the roar of true English hurrahs that sprang from the Light Division, and was taken up, camp after camp, by all our troops on the Chersonese. Pélissier was deeply impressed. Tears came to the eyes of the seemingly hard, iron Chief; but—true commander—he looked to the firm, warlike purpose implied by this heart-stirring welcome. He seized it as an omen of victory.¹

Significance
of their
cheers.

The bombard-
ment contin-
ued at night.

Although only with vertical fire (from the time when darkness set in) a bombardment went on through the night.

Next morning, the 7th of June, the siege-guns, reopening, continued their work of destruction; and, whilst still, as before, expending the main of their strength on the Faubourg, they now too (by way of diversion) assailed the Flagstaff Bastion.

Bombard-
ment of the
7th of June.

¹ Letters from Head-quarters, ii. p. 294.

On even the first day, the 6th, the batteries of the Allies obtained a decisive ascendant; but from the morning of the following day, the 7th, they hour by hour asserted their more and more thorough mastery over all the antagonist batteries. The fire of the allied batteries was so destructive that even General Todleben was fain to break away in describing it from the colder language of science, and to treat the bombardment as an abnormal exertion of force—as violent, terrible, murderous. More

Effect of the bombardment. The fire of the English guns. terrific, it seems, than all else was the fire of the English.¹ They delivered their artillery blows somewhat slowly, one after another, but with a dreadful exactness, entailing havoc and ruin.⁽¹⁾ After three o'clock in the afternoon, the whole fire of the Allies—then no longer assailing the Flagstaff Bastion—was brought to bear on the Faubourg with appalling effect. By six o'clock

Crippled state of the enemy's works concerned in opposing the French. on the evening, not only the two White Redoubts on Mount Inkerman with the battery called 'Za-balkansky' then newly thrown up in their rear, but also the Kamtchatka Lunette that crowned the Mamelon Height, and all the neighboring works (including even the Malakoff) that might otherwise have given support to the foremost line of defense, were ruined or grievously crippled. Though not for the most part dismounted, the guns in the enemy's batteries were, so to speak, 'buried alive'—covered over with heaps upon heaps of what had been merlons, or traverses, or revetments of lined embrasures.²

In its bearing on all the assaults then about to be made by the French, the bombardment proved itself so effective that their onsets, however exposed to peril of other kinds, could hardly be defeated or checked by any artillery power.

Whilst thus smoothing, so far as was possible, the rough path of conquest, the English did more for the French than they found they could do for themselves. They of course poured the fire of their siege-guns on the work of 'the Quarries'—the work they meant to assault—and they wrought a good deal of havoc on the nearest supporting work, that is, the Great Redan;³ but they could not so cripple the numerous and powerful batteries in this part of the Karabelnaya as to prevent the enemy's gunners from disputing any hold they might take of the Work they were minded to seize.

¹ Todleben, ii. p. 310.

² Ibid. pp. 314, 315.

³ Ibid. p. 315.

The time for
the bayonet
come.

All, however, agreed that the cannon had now done its work, and that what must come next was—the bayonet.

IV.

Pélissier and Lord Raglan determined to assault at al-
most the same time the whole of the counter-ap-
proaches which still in the Karabelnaya affronted
the now strong besiegers. The attack on the part
of the French was to be effected in strength by portions of
the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Divisions of the 2d Corps commanded
by Bosquet; on the part of the English, by detachments
from the Light and Second Divisions, supported (at night)
by the 62d Regiment, and intrusted to Colonel Shirley of
the 88th, then acting as the general officer in command of
the trenches. For counsel in matters best known to Engineer
officers, Colonel Shirley had with him Colonel Tylden, the
directing Engineer officer of the right attack. The English,
as was their wont, hoped to do great things with small num-
bers; but by exerting the power he held as the officer in
command of the trenches, Colonel Shirley could largely re-
inforce the troops first engaged, and a word from Lord
Raglan (who would be present in person on the Woronzoff
Ridge) might still further add to their strength.

Osman Pasha's division was placed in reserve near the
head of the Carcenage Ravine.

V.

At about half-past six in the evening of the 7th of June
the welcome signal was given by a jet of rockets thrown up
from the lofty Victoria Ridge; and it not only summoned
to action French troops in that part of the field, but also
those on Mount Inkerman, with which General Bosquet pro-
posed to carry the two White Redoubts.

With the 4th Division (Dulac) as its reserve, the 3d Di-
vision (Mayran) moved forward in two columns;
General Lavarande's brigade advancing on the
Vollhynia, that of Failly on the Selinghinsk Re-
doubt; and although the assailants of the Volhynia Redoubt
had to cross a breadth of some 330 yards, whilst those at-
tacking the Selinghinsk were to traverse even double that
space, both the forces pushed steadily on under fire without
coming once to a halt before reaching each its set goal. To
accomplish this advance—and it did not cost them any great

Attack and
seizure of the
two White
Redoubts.

sacrifice—was almost to insure final victory ; for thenceforth the weight of numbers—two whole French brigades to two bodies of but 225 men each—could scarce fail to govern the issue. The resistance of the two little garrisons might be hopeless, but still was brave. Chestakoff, the commander of the redoubts, and Bélaieff, commanding the battalion, were both of them killed. After a struggle in each of the works, which, although not greatly prolonged, was still hot so long as it lasted, the redoubts were both of them taken, the Volhynia by General Lavarande's, the Selinghinsk by Faily's brigade.

A second battalion of the Moroum regiment came up with a mind to support the vanquished and retreating garrisons ; but yielding to weight of numbers, the men of this last force were soon in a state of discomfiture, and sharing in the fate of their comrades. Pursuing their vanquished enemy, the French pressed on over a distance of some 500 yards, and seized the Zabalkansky battery ; but not choosing to hold as their own a work so far out in advance, they destroyed its embrasures, and spiked the five guns it contained.¹

Seizure and abandonment of the Zabalkansky battery.

When about half an hour had passed, two other battalions of the Moroum regiment which had been in reserve all this while marched out of the Ouchakoff Ravine with a mind to retake the Redoubts ; but long since, General Bosquet had seen that any movements of troops going on, whether eastward or westward, between the Faubourg and the White Redoubts might give him a good opportunity of striking them in flank or in rear. Therefore under his orders Lieutenant-Colonel Larrouy d'Orion with two French battalions had moved down along the deep bed of the Carenage Ravine till he came to the viaduct, and had then clambered up the right bank of the gorge to a lair from which he might strike at the front, the flank, or the rear of any Russian troops moving to or from the Redoubts in either advance or retreat.

The Russians throwing forward two battalions of their Moroum regiment.


Movement by Colonel d'Orion under Bosquet's orders.

The two ill-fated Russian battalions had already passed over the viaduct, and were ascending the path up Mount Inkerman which led towards their goal, when all at once Colonel d'Orion with his agile French force sprang up the hillside in their rear, seemed intent to cut them off from Sebastopol, and threw them into

His overthrow of the two Moroum battalions ;

¹ In that state Todleben found it, vol. ii. p. 330.

THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE 7TH OF JUNE.



ENGLISH RIGHT
GORDON'S ATTACK

Good progress was made in the direction of the French position, and the English forces were able to capture the Lunette.



confusion. They turned, and strove to get back the way they had come, and their movement to the rear was afterwards represented to Todleben as 'opening a way with the 'bayonet.' Of what fighting really took place we see, indeed, one painful trace—for the brave Colonel d'Orion received a mortal wound; but, so far as concerned nearly half, or, more strictly, four tenths, of the enemy's force, there resulted nothing short of surrender. Four hundred of the 400 Russians surrendering. Russians, including twenty officers, were content to be taken prisoners by Colonel d'Orion's force.¹

When the French, as we saw, had determined that the Zabalkansky battery was too distant to be of service to them, and had therefore done their best to destroy it, they were far from intending that their outposts should be kept back in rear of the work they had thus discarded as useless, and took good care, on the contrary, to spread their patrols over ground several hundreds of yards more advanced—ground by which they well knew that the enemy might approach them from the Karabelnaya; whilst also, as was natural, volunteer explorers and idlers moved rambling over the ground newly opened on that summer evening to the eyes of the victors.

The people thus scattered were, at one point, pressed back by Colonel Prince Ouroussoff with a single battalion;² at another by Colonel Kraievsky, dispatched under Khrouleff's directions with no less than 800 men. In the course of the movement he made against troops thus receding before him, Prince Ouroussoff entered the site of the discarded battery (which the French had taken, spoilt, and abandoned three hours before), and on that simple action built up—built up, I believe, in good faith—a theory that he with his men had victoriously 'retaken' the work. Though he added that he had retaken it with our old friend 'the bayonet,' one is not therefore forced to infer that he meant to deceive human beings, but rather—Slave like—to put a kind of 'Hurrah' in the midst of what reads like a statement. Prince Ouroussoff had even what seemed like a 'trophy' of the miniature sort; for the French in their chase had been using a baby-sized howitzer of the kind

¹ Niel, p. 296. By Todleben (who wrote long afterwards) the statement is not called in question.

² General Timovieff (on what ground I know not) accompanied Ouroussoff's battalion, and was killed.

drawn by human strength ; and when the pursuit had ceased, this 'perambulator,' as our nursemaids would call it, was left without 'hands' strong enough to withdraw it from the spot where it stood—the spot on which, it would seem, Prince Ouroussoff's soldiery found it.¹

With plain signs of smiling incontinently at Ouroussoff's other mistakes, General Todleben nevertheless accepted the Prince's bold story ;⁽²⁾ and was certainly led to represent that both Ouroussoff and Kraievsky had triumphantly engaged their small forces in not less than two brilliant combats. The theory drew much support from statements which showed that these Colonels had purchased their triumphs by enormous sacrifices of men ;² but the French, it appears, never knew of their having sustained the reverses implied by such Russian victories, or at all events did not confess that they had encountered any such checks ; and, on the whole, my conclusion is that, although both Prince Ouroussoff and Kraievsky (the last under Khrouleff's orders) did really advance up the spur, and press back all the loose soldiery that came in their way, they encountered no formed battalion, and engaged in no serious fight, their losses being caused by the error of 'trespassing,' if so one may speak, on what had become a French realm, without any due warlike motive. The deserts of the Prince and of Khrouleff (the ordainer of Kraievsky's advance) were not unlike those of an officer who has wasted good troops in the pastime of molesting an enemy's pickets.

Rejoicing in what he believed to have been his triumphant recapture of the Zabalkansky battery, and there contentedly tarrying, whilst also perhaps somewhat flushed by his seizure of the small French 'perambulator,' Prince Ouroussoff harbored a fancy strong enough to make him feel sure that he then had 'no more worlds to conquer.' He not only fancied, but even—twice over—reported that the two White Redoubts—then observed to be doggedly silent—had passed back into the hands of his own fellow-countrymen, and he even brought General Khrouleff to accept the same pleasant belief ; but under Todleben's orders the valiant sea-captain Skariatine³ dispelled it in a very plain way by moving up with some men to the verge of the Selinghinsk Redoubt, and approaching the work so closely—of course

¹ See Rousset, vol. ii. p. 235.

² The Prince losing *one half* of his force, and Kraievsky 187 out of 800.—Todleben, pp. 322 and 327.

³ Respecting Skariatine, see Note in the Appendix (³).

the darkness was favoring—as to be able to catch the voices of soldiers talking within it, and hear that they were talking in French.

Both this and the Volhynia Redoubt were secure in the hands of their conquerors; but the site of the Zabalkansky battery remained in the hands of the Russians till a day or two afterwards, when, as the French had done before them, they spontaneously relinquished what Ouroussoff had thought to be a great prize.

It was after his capture of the Volhynia Redoubt, and, indeed, on the following day, that—stricken unhappily by a mere chance shot—the brave General Lavarande fell.

VI.

Far away from the two White Redoubts, but still in a sense closely joined with them by relations of interdependence, that work audaciously planted on 'the Mamelon' with which the genius of Todleben had long been shielding his Malakoff was now at last brought under challenge. Not to take the Kamtchatka Lunette by even so mighty an effort as Pélissier was determined to make would be a disheartening calamity; but to win it might be winning a stepping-stone to the paramount stronghold, and—after a while—to Sebastopol. Few, if any, believed that the Work could be seized and held fast without incurring grave losses.

At half-past five o'clock in the evening, General Bosquet, on ground near the Lancaster Battery, which he had chosen as his post of observation, assembled the Divisions of Camou and Brunet—the troops destined to attack the Lunette—and haranguing them regiment by regiment was answered by the cheers of the men. In order to reach the last covert from which they would make their spring, they were first to advance some way down by the bed of the Dockyard Ravine, next file up its right bank, and proceed to line the Third Parallel—the foremost entrenchment then stretching across the Victoria Ridge. There ensconced, they would have but to wait till unleashed by the promised signal, and then at once storm the Lunette.

After hearing General Bosquet's harangues the French troops advanced, and began to move down the Ravine in a state of brisk effervescence, and a temper so eagerly warlike that to the eyes of a

First seizure
of the Kamt-
chatka Lu-
nette by the
French.

5.30 P.M. The
French troops
harangued by
Bosquet.

Their advance
in a state of
warlike effervescence.

staid English critic their march seemed almost tumultuous.¹

The more any regiment was agitated by perturbing emotions, the more its men seemed to contrast with the fair one who rode at their head in her panoply of fearless, calm pride.

To our people—descended of men who never had learned to revere the beauteous goddess of Reason—this time-honored scene of a drama in which the Vivandière acts was beyond measure strange; but to one who—first having been reared in the genuine French School of High Art—beholds her riding serenely at the head of her regiment in the moments preceding a fight she represents an Idea; and, it being divined, though but dimly, that this march against the Lunette would involve heavy slaughter, she now more than ever seemed one who embodied the spirit of war. You might call her a priestess ordained, and bringing up human sacrifices to lay on the altar of glory; or again might see in her form a conventional image of France nobly leading her sons into action, and commanding them, if need be, to die. Each actress had her own ‘reading’ of the part that she played; so that one corps of troops, for example, was proudly led down through the gorge by a chieftainess riding in plumes; another by a bright girl attired with all the ineffable comeliness that belongs to the daughters of France when obeying strict laws of costume. The fairest of all was the one at the head of a much-favored regiment, by our people called the ‘Green Chasseurs.’² With infinite grace and composure she led her men down the Ravine to meet the fortune of war.

We have—not wrongly—lingered a moment to see the Vivandière pass; for—always characteristic, and linked with great warlike traditions—the memory of her presence, that day, gathered strength from the slaughter that followed. After an interval of perhaps hardly more than thirty or thirty-five minutes, the fight was destined to open, and then within one single hour, and within but a few hundred yards of the scenic display we have witnessed, the troops thus led down the Ravine would be falling, and falling by thousands.³

The chosen assailants of the Lunette had been not many

¹ Hamley, p. 239.

² Apparently the ‘*Tirailleurs*.’

³ As to the extent of the losses sustained by the French in that hour, see *post*, footnote, p. 83.

minutes ensconced in the Third Parallel when, at half-past seven o'clock, the rocket-signal unleashed them, and with a vigor and evident intentness of purpose observed and admired by Lord Raglan they sprang at once out to the front.

To reach the Kamtchatka Lunette, General Wimpfen's brigade would have to traverse a space of some 500 yards; but the formation of the ground made it possible by choosing right paths to compass most of the distance without incurring strong fire.

The fast-advancing brigade swept easily over the rifle-pits with which the great Engineer had striven to screen his Lunette, and pushed on in three columns. The one on the right was a regiment of Algerine Tirailleurs under Colonel Rose, the one in the centre was the 50th Line Regiment commanded by Colonel de Brancion, the one on the left was the 3d Zouave Regiment commanded by Colonel Polhès.

The Tirailleurs stormed and carried at once two of the collaterals batteries on the (proper) left flank of the Lunette; and the other two columns advanced against the Lunette itself. When emerging from the shelter afforded by a dip in the ground, these troops gained the top of the steep leading up to the Work, they at once became fully exposed to grape-shot and musketry-fire, and at the same time began to learn something of the strength of the Lunette. The Ditch they had reached was one cut in the solid rock, was broad, was deep, with beyond it a bristling parapet. The French, however, undaunted by all the perils before them, descended the counterscarp, and some of them moved round by the Ditch to make their way into the Work by its gorge, whilst others by taking advantage of small breaches found in the parapet, and, in some cases, by standing upon the shoulders of their comrades, found means to enter the Work by its embrasures. Colonel De Brancion was presently seen to be planting the colors of his regiment on the parapet of the assaulted Work.

Too soon, the brave colonel was struck dead; but, the sight of the victorious standard not failing to draw on the men still outside of the parapet, and the enemy's resistance collapsing under this bold attack, the Lunette was taken and occupied by the victorious French.

Carried wildly away by their victory and the heat of pursuit, no small part of the French troops pushed valiantly on up the glacis of the towering Malakoff, and some of them, reaching the Work, moved

First Capture
of the Lunette
by French
troops.

Their impetuous
advance
on the
Malakoff.

boldly down into its Ditch; but their effort not having formed part of the general design was left unsupported; and unable to climb their way back by the very steep counter-scarp, these brave men became prisoners of war.

The spontaneous attack, as it chanced, took place at a moment when several fresh Russian battalions (held back until then in reserve) had newly entered the Work. These gathering together and led by General Khrouleff himself, fell in strength on all those of the assailants who had not yet entered the Work, and drove them back into the gorge of the then newly captured Lunette. But this was not all; for those who were flying carried with them so great a disorder—augmented a few moments afterwards by the explosion of a 'fougasse'—that although, it seems, bravely attempted, no lastingly effectual stand could be made within the precincts of the Lunette, and after a brief yet sharp struggle the enemy, still pressing forward, drove all the French out of the Work they so lately had taken, and pressed them far in pursuit. These reverses brought with them a terrible slaughter of the French troops.¹

Thus for once, although transient, there shone one bright gleam of success on a movement adventured by Khrouleff, and to him this was much; for, with all his ardor in war, he had not hitherto proved to be a fortunate general. He seems to have become highly excited. Believing perhaps that the French would patiently endure this recapture, he at once rode off to the east with a mind, it would seem, to complete his apparent victory by recovering the two White Redoubts.

But whatever Khrouleff might hope, General Bosquet did not harbor a thought of submitting to this reverse. He proved equal to this new occasion. First ordering some batteries to play on the swiftly recaptured Lunette, he prepared to attack it with no less than two brigades of infantry, keeping also another brigade in occupation of the foremost parallel, or the trenches adjacent. For a while, the artillery raged; then all at once ceased, and the two brigades of Camou's Division advanced swiftly on the Lunette, surrounded it on all sides, attacked it with ardor, and rapidly carried the Work. This reconquest took place at half-past seven o'clock, and therefore at a convenient time, since the dark-

Their retreat when attacked in strength by General Khrouleff.

Khrouleff's recapture of the Kamtchatka Lunette.

General Bosquet's measures.

Second and definitive capture of the Lunette by the French.

¹ See footnote *post*, p. 83.

ness before long approaching would enable the French engineers to fasten on the captured Lunette, and turn it against the garrison.

At this time Vice-Admiral Nachimoff and General Todleben were both in the midst of the ruins which cumbered, which almost had silenced, the cardinal Fort of Sebastopol; and their counsels must needs have been anxious; for he who better than all men could judge such a question has said that the Malakoff for some time that evening was not only at the mercy of the French, but might even have been taken with ease.¹

I have no separate statement before me of the losses sustained by the French in this part of the field, but we know that they must have been huge.²

VII.

The English attack was to open as soon as the French, towards their right, should carry the Work on the Mamelon. So, when from the Woronzoff Ridge Lord Raglan—warmly admiring—saw Bosquet's troops make their first onset, and seize the Kamtchatka Lunette, he at once let our people begin their intended assault of 'the Quarries.'

Since the night of the 19th of April, when Egerton captured the 'lodgment' confronting the left of 'Gordon's Attack,' and bequeathed his honored name to the conquest thenceforth called 'Egerton's Pit,' the enemy had enlarged and connected the other neighboring 'lodgments' which still remained in his hands, and from that beginning at last had completed a system of field-work which covered the Great Redan by an outer belt of defenses some 400 yards in advance. These field-works, or 'counter-approaches,' as General Todleben called them, stretched across the whole Woronzoff Ridge in twofold lines of entrenchment; but the part of them destined to furnish the principal subject of strife was their main work thrown up on the crest of a small rounded ledge which faced down towards Egerton's Pit. By our people this principal Work was always named after some hollows which scarred the ground in its rear; so

¹ Todleben, ii. pp. 323, 324.

² Because those who fell elsewhere were certainly few; so that, to get at the number of those who fell in the strife connected with the enterprise against the Lunette no more than a small deduction can be made from the number—5543—which represents the French 'casualties.'

that when a man spoke of 'the Quarries,' he did not in general mean the old excavations of stone, but the field-work which covered their front.

For the defense of this principal field-work, and the col-
The enemy's measures of defense. lateral intrenchments extending it across the Wornzoff Ridge, the enemy, at first, it would seem, assigned only six battalions; but from time to time, later on, as will be presently shown, he threw into the Work other bodies of chosen infantry, and on the whole one may say that, besides the original garrison, he engaged first and last in the conflict four distinct expeditions of infantry, with an aggregate of strength not disclosed, though clearly shown to be large. He laid in the ground where he judged that our soldiers might tread a number of boxes, charged each with 35 lbs. of gunpowder. These were furnished with the needed appliances for making them explode under pressure; and—mainly because in mere structure they differed from the well-known 'fougasse'—men spoke of their use as a novelty malicious rather than warlike, and called them 'infernal machines.'

The attack was to be delivered by detachments from our Light and 2d Divisions, supported after a while by the 62d Regiment; and as 'General in the trenches,' Colonel Shirley commanded them. The duty of guiding our troops rested with the Engineers, and specially with Colonel Tylden, their chief.

If occasion should offer, Colonel Shirley (as General in the trenches) was to act with alertness, with vigor on his extreme right, and to give the French troops all such aid as the strength of his own would allow.¹

One great and exclusive advantage was destined to favor
The great and exclusive advantage about to be enjoyed by the enemy. the enemy. The conditions were about to be such that (lest they might harm our own troops) the batteries of the English would presently have to abstain from delivering any fire on 'the Quarries;' yet the enemy, otherwise circumstanced, would remain free to use in the conflict his great artillery power; and this so extensively that, except only during brief intervals (whilst attempting to hold, or to retake the disputed Work with his infantry), he was destined to keep, and exert this terrible privilege throughout the approaching fight—a period of nearly ten hours.

¹ Journal Royal Engineers, ii. pp. 269, 270.

Lord Raglan, confiding in the quality of his troops, and anxious to avoid the losses that might be expected to follow from the use of gross numbers, determined to assault the main field-work with two separated bodies of only 200 men each, sending 300 more to attack the collateral intrenchments; but the troops thus thrown forward were to be supported by 600 more, and to be rapidly followed by very strong working-parties, some destined from almost the first (as was the case, for instance, with the working-party of the 55th Regiment, 160 strong) to act as combatants, and besides, after nightfall to be aided by the 62d Regiment, as also, if the need should occur, by other troops within reach.

Colonel Robert Campbell, of the 90th Regiment, commanded the stormers, and led in person that half of them (200 strong) which was furnished by the Light Division; whilst the other half, furnished by the 2d Division, was led by Major James Armstrong of the 49th.

Lord Raglan determined that the assault should be delivered exclusively against the flanks of the Work which our people had surnamed 'the Quarries;' and this decision proved fortunate; for in the quarters thus marked for attack the ground had not, as elsewhere, been charged with any explosive machines.

Our artillery had been searching the Work of 'the Quarries' with a powerful fire; but all at once became silent.

Then the two chosen bodies of stormers, led, on one flank, by their commander, Colonel Campbell of the 90th, in person, on the other, by Major Armstrong of the 49th, advanced on the enemy's trenches without, it seems, firing a shot, and—unchecked by ditch, or

by parapet, or by what General Todleben says was the strenuous resistance of the Russian soldiery—

pushed forward so resolutely that, in spite of their scanty numbers, they swiftly broke into the Work. They thus gave the warrant of successful experience to that wise reliance on the quality of his soldiers which had induced Lord Raglan to avoid, if he could, heavy loss by delivering the intended attack with only a few valiant men.

These, however, were quickly supported by the troops assigned for the purpose, and by the strong working-party of the 55th Regiment under Captain Cure, which having been previously ordered to throw down their tools and stand to their arms, drove the enemy, at the point of the bayonet, from the trench they attacked. The conquest quickly em-

Lord Raglan's
dispositions
for the
attack.

Advance of
our storming-
parties.

Their seizure
of the Work.

Capture of
the collateral
intrench-
ments.

braced not only the Work of the Quarries, but the foremost of the collateral intrenchments, thence extending far eastward across the whole Woronzoff Ridge. High praise was awarded to Captain Elton for the skillful, resolute way in which, with some 55th men, he fended off the enemy's troops from some of our people then laboring to reverse a captured parapet.¹

Colonel Campbell, at the head of his men, was wounded—twice wounded—without being therefore disabled; but of the forces he led no great proportion were stricken while busied in storming the Work. There were several of them who fell, but fell at a later moment. Major Armstrong, for instance, the chief who had led the storming forces contributed by the 2d Division, was severely wounded; but, when the ball reached him, he—acting on one flank, and Campbell besides on the other—had already made good their attack.

Overthrown at their foremost intrenchments, the Russians were soon driven out from every part of the field-work, and they fled back into the fortress with a loss of two officers and a hundred men. Pursuing the fugitives eagerly, our few soldiers pressed their way forward to spots where the ground offered something like shelter against the guns of the Fortress, and thence searched the embrasures of the Great Redan in their front with a keenly sustained rifle-fire.

Far from proving to be a sheer blessing, the defeat of the enemy's troops laid open the counter-approach to a fire of great guns more destructive than the efforts of Russian infantry; and, on the whole, it was plain that, although for the moment victorious, heavy tasks yet awaited our people; for, if striving by work carried on under the fire of great batteries to effect—to effect before morning—a fairly tenable lodgment on the ground that their stormers had won, and to connect it with their system of trenches, they also would have, if they could, to withstand all such efforts to recover his counter-approach as the enemy might make in the night-time.

Though disabled in body—not mind—by his dangerous wound, Major Armstrong was so good a soldier as to be carefully thinking already of this last imperious exigency. His men wanting to carry him to the rear, he forbade them, saying firmly: 'No, no; lay me down at the

Flight of the
defenders,
pursued by
our troops.

Our men in
the extreme
front.

The tasks yet
awaiting our
people.

Major Arm-
strong.

¹ The high honor of the Victoria Cross was granted to Captain, now Colonel, F. Elton.

‘bottom of the ditch; for we can’t spare a man till we know whether the enemy will attempt a recapture.’⁽⁴⁾

Notwithstanding his wounds received in storming the Work, Colonel Campbell accepted and throughout retained supreme command in the Quarries, not only of the original attacking force and supports, but of all the reinforcements brought up in the course of the night.

The commander of the working-party of the 49th Regiment, which the 2d Division had furnished, was Colonel Thornton Grant, whom we have known, if so one may speak, since the morning of the Inkerman day. Whilst overlooking his men, Grant found himself at the side of Colonel Tylden, the gifted Engineer officer whom again and again we have seen where the fighting was thickest. Even he, even Tylden himself, was for one instant doubting whether under the fire—the murderous fire—of artillery which now swept the site of the projected constructions, it would be possible for mortal men to execute the task ordained; but convincing himself the next moment that, unless a communication and lodgment could be made good before morning, the victory achieved by our stormers would prove to be all in vain, he resolved that, at even a sacrifice so great as to seem appalling, the needed work must be done. What he followed—unknowingly—was the logic of him who once said: ‘It is necessary to sail: it is not necessary to live.’ Grant warmly concurring, and trustful in the valor of his 49th men, undertook to propel the execution of the work which was to connect the newly won ground with our system of trenches at the point called ‘Egerton’s Pit.’

Of the men brought up as ‘working-parties’ so large a proportion were summoned to act as combatants in the fights one after another, of which we shall presently hear, that to execute the needed works with only the few ‘hands’ remaining was a formidable task.¹ There, however, were happily present some officers of great zeal and energy who might be trusted to go to the utmost of what mortal men could do. In darkness more or less thick, they toiled through the night, and, on the whole, under conditions which (except as regarded some few) made it hard for a chief in authority,

Colonel Campbell's command.

Colonel Grant's meeting with Colonel Tylden.

¹ It is said that after deducting the numbers thus summoned to throw down their tools and stand to their arms, there remained only 250 for the needed work.

however painstaking and anxious, to award them the praise they deserved. Yet, without overpassing the limits of even official recognition, we see the names of six officers whose valorous exertions were soon brought to light—the name

Colonel	first and foremost of Colonel Tylden, the com-
Tylden.	manding Engineer, the names of Colonel Thorn-
Thornton	ton Grant, of Captain Browne, of Lieutenant
Grant.	Elphinstone, of Lieutenant Anderson of the 96th.
Elphinstone.	

The sixth name was that of a young officer of the 90th Regiment, whom a casual observer would call a strangely bright-looking boy. Now, however—with pickaxe in hand—this boy (as he seemed) was devoting a mighty zeal—zeal governed by knowledge and skill—to the cardinal purpose in hand. He was one who (as now the world knows) had a life of warlike glory before him. Though seeming much younger, he was really twenty-one years of age. Twenty-one years of age, yet already distinguished for the number and the brilliancy of his warlike services, Captain—then Lieutenant—Wolseley had come out to the Crimea in the midst of the terrible winter. Within a few days from the time of his landing, he had courted hardship and work by volunteering to serve as an engineer in the trenches; and it is still as acting engineer that we first see him busied in this evening of the 7th of June. From a work—discontinued soon afterwards—on a part of the ground further east he was summoned to replace an engineer officer who had been killed at the Quarries; and thenceforth, till the morning hour which found him exchanging all other toil for the toil of a desperate fight, he shared in the strenuous efforts by which our people were striving to connect the works newly captured with Egerton's Pit, and to form, before break of day, what, however imperfect, might prove to be a tenable lodgment. The loss of blood caused by a wound received at an earlier hour did not slacken his powerful energies; and, although he was destined to touch—was destined even to pass—the actual physical limit, of what angry Nature allows in the way of bodily effort, we shall not see him robbed of his strength by either the work or the fighting he chose to go through till the object of his toil had been reached and the difficult victory won.

While thus the men of our 'working-parties' were striving to connect the Work of the 'Quarries' with the trenches of Gordon's Attack, and to effect such a lodgment, or inchoate lodgment, as might afterwards enable fresh 'hands' to continue the task under daylight, their comrades in arms

were sustaining, with checkered fortunes, a series of obstinate fights.

In contests for field-works so placed that they can be brought under fire by opposing batteries, men oftentimes find it more easy to wrest the coveted prize from their enemy's hands than to hold it fast after the capture.¹ Our people were destined all night to be either under the fire of powerful batteries, or—at intervals—meeting the onslaught of troops intent on recapture.

At the head of a powerful body of Russian troops drawn from the Kamtchatka, the Volhynia, and the Minsk regiments, Captain Boudistcheff, of the Imperial Navy, strove hard to retake the counter-approaches⁽⁵⁾; but was stubbornly met by the English in spite of their scanty numbers. Captain Boudistcheff, the commander of the assailing force, was wounded and taken prisoner by our people, and Khomenko, the commander of the Kamtchatka battery, was killed. Still the English were forced back a good way by the weight of the assailing mass, and were even, it seems, for the moment driven out of the field-work, carrying with them, however, their distinguished prisoner the commander Boudistcheff who had fallen wounded into their hands. After making a rally, and re-entering the field-work, our people once more engaged the enemy, and, bewildered or depressed by the loss of both Boudistcheff and Khomenko, the Russians faltered awhile, but again were led on by Captain Reutlinger of the Engineers, and they rescued the valiant Boudistcheff, their wounded commander; but presently Reutlinger himself was wounded in the head; and our people returning to the charge drove all the Russians out of the Work and back once more into the fortress. The young Engineer officer, Lieutenant Lowry, had survived the perilous task of conducting one of our storming-parties, but, long after, was killed while rallying our men in the night-time for this last victorious charge.

Somewhat later, and when the night had become more dark than before, another attempt to recover the counter-approaches was made by the Volhynia regiment, then forming a single battalion. Though the effort was resisted by our people with great

¹ We saw, *ante*, vol. v. pp. 140 *et seq.*, an instance in which the Russians seemed to act on that conviction.

determination and energy, the regiment under Colonel Snelkoff, its chief, proved able to enter the Work, but, under a fresh effort made by the English soldiery, was presently forced to yield ground. After falling back upon the second line of the counter-approaches the Volhynia regiment rallied and made a rush upon the counter-approaches in front, but, its Colonel being then wounded, and fresh troops reinforcing our people, the enemy was again driven back and fled once more to find shelter behind the works of the fortress.

Maintained on each side with valor and obstinacy, these several infantry conflicts must needs have involved serious loss; yet the periods of time that they occupied were those perhaps when our men suffered less than they did during all the other hours of darkness; for, whilst mingled in fight with the enemy's troops, they were spared from the fire of the place, but always underwent it again (without having yet obtained cover) so soon as they had defeated their assailants and thrust them back into the fortress.

Of course under such conditions there was need of the ability with which, as we know, Colonel Shirley conducted the fight, and especially of the moderation and judgment with which he brought up reinforcements, neither suffering the conflict to end for want of men to sustain it, nor pouring in heavy masses—to fall in proportionate numbers—beneath the guns of the fortress. Lord Raglan declared that the manner in which Colonel Shirley conducted this 'arduous service' entitled him to the highest praise.¹

Not long before daybreak, and when indeed some observed the first faint glimmer of twilight, the enemy launched a fresh column against our wearied soldiery, and once more challenged their hold of the long-disputed field-work. The column advanced up a dell that opened in front of our people at a distance of more than 200 yards, and, whilst still in the hollow, was seen by Colonel Campbell and Captain Wolseley, both of the 90th, as well as by other officers. They hastened at once to prepare all the means of resistance at hand by summoning the men within reach to rise up from the ground where they lay, to meet the approaching attack; but a startling disappointment awaited them. During the last ten

¹ To Secretary of State, 9th June, 1855.

Prostrate
state of most
of our men.

hours of fighting and working, the physical strength of our men had been heavily taxed—taxed so closely up to its limit that, except as regarded a few (of whom we shall presently hear), they had fallen into a state which many, perhaps, might describe as one of faintness, or syncope, but what at all events ailed them was exhaustion of the power which alone can put muscles in action. They could not be roused; and, when lifted, could hardly, if at all, keep their feet.¹

Show of re-
sistance at-
tempted by
some officers
and men.

An enemy's column advancing, and before them British troops lying helpless as though stricken and nailed to the ground by some hellish enchantment! 'It seemed to me,' said one officer present, 'like the end of the world.' However, some few of our officers—including Colonel Campbell and Captain Wolseley, and also several sergeants and corporals, with some men of the rank and file, making up altogether a strength variously computed at from one to three score—began to act together, and they all instinctively sought to make the very most of their scanty numbers by firing into the column (our officers firing even their pistols), but also by vehement cheering; and happily one alert bugler became a host in himself, for—pouring out the glad notes which govern the movement of troops—he wrought on the imaginations of men, and peopled the darkness with phantoms of a soldiery obeying his call.

Its effect.

The seemingly shallow expedient of attempting a show of resistance with means such as those which were used might pass with many grave men as an inopportune sort of mockery; but—favored of course by the darkness scarce yielding as yet to dim twilight—the effort, however desperate, produced a strange, sudden effect. The

The Russian
column falter-
ing and
coming to
a stop;

enemy's column began to falter, then stopped. Then—at first with gestures of encouragement and entreaty, but afterwards—with indications of violent rage, with efforts to drag the men forward by their collars, and even to enforce obedience by blows from the flats of their swords, the Russian officers could be seen trying hard to make their people come on. They labored, however, in vain, and the column began to fall back. This abortive attempt was the last, and the morning that now quickly dawned found our people still holding the Work.

and falling
back.

The English
at break of
day still re-
taining their
hold.

¹ See *post*, p. 92 *et seq.*, as to state of two officers afterwards stricken in this way.

In general, the Russian soldiery were no less obedient than brave; and the refusal of a powerful body composed of such men to advance at a critical moment sprang plainly from one of those freaks of the imagination which often mislead the best troops when attempting a night attack. It may therefore be said that our people owed this, their definitive victory, to one of the chances of war. Still, if any one thinks for a moment of what we called the 'show of resistance'—the appeal of the single bugler, the touching recourse to small pistols, the shouts (instead of a volley!) opposed to a column of infantry—he will say that, though Fortune took part in this the last of the conflicts repeated during the night, she at least (as is often her wont) ranged herself on the side of bold men—men who hardly, it seems, entertained any rational hope, yet—superbly deficient in logic—refused nevertheless to despair.

Whilst thus happily achieving their tasks of the more strictly combative sort, our people had also done more; for with only a few 'hands,' and—in general—working under strong fire, they had connected the newly won field-work with Egerton's Pit by a fairly sufficient 'boyau,' and moreover had thrown up a parapet—consisting of gabions and barrels, but also in part of dead bodies—on the captured ground, thus providing such means as might render it possible to continue the work under daylight, and entitling themselves to hope that their seizure and night-long defense of what our men called 'the Quarries' would ripen into a conquest.

We spoke of men lying helpless because they had passed the limits of what human beings could do in the way of hard toil; and it happened, though not till after the fight, that the very two officers whom we saw taking a foremost part in the desperate 'show of resistance' were both made to suffer the penalty of working too hard and too long. The fatigue (with a load of anxiety) which the chief, Colonel Campbell, endured on that night of the 7th of June was so great that even five weeks afterwards he had not recovered from the overstrain put on his energies.¹ The other example was that of a man but twenty-one years of age. Although Captain Wolseley had been engaged on active duty incessantly since the morning of the 7th, his power of exertion continued until

¹ See his dispatch of 13th July, 1855, to Sir James Simpson.

the victory had been definitively won.⁽⁶⁾ Then Nature gave way. Unable to stand, he fell helpless amongst the slain; and, when lifted up, by the strength of others, stood only to fall again. He was conscious, and could speak, but only in a very faint whisper. We find a clew to the nature of his ailment by learning what cured it. Some twenty-four hours of sleep restored to him full life and health.

VIII.

It was not without submitting to painful sacrifices that our people achieved this hard conquest, a conquest of what—measured strictly—was only a ribbon of ground, but still one that helped on the siege.

In killed, wounded, and missing, the Russians lost 5000;¹ the French 5500;² the English nearly 700, of whom not less than 47 were officers.³ The French took from the enemy 73 pieces of ordnance, of which all except six were of heavy calibre.⁴

IX.

The Allies soon reversed, and turned to their own use, the works they had wrested from the enemy; so that what had been the two White Redoubts, the Kamtchatka Lunette and the counter-approach called the ‘Quarries,’ all powerfully defending Sebastopol, now marked the front newly advanced from which the Allies would spring out to make their attack on the fortress.

By establishing batteries on the new positions thus won, the Allies pressed their siege with a stringency greatly increased; and one result seemingly was that thenceforth there remained but one quarter in which the inhabitants or the men of the garrison could loiter or pass without risk.⁵

X.

The fire of siege-guns we saw open on the afternoon of the 6th was continued on the morrow, and during the three following days. This artillery effort was called the Third Bombardment, and it in-

¹ Todleben, ii. p. 333.

² More exactly 5443.—Niel, p. 301.

³ More exactly 671, being the number shown in Journal of Royal Engineers, when corrected by the addition of two casualties omitted by mistake in the Return.

⁴ Niel, p. 298.

⁵ Ernschoff.

flicted on the Russians a loss of 3507 men, the Allies, it seems, only losing under the fire of the responding batteries 150 each day.¹

CHAPTER VI.

THE SIEGE AND DEFENSE CARRIED ON TO THE CLOSE OF THE FOURTH BOMBARDMENT.

I.

THE victorious achievements of the 7th of June did not even for a moment allay that spirit of obstinate antagonism which divided Louis Napoleon from his strong-willed general; and, indeed, the huge sacrifice of men by which the French army had purchased its recent advantages gave the Emperor a powerful leverage that he could and would use against the recusant Pélissier; for of course the ruler might say—might say, as he imagined, with truth—that the idea of incurring such losses as had to be numbered by thousands in order to conquer mere stepping-stones a few hundred yards in advance was unworthy of any comparison with the dream he had dreamt and was dreaming—the dream of a new ‘Great St. Bernard’ discovered by a new Bonaparte amongst the passes of the Tchatir Dag, with, beyond it, another Marengo.

So, after having received the prompt congratulations of Queen Victoria expressed in the most gracious terms, Pélissier had to wait a whole week for any recognition at all on the part of his own angry sovereign, and was then at last greeted by words giving praise indeed to the troops, but—constructively—blaming the general, and approaching him yet once again with hard, peremptory words of dictation—words commanding him to do, and do quickly, the opposite of what he thought right—the opposite of what he was doing. ‘Before,’ wrote the Emperor on the 14th of June, ‘before congratulating you on the brilliant success you obtained on the 7th, I wished to know what sacrifices it had cost. I now learn the extent of them from St. Petersburg. I admire the courage of the troops, but observe that a pitched battle disposing of the fate of the Crimea would not have cost more men. I persist, then, in the order I have caused

¹ Todleben, ii. pp. 339, 340. We have already seen (*ante*, vol. v. p. 98) why the Russians submitted to great sacrifices whilst under bombardment.

‘to be given you by the Minister of War, to bend all your efforts to the object of resolutely taking the field.’

The language used by Pélissier whilst resisting the imperial orders had been hitherto of a varied kind; for, though oftentimes savage and fierce, not trying to hide his scorn, he had also in other moods chosen to be either immensely adroit, or cleverly or openly evasive, or again to be mystifying his correspondent with appeals to the Doctrine of sieges, and the sacred authority of Vauban; condescending, besides, now and then to toss in some phrase of few syllables that made a thin show of loyalty; but, whilst thus lightly fencing with words, he had always in action proved stubborn, doing simply what he himself chose, and nothing that the Emperor ordered.⁽¹⁾

But when answering the Emperor’s letter of the 14th of June, Pélissier altered his tone. No longer evasive, he was graver, more stern. He stood fiercely at bay. He told the Emperor plainly that the full execution of his orders was ‘impossible;’ declared that those orders subjected him to the alternative of either resisting authority, or dishonoring himself by obeying it, and prayed that by his Majesty’s orders he might be either set free from the narrow limits assigned him, or allowed to resign the command—a command he described as one ‘impossible to exercise in concert with ‘our loyal allies, at the sometimes paralyzing extremity of ‘an electric wire.’¹

For any answer at all to this stern dispatch Pélissier was kept waiting in vain throughout the whole day and the night of the 17th of June.

The truth is that, while torturing Pélissier by perverse interference the Emperor was himself under tortures of the kind that needs must be suffered by any distracted mortal who long and anxiously hesitates on a question he deems to be vital. To be treated as a dreamy civilian by one of his generals was mortifying of course to his vanity, and subversive of his curious pretension to rule as a quasi-Napoleon; yet at a time so big with fate as the one at last reached—the eve, as it were, of a battle—he could not but see staring danger in so bold a measure as that of removing Pélissier from the command of an army drawn up in the enemy’s presence. It may be that the French in the Crimea would have regarded the withdrawal of their commander with somewhat mixed feelings, for many of them deemed

¹ Pélissier to the Emperor, 16th June, 1855.

him a chief who was prodigal—unduly prodigal—of the lives of his men ; but it is believed that the French army elsewhere—more especially the army in France, which gave what there was of security to the second French Empire—would have looked with ill favor on the change, and even perhaps with grave anger. Be that as it may, the Emperor faltered, and, as is usual with men in his state, sent dubious, weak, clashing words : ‘Certainly,’ said the Emperor to Péliissier, ‘I have confidence in you, but that does not prevent me from having my personal conviction. Besides, there is nothing dishonoring to a general in executing the orders of his Government if he believes them capable of being executed. It was thus that the Kertch Expedition took place by orders of the English Government.’⁽²⁾ If the instructions of the 14th are too absolute, ‘modify them ; but it is impossible to close one’s eyes to the evidence, and to refrain from telling you’—here again supervened the old dream—‘that the key of the Crimea is at Simphéropol, and that an expedition like that of Kertch, but with double the strength, and landing at Aloushta and holding Simphéropol, would have a more decisive effect than all the bloody attacks against Sebastopol.’¹

Louis Napoleon unaware of the way in which his plan had collapsed.

If the Emperor thus still continued to harp on the plan he had formed, this was plainly because none had told him of the curiously signal collapse which his cherished design underwent so long since as the middle of May. Inquiry in the Crimea soon made it appear that for the defence of the Allied position—a task all agreed to be vital—there would be needed no less than 90,000 men who (for reasons we showed in their place) would have to be all either French, or French and English combined. Under General Péliissier’s plan of firmly pressing the siege, the Allies—by simply their presence—would be amply sufficing for all defensive purposes, yet meanwhile would be free to exert their whole strength in attack. Under the Emperor’s plan, on the contrary, the 90,000 men required for the defence of the position would be all, as it were, standing sentry, doing nothing besides towards the object in hand ; and it is obvious that any design would stand self-condemned, if requiring so vast a withdrawal as one of 90,000 prime troops from all share in the coming attack.

¹ Rousset, ii. p. 258.

In parting at last with that subject of the superincumbent plan which during several months had hampered the cause of the Allies, one may say that the idea of resorting to some sort of field operations well deserved to be considered with care; but all the wishes formed by the Emperor in that general direction were balked by his own course of action. He tenaciously coupled his longing for field operations with the eccentric, fanciful plan of an Alpine excursion from Aloushta; and on the other hand, he insisted with almost passionate energy that no enterprise against the enemy's flank or rear should be attempted from Eupatoria.

Well, inquiry in the Crimea convinced people there that the idea of an advance into the mountains from Aloushta was rash, was even wild, yet also satisfied many (including among others Lord Raglan) that a plan of attacking the Russian field army from Eupatoria might be well carried into effect; ⁽³⁾ and what forbade a resort to that last simple measure was the antipathy it excited in the mind of Louis Napoleon. He, in short, had constructed a plan which, however enchanting to himself, was by others considered absurd; and the one that others approved he ran down with singular vehemence.

In this way, though eager for field operations, he effectually prevented recourse to any such scheme of action.

The electric communication between France and Pélissier's Head-quarters had been made too complete to leave room for what people called the 'cross purposes' occasioned in old times by distance; yet it was with the equivocal dispatch we last quoted—one expressing confidence, but importing distrust, and ending with the obsolete subject of a fancied campaign in the open—that the Emperor thus interposed—interposed, in the midst of a battle. When he sent off his message the preparative bombardment of the 17th of June had been raging for several hours.

For Pélissier, while kept in suspense, adhered all the time to his practice of meeting the Emperor's orders by actions which set them at naught; and unflinchingly went on preparing to execute his great siege attacks without knowing whether his fate would be to command the French army with the latitude on which he insisted, or not to command it at all.

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II.

In maintaining these struggles against his sovereign, Pélissier, after all, was resisting the then actual 'law' of his country; and, although this strong and proud man was accustomed to mask his sense of pain by outbursts of uncontrolled rage, he suffered, bitterly suffered, under words of rebuke and command, all importing that the terrible sacrifices of men he had made and was going to make would receive no sanction in France from the constituted Chief of the State. Writing to the War Minister, he declared himself to be 'afflicted' by the course that the Emperor was taking against him.¹ It is true that the torture of mind thus endured by Pélissier did not bend him by even a hair's-breadth in the direction of the Emperor's wishes, but — perhaps by interfering with sleep — it seems to have weakened his judgment, and this at a critical time, extending over eight days, from the close of the 10th of June.

Of course, men are free, if they choose, to question the simple inference which sees in torture of mind close followed by ailing judgment the relation of 'cause and effect;' but, whatever its cause, the lowered degree of ability displayed by Pélissier in the course of those anxious 'eight days' is brought under so strong a light by contrasting it with the really great qualities he showed to the world both before and soon after the interval that this difference has become a proved fact—a proved fact making it certain that, while the brief interval lasted, he did not retain full command of the powers that Nature had given him.

It was during this interposed period of no more at the most than eight days that Pélissier's mind underwent three ill-omened changes of purpose, and impelled him besides, in one instance, to tear himself loose from the bonds of concerted action with a recklessness and haste not excused by any sound warlike reason, or even any reason at all.

On the 10th of June, General Pélissier was believed to be still, as before, in full accord with Lord Raglan; and, meeting in conference, the delegate generals of the French and the English commanders then concurred in approving and framing a plan of at-

The affliction
endured by
Pélissier;

its apparent
effect on his
judgment
during nearly
eight days.

Changes dur-
ing the inter-
val under-
gone by Pélis-
sier's mind.

10th of June;
full accord be-
tween Pélis-
sier and Lord
Raglan.

tack which was to include the town front ;¹ but Pélissier afterwards chose to discard that part of the scheme ;² and the enemy was thus to be spared from that very assault—an assault of the Flagstaff Bastion—which more than all else he had dreaded. Assuming—though not on good grounds—that if his troops should lay hold of the Flagstaff Bastion, they could and would enter the town, Pélissier got to imagine (as Canrobert had imagined before him) that dispersing themselves through the streets, and there for a while running riot, they would lapse into an uncontrolled state, bringing thus on themselves to begin with, but afterwards on the besiegers at large, some grave disaster.³ He therefore resolved, in antagonism to Lord Raglan's opinion, and to that of, besides, some French generals, including General Niel—that his attacks should be confined to the Faubourg. He so resolved, though the French engaged before the town front had sapped up to within a short distance of the enemy's works, whilst all the Allies, on the contrary, who craned from their foremost trenches in the Karabelnaya were divided from the opposite counterscarps by several hundreds of yards.

Lord Raglan lamented the change. It was not for him to judge whether the French ranged before the town front could or not have defeated their adversaries ; but he set a great value on any assaults towards the west, which would there have detained a great number of the enemy's troops, and prevented their taking a part in the fights for the Karabelnaya.⁴

The next change made by Pélissier was one of a hazardous kind. Finding that Bosquet did not agree with him in his plan of attacking the Faubourg without first sapping up to close quarters with its works of defense, the chief became hotly enraged ; and, after besides laying stress on an act of omission which had given him grave offense, he broke with the general who thus had ruffled his temper—the general then commanding in front of the Karabelnaya who would otherwise have had the direction of all the projected assaults.⁽⁴⁾ It was greatly, of course, to be wished that the general charged to direct the in-

¹ Plan signed by Generals Niel, Thiry, Harry Jones, and Dacres, given in *Journal Royal Engineers*, ii. p. 286 *et seq.*

² See his dispatch, Rousset, ii. p. 254.

³ Lord Raglan (whose means of knowing were trustworthy) to Lord Panmure, June 19, 1855.

⁴ Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure, Private, 19th June, 1855.

tended assaults should be a man fully imbued with the ideas of the Commander-in-Chief, fully sharing his most eager hopes; and, if frankly aiming at agreement, or—alternatively—at some change of plan, consultations pursued by the chief with his richly experienced lieutenant might have brought about happy results, more especially had it been possible that, instead of remaining misguided by his own fallacious opinion, Péliissier would carefully listen to the counsels of Bosquet, whose judgment on the question in hand was, as now we know, sound.¹

But Péliissier's state of mind and of temper did not suffer him to brook opposition, and he hastened to take a course that perhaps he then believed to be 'vigorous,' though, in truth, as he afterwards learned, it was violent rather than strong, and more likely to advantage the enemy than either himself or his cause. Directing General Bosquet to undertake duties elsewhere, Péliissier removed him—uprooted him—from his command in the Karabelnaya, and replaced him by General Regnault St. Jean d'Angély, the officer then at the head of the Division of the Imperial Guard.

To do thus was to withdraw from the scene of real conflict an able, a victorious commander well knowing the ground, and well known to the troops, to withdraw him on the eve of an action, and besides to raise up in his stead a newly-come man, then a stranger almost to the army, and one but little acquainted with the field of the intended attacks.²

This was only the second of the principal changes that General Péliissier wrought within the ill-omened 'eight days.'

III.

Péliissier's measures included a feint on the Tchernaya effected with troops of all arms—troops which
 Designed movement on the Tchernaya. likewise would be charged to fend off any onset in that quarter hazarded by the Russian Field Army. The command of this force was the one to which Bosquet found himself shifted.

The main purpose of the Allies, French and English, comprised only a set of attacks to be delivered by infantry on the 18th of June against the greater part of the works which defended the Karabel-
 Main design of the Allies against the Karabelnaya.

¹ So afterwards proved by experience convincing to all, including General Péliissier.

² The change (strongly censured by Rousset, and presumably disapproved at his office, the Ministry of War) was made on the 16th of June, and, next day, the preparative bombardment was to open.

naya. To open a way for these onslaughts, and to protract the enemy's anxiety in regard to his defenses elsewhere, the day next before these attacks was to be occupied in bombarding—not simply the works of the Faubourg, but—the whole south front of Sebastopol.

IV.

Accordingly, at break of day on the 17th of June, the French and the English began to deliver their fourth bombardment. Their fleets¹ (where fleets could act), and elsewhere far more extensively their now greatly strengthened siege-batteries, brought under a vast arc of fire the whole south front of Sebastopol from the Quarantine Fort on the west to that 'Battery of the Point' which, as always, still marked its easternmost limit. Apart from the fire of the ships, it was with nearly 600 siege-guns that the Allies were able to execute this great bombardment, and the number of the pieces of ordnance with which the enemy answered them was about 550.² On the Karabelnaya defenses (where alone the attack would be real) the Allies poured a fire of 280 siege-guns, 114 being French, and 166 of them English.³ To this fire on the Karabelnaya the enemy answered with guns that numbered 207.⁴ Maintaining the cannonade until nightfall, the allied gunners grievously mutilated the enemy's defenses, and inflicted, moreover, upon him heavy losses of men. Before sunset the Flagstaff Bastion and the works further west had suffered great havoc; and in the Faubourg (where the bombardment was meant to open paths for the infantry) the results were more strongly marked. The Barrack Battery, the Great Redan, the Gervais Battery, the Malakoff, with its auxiliary works, the Little Redan, and the Battery of the Point were reduced to a nearly helpless state. Indeed, the Malakoff could no longer maintain any fire at all, and it was the same with the Nikonoff Battery and the Little Redan.⁵ The enemy under this cannonade lost many officers of high distinction, including the valiant Boudistcheff, and a great number of gunners; but also (as in former bombardments) the cruel necessity of having to keep bodies of infantry under fire by way of precaution so greatly augmented his losses as to bring up the number of his killed and wounded to no less than 4000.⁶

¹ At the cost of a precious life—that of young Lyons of the 'Miranda.'

² The number according to Todleben (ii. p. 350) being 549.

³ Rousset, ii. p. 255.

⁴ Todleben, ii. p. 350.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 363, 364.

⁶ Ibid., p. 380.

The losses of the Allies were confined to only a few score of men.⁽⁵⁾

There was a failure of ammunition at one time in some of the enemy's batteries, and his gunners suffered so frightfully under the fire of the besiegers that in some of the works it was necessary to replace them by infantry men, whose skill in the working of ordnance was greatly inferior; but the enemy apparently thought that, in spite of these checks, he had effectively answered the Allies with the 19,000 shots he delivered in the course of the day.

The besiegers, on the other hand, judged that the garrison had answered but weakly to their mighty bombardment; and, although there is no ground for saying that the enemy refrained of set purpose from doing his best, the discomfiture he underwent in this strife of guns against guns produced all the effect of a stratagem profoundly contrived. The Allies, French and English alike, were lulled into what at the time was a pleasant belief—a belief that, after having wrought wonders by the development of his artillery power, the enemy was coming at last to the end of his long-strained resources, and they imagined—not perhaps wrongly—that the Faubourg of the Karabelnaya—carrying with it the fate of Sebastopol—was ripe for assault. But with those who called to mind the immense and effective repairs which the enemy had so often achieved in the course of a night, it did not follow at all that the then ruined state of the Karabelnaya defenses could be fairly expected to last until break of day on the morrow.

The results of Péliissier's fierce war against all the 'town 'counter-approaches,' the triumphs of the Kertch Expedition, the joyful return of the victors, fresh, unending accessions of troops, the conquests, already made good, of the Selinghinsk and Volhynia Redoubts, the Kamtchatka Lunette, and the 'Quarries'—these changes of late had been acting on the hopes of the besiegers with great, with increasing effect; and when now, in the afternoon hours of Sunday the 17th of June, they saw, or got to know of the havoc inflicted by their great cannonade, whilst observing, too, what—to their eyes—seemed the desperate plight of the garrison, there swept through the camps, French and English, an ungoverned flood of Opinion—Opinion making sure that the fortress must fall, and fall the next day.

Reply of Russian batteries.

This regarded by the besiegers as weak.

The effect like that of a stratagem.

The Allies lulled into a faith that Sebastopol was ready to fall.

Exultant opinion in camp.

No general, of course, can find pardon for any mistake made in war by saying he was carried away by a torrent of feeling in camp; but the all-pervading faith entertained by myriads and myriads of soldiers collected on one shred of ground is nevertheless a real force that, in justice to the memory of the French commander—then about to commit a grave fault—ought not to be wholly ignored.

This force of gathered opinion was in one point of view a good sign, because showing the ardor of the troops; but its impact on the mind of Pélissier—not yet at the end of that interval of eight days which we had to point out—was likely to do grievous harm. Long kept, as we have seen, under torture by his obstinate sovereign, he was conducting the business of war at a critical time with a temper exasperated by Imperial dictation, and therefore—for this would follow—with nerves highly, painfully strung. On a Chief in that state the effect of the flood of opinion sweeping over the camps might be such as to precipitate action.

Lord Raglan has freely confessed that he shared the illusory confidence extending over the camps; but remaining throughout calm and firm, he did not make the feeling a ground for any change of plan. It is in open campaigning much more than in any siege process that the abnormal fervor of troops can be prudently used as a reason for altering the designs of a Chief.

V.

On the morning of this day, the 17th, the eve of the intended assaults, Pélissier had come to Lord Raglan at the English Head-quarters, and imparted his designs for the morrow. To the entire satisfaction of Lord Raglan, he announced that his siege-guns would open with the daylight next morning, and continue their fire for two hours, thus accomplishing a second destruction of any resurgent batteries which the garrison might repair in the night-time. He also determined that at the close of the two hours' bombardment, that is, at five, or half-past five o'clock, his infantry should begin to deliver their intended assaults. With Pélissier's approval, Lord Raglan, on his part, determined to open his intended bombardment simultaneously with that of the French; but of the times when his infantry columns should begin their attacks he reserved to himself a free choice.

From some cause it happened that the choice of measures and time thus made at first by Péliissier lay hidden from Louis Napoleon, as well as from the French War Department, and therefore, perhaps, it is well to give Lord Raglan's words. 'General Péliissier said here on Sunday morning that 'it was desirable that the artillery should have a couple of 'hours after daylight the following morning to destroy any 'repairs the Russians might have made in the night, and 'that he should open the attack by the troops at five, or half-'past five, as his commanding officer of artillery on the spot 'might determine.'¹

VI.

But unhappily in the evening of the 17th of June the resolve of Péliissier underwent a change wild and abrupt. Whether duped by 'information' from some returned prisoner, or some deserter or spy, which told him that—ripe for conquest at once by the mere sight of infantry columns advancing against them at day-break—the works of the Karabelnaya would fall, as it were, at his touch ;² or whether—because at last weakened by the tortures we saw him enduring at the hands of his sovereign—he simply was carried away by the flood of exultant Opinion then sweeping over the camp, he at all events made a rush headlong—a rush towards what was much worse than simply to precipitate action.³

Strange, flighty, and wrong as so great a dereliction must seem after what he had announced in the morning at the English Head-quarters, he did not consult Lord Raglan on the change he was making. He assembled some generals at his own Head-quarters, but they did not restrain him, and I treat the resolve as his own.

He determined—determined irrevocably—that the further preparative measure of bombarding the enemy's works which was to have opened the morrow's operations should by him be altogether omitted, and that the signal directing his infantry to commence their intended assaults should be given at three o'clock in the morning, that is, at the least two full hours before the time he had fixed in concert with the English commander.

¹ To Lord Panmure, 19th June, 1855.

² This seems to have been widely believed in France, and the name of the deceiver used to be mentioned, but I have no proof that the conjecture was sound.

³ Because an attack that same evening would have been vastly more prudent and hopeful.

This abrupt change of plan on the part of Pélissier was substantially an actual reversal of what a few hours before he had voluntarily announced to Lord Raglan as his settled design. And the change, too, was seemingly made in defiance of known conditions. The Allies at this time had nowhere sapped up to within a distance of less than several hundreds of yards off from the Karabelnaya enceinte; and—encumbered, as they would be, with scaling-ladders and other needed appliances—troops marching over such spaces in the teeth of mighty batteries restored to their original power might expect to encounter destruction, or at all events slaughter so great as would leave them unequal to the ulterior operation of carrying the defenses by storm. Yet—so immense was the difference!—a march on those very same batteries, if still in the ruined state to which a bombardment could bring them, might be only, after all, a light matter. Now experience had shown the Allies that to this state of ruin they could bring the defenses by duly using their siege-guns, whilst also it had taught them that the batteries thus ruined, and rendered for the moment innocuous, could be restored by the garrison to a state of efficiency in the course of a night; and, although the advance of the year from April to the middle of June had abridged the length of the time dividing sunset from sunrise, there was no reason why the enemy should not meet this curtailment of the working hours by employing on the needed repairs a greater number of ‘hands.’

By his plan announced in the morning, Pélissier had rightly provided that the batteries to be faced by his troops should first be rendered innocuous by the powers of the siege-guns. The evening project was one that condemned all the infantry columns to traverse lengthened spaces—by daylight—in the teeth of destructive batteries no longer in ruined condition but restored to their original power. To any question which asks why Pélissier discarded the first, and rushed headlong into the perils of the second design, one can only answer that he had not yet come to the end of those troubled ‘eight days,’ during which his full power of wisely exerting the judgment underwent, as we saw, interruption, and that, when he effected his change, the mighty flood of opinion we saw exultant in camp was running its course with a strength that might carry away a chief tortured in the midst of his warlike cares by a raging strife with his sovereign. That Pélissier, on the evening of the 17th, was under some access of plainly abnormal excite-

Question why
Pélissier
thus acted.

ment is proved, I think, by the fact that, when making up his mind to break loose from the perfect agreement attained a few hours before on his visit to the English Head-quarters, and even to invert its provisions, he shunned that safe, wholesome, and obvious expedient of consulting with Lord Raglan in person, which not only common prudence but obvious duty enjoined.

Pélissier's new resolve was imparted to our Engineer Chief; but imparted, it seems, as definitive, and in terms which—far from inviting—made bold to exclude all discussion.

Lord Raglan, after visiting his Divisional camps, and giving what he thought for the night would be his definitive orders—orders all in conformity with the previously concerted plan—had ridden back to Head-quarters, and there had scarce quitted his saddle, when he not only heard from the Chief of our Engineer force that Pélissier had made this ill change in his plan for the morrow, but also learned that the new resolve was definitive, and even announced as one resting on grounds that allowed no dispute.¹

Magnanimously regardless of any slight towards himself implied by Pélissier's conduct, Lord Raglan thought only of the public service. He judged that, in the teeth of such an announcement by the commander of what (from its largely predominant numbers) one rightly might call the main body of the Anglo-French army, it would be perilous, confusing, unwise to attempt to enter into controversy with the French commander, or to protest against his sudden reversal of the plan on which both had agreed, or, lastly, to persist in the course approved by the two commanders some hours before without suffering himself to be moved by the wild alteration since made; and therefore, whilst bitterly pained by his colleague's new and sudden resolve, he determined that the operations of the English on the morrow should be in conformity with Pélissier's altered design.

VII.

Lord Raglan gave his orders accordingly; and his troops before sunrise all reached the positions assigned them.

The marches of Pélissier's troops did not all take effect in

¹ The grounds, I believe, were announced as "des raisons incontestables."

Movements of English and French troops. good time. The brigades under Faucheux and Monteynard, which he had summoned from his camps in the west, received their orders too late; and, when ready to move, the troops under General Brunet were obstructed by finding that the trenches through which they received instructions to pass had not yet been left vacated for them by General d'Autemarre's forces.¹

These movements described by the enemy. It was a beauteous midsummer night; and the stars in the heavens disclosed these marches of troops to a vigilant garrison, enabling their great Engineer to infer the design of the besiegers in its general bearing, and even to divine in some measure their special plans of attack.

Bombardment at night by vertical fire. The bombardment was maintained after dark, and throughout the whole of the night, but only by vertical fire; and, although this use of artillery inflicted grave losses on those brave men of the garrison who were striving to repair their crushed batteries, it did not so take effect as to make the repairing impossible.

The enemy repairing and even augmenting his batteries. To that object of repairing at night their ruined batteries the garrison did not fail to apply a high warlike spirit and truly magnificent energies. Far from having yet come, as their adversaries fondly imagined, to the end of their mighty resources, far from being discomfited by the shortness of a night in mid-June, they toiled on under a vertical fire pouring down with destructive power till they had fully restored their defences to an effective condition, and even at one point had added to the power of their batteries. It was only on that very night that Todleben crowned the ramparts of the Malakoff with field-guns placed *en barbette* which were destined to exert no small sway in the approaching engagement.

This constancy on the part of the garrison was soon to have its reward.

¹ The cause of this error—not now material—is shown by Niel, p. 314.

CHAPTER VII.

EIGHTEENTH OF JUNE.—ABORTIVE ATTACKS OF THE ALLIES
ON THE KARABELNAYA DEFENCES.—THE VICTORIOUS OP-
ERATION EFFECTED BY GENERAL EYRE.

I.

WHILST under cover of darkness not yet dispersed or dis-
persing the garrison still was engaged in restor-
ing its artillery power, another arm of the service
had already begun to make ready for the approach-
ing strife. General Khrouleff, commanding the
infantry in the Karabelnaya, developed great en-
ergies; and, ill-fortune no longer pursuing him,
he not only acted with his known warlike ardor, but also, this
time, with a judgment apparently sound, and with that kind
of mental agility that was required by his special task—not,
of course, such a task as that of commanding in
‘battle,’ but—that of directing foot-soldiers col-
lected behind valid ramparts, and from time to time moving
a little body of men to any point where the defenses ap-
peared to be needing this aid.

The garrison had found itself able to infer the designs of
the besiegers from the preparative marching of
their columns, discerned through the imperfect
darkness of a fair summer night; and, so early as
two o'clock in the morning, their bugles were
sounding all over the Karabelnaya. Soon, infan-
try men, standing up on the crowded banquettes,
were not only manning the ramparts, but showing their pres-
ence in numbers that surprised a beholder not versed in Gen-
eral Todleben's Art. The truth is, as we know, that, whilst
trusting in the main to great guns, the illustrious defender
of Sebastopol had been minded, nevertheless, from the first
to ally with his blasts of mitrail a powerful musketry-fire.
It was for this special service that infantry crowded the
parapets, and even some of the traverses.

The artillerymen stood to their guns.

II.

Resting upon supports and reserves of great strength, three Divisions of French infantry, led respectively by General Mayran on the right, by General Brunet towards the centre, and by General d'Autemarre on the left, were to be simultaneously thrown forward with orders to endeavor to carry not only the Malakoff but all the other works of defense from the Battery of the Point on the east to the Gervais Battery on the west.

The splendid Division of the Imperial Guard formed Pé-
Pélissier's dispositions. lissier's great reserve, and was posted in rear of the Victoria Fort at a greatly extended distance from the nearest of the Russian defenses. The chief apparently thought that this distance was not excessive; for although, when warned on the subject in the course of the previous afternoon, he had consented that two brigades brought up from the west for this purpose should take up an intermediate position in advance of the Imperial Guard, he yet laughed in the face of the officer who had given the caution, addressing him, in his rough, playful way, as 'Mr. Timorous.' Those two brigades were the forces that received their orders too late, and did not come up in good time.¹

From that mishap, it resulted that Pé-
Pélissier's original plan lissier's original plan of planting all his reserves at a great distance was brought to the test of experience; and whether the Commander-in-Chief or the gibe-stricken 'Mr. Timorous' was the more skilled disposer of troops, we shall not be without means of judging.

To insure the simultaneous outset of the three attacks, they were all to be launched by one signal, that is, by a bright jet of rockets thrown up, at Pé-
Pélissier's bidding lissier's bidding, from a spot that formed nearly the summit of the lofty Victoria Bridge.

Including the great reserve, but not counting the two brigades ordered up from the west, the whole force allotted for the enterprise comprised four Divisions, and was placed, as we have seen, under the orders of General St. Jean d'Angély.

III.

For his post of observation Lord Raglan had chosen the
Post chosen by Lord Raglan. Mortar Battery of the 3d Parallel established on the Woronzoff Ridge; and thither (having left all

¹ The brigades of Fauchaux and Monteynard. See *ante*, p. 107.

the horses on a less exposed part of the ground) he came on foot with his staff before the break of day.

In the precincts of the French Head-quarters men were
Midnight at the French Head-quarters. busied in saddling at midnight; but, whether detained by work, or craving for some moments of sleep that indeed might have done him good service, Péliissier, it seems, did not mount until two o'clock in the morning. Considering that his own plans required him to be at the Lancaster Battery before the break of day, and that he could not or would not ride long at a pace beyond that of a walk, the distance to be traversed was such that he ought to have been in his saddle at an earlier hour. This after a while became plain, it seems, even to him; and while fretting with natural vexation at the thought of having allowed himself to be behind-hand with time, he saw and heard that which might well throw a man of his violent, choleric temperament into frenzies of rage. Not brought about, he well knew, by any word or sign from himself, he all at once saw and heard a fire of great guns and of musketry breaking out from the far eastern wing of the Karabelnaya defenses.

What he saw and heard before sunrise.

IV.

Observing what was really a shell thrown up from the Mamelon with the trail of light from its fuse that shone out through the still reigning darkness, General Mayran—over-anxious, expectant, with nerves highly strung—imagined that this was the appointed signal for commencing the three French attacks, and—unmoved by the counsels of officers who did not share his mistake—he made haste to lead on—prematurely—the forces placed under his charge.

General Mayran's premature attack.

Having been posted the night before in a part of the Careenage Ravine that seemed apt for his purpose, General Mayran, preceded by Engineers and supported by two battalions of the Voltigeurs of the Guard, was to turn the Point Battery, and enter it by the gorge, to assail and break through the courtine extending from its westerly flank, then abruptly bend off to the left, and (by operating from within the enceinte) lay hold of the Little Redan. It was to assail this courtine from a distance of some 800 yards that, a little before three o'clock, General Failly led on his brigade. Met by fire of great power from the ramparts, and also from six steamers anchored off the mouth of the Careenage Ravine,

the heads of the columns were broken ; but, after a while, Faily rallied them in a fold of the ground, and renewed the attack, pushing forward, this time, to ground no less far in advance than the verge of the ' wolf-pits ' there sunk in front of the enemy's works ;¹ but they only achieved this lengthened advance at the cost of effecting it under a destructive fire. General Mayran was wounded, then presently wounded again, and the second blow brought him his death. By storms of mitrail and of musketry the columns were again driven back, and a like fate befell the fresh troops of not only Saurin's brigade, but also one of the two Voltigeur battalions brought up to renew the attack. Soon, however, under Faily (who had succeeded to Mayran's command) the remains of the Division were rallied on sheltered ground whence they plied the embrasures and the men on the ramparts with fire.

All this while, the Division engaged looked in vain towards its left for the expected co-operation of Brunet. The premature onset of Mayran had dislocated all the arrangements for securing simultaneous action.

The Commander-in-Chief directed General St. Jean d'Angély to support the repulsed troops of Mayran's Division with four battalions of the Guard ; but it was not found possible to renew the attack.²

When Pélissier at length reached the post he had chosen, that is, the Right Lancaster Battery, he soon vainly caused his signal to dart up into the air from the launching his signal. lofty Victoria Fort ; and the whirlwind of rage that soon burst on this choleric man may well be imagined ; for, whilst still writhing with anger because General Mayran's Division had sprung into premature action, he now suffered the torment of finding that his own genuine signal produced no result. For the reason already assigned, it was only after some lapse of time that General Brunet could stir ; and the original cause of the obstruction was one that also affected the movements of General d'Autemarre.

V.

General Brunet was to attack and break in through the courtine extending from the west flank of the Little Redan, and from the interior position so won force his way into the heart of the Malakoff Work.

General
Brunet's
attack.

¹ The *trou de loup* is a pit shaped like the hollow of an inverted extinguisher, and is provided with a stake projecting upwards.

² Niel, p. 317.

When the troops of General Brunet's Division at length moved out of their trenches, they were met by so mighty a fire of grape and musketry that they disappeared from the eyes of observers under the clouds of dust raised by the missiles directed against them. The heads of the columns were shattered by the falling of men. General Brunet received his death-blow. The foremost part of one column inclined too much to its right, and advanced towards the Little Redan, but the men, it seems, came to a halt when within some 110 yards of the work, and ensconced themselves in a fold of the ground, there awaiting support. The officers did not brook this desistance, and several of them met their deaths in the efforts they made to draw the troops forward.

Another column of the same Division moved straight towards the courtine along a distance of some 330 yards under so hot a fire that it loaded the ground with their dead. Some of the boldest of the men, pressing forward beyond the line of the wolf-pits, approached the Ditch of the courtine, where, however—too few to achieve any more—they were crushed by the enemy's fire. Others stopped, seeking shelter from undulations of the ground, or fell back into the stone-quarries which here and there offered cover. The number of men coming back into the trenches there caused great confusion. The officers tried hard to rally and re-form the defeated troops and lead them forward once more to the assistance of the heads of columns; but the enemy's fire proved so unrelenting and strong that the ranks had been hardly re-formed when again they were stricken and torn.¹

VI.

The advance of the left column was simultaneous with that of the force under Brunet. General d'Au-
General d'Au-temarre's at-
tack.
 temarre's Division was to descend by the right bank of the Dockyard Ravine, force the lines of defense near the Gervais Battery, and then operating flankwise from within the enceinte to turn and to carry the Malakoff.

In the absence of any mishap that might neutralize the enemy's fire, General d'Autemarre had no better prospect than either Mayran or Brunet of marching unscathed beneath the enemy's batteries, and so proving able to close on the works of the Karabelnaya; but in war oftentimes sheer Accident comes in to govern, or vary the course of events. When the heads of General d'Autemarre's column moved

¹ Niel, p. 316.

down through the Dockyard Ravine, some brief, unexplained inadvertence on the part of the enemy's gunners prevented their using the power with which they were armed; and being from this cause enabled to reach the lines of defense, the foremost assailants not only seized the occasion, but seized and used it so boldly, and maintained all they won with so persistent a valor, that at once they gave a new turn to what a moment before could hardly have been called an engagement affording to the baffled Allies any known and sound basis of hope.

One of d'Autemarre's Chasseur battalions commanded by Garnier assailed and broke through the courtine at a part near the foot of the Dockyard Ravine, and pushed on into the Faubourg;¹ whilst somewhat more to the right, Major Abinal, with some eighty of his Engineers under the immediate command of Captain Bressonet, approached the Gervais Battery, found places where unremoved earth interrupted the course of the Ditch, passed over by these little dikes to the parapet beyond, seized, conquered the work, driving out a battalion of the Pultawa regiment, proved able to take some prisoners, and prepared, on the arrival of reinforcements (for which he appealed), to pursue the adopted design of operating against the Malakoff from within the enceinte.² It is true that the enemy, flushed with the success of his resistance elsewhere, relieved from anxiety in the quarters assailed by Mayran and Brunet, and acting under the impulsion of so ardent a commander as Khrouleff, was soon moving troops towards his lost Gervais Battery, and the part of the Faubourg which d'Autemarre's light troops had entered; but on the other hand, the French heads of columns proved resolute, the Chasseurs trying hard to defend house by house the ground they had won, and the Engineers who had seized the Gervais Battery undertaking with excellent zeal to strengthen their hold of the prize. They turned one of its guns against the enemy. By their firmness, these valiant men—the Chasseurs in the Faubourg, and the eighty Engineers in the captured battery—secured ample time at each place for the junction of any fresh troops that d'Autemarre might promptly send down.

¹ The Chasseurs seem to have been supported in their march by a battalion of the 19th Regiment, but I do not observe any statement showing that that last battalion broke into the Faubourg.

² Niel, p. 316. This was certainly an extraordinary achievement to be compassed by eighty sappers; but since Niel commanded the Engineers, and has made the statement officially, I cannot (with the knowledge I have) undertake to question its truth.

Followed up, as we have seen that it was, by brave and venturesome men, this piece of good-fortune seemed fitted to warrant a confident hope; for the problem which asked how assailants could break their way into the fortress had been brilliantly solved. There remained to be accomplished indeed the vital, the difficult work of reinforcing the victors, and for that purpose moving down soldiery distressingly exposed on their flank to the enemy's guns; but the peril of even this task was of course greatly lightened by what the foremost troops had achieved; for the succoring forces, this time, would face a courtine and a battery no longer bristling with armaments in the hands of their adversaries, but manned by comrades impatient to greet them with outbursts of welcome; and although in their way towards this goal they indeed would be running the gauntlet under powerful fire, they at least, under these new conditions, might perform their swift march, or make their yet swifter rush unencumbered with ladders and wool-sacks.

However, the gunners on duty at the eastern face of the Redan were by this time devoting a care to the bulk of d'Autemarre's force which they had not bestowed on the heads of his column. On his troops moving down with a mind to support the victorious assailants there poured from the Malakoff and from the eastern face of the Redan a fire so destructive that it not only caused them great losses, but checked their advance. They did not fall back, did not cease to be intent on their purpose of reinforcing their comrades, but moved slowly when moving at all, and from time to time even stopped.

VII.

The check thus sustained by the bulk of d'Autemarre's Division was seen by the English Commander from his place on the Woronzoff Ridge; and having forces in readiness for the attack of that very Redan which was dealing its blows on the French, he could not loyally hesitate to interpose in action. He, indeed, had a choice. He might either relieve the French by pouring a crushing fire of great guns on the eastern face of the Redan; or, again, he might aid them by assaulting the work with his columns of infantry already prepared for the task, and this last, he well knew, was the kind of support that Péliissier yearned to receive.

'I always,' wrote Lord Raglan to the Secretary of War, 'guarded myself from being tied down to attack at the same

The bearing of the hindrance encountered by d'Autemarre on Lord Raglan's course of action.

Motives tending to govern Lord Raglan's decision.

'moment as the French, and I felt that I ought to have some hope of their success before I committed our troops ; but, when I saw how stoutly they were opposed, I considered it was my duty to assist them by attacking myself.'

In the light of the past we can see that Lord Raglan would best have supported the French by acting upon his own military opinion, still therefore pursuing the course which Pélissier, as well as himself, had—until the last evening—chosen, and accordingly expending some two or three hours in the preliminary task of bombardment, with a mind to assault when the batteries of the Redan should be quelled ; but Lord Raglan well knew that nothing short of conformity with Pélissier's new plan—that is, an advance of British infantry—an advance not delayed by first making use of the siege-guns—would pass with the French as affording the loyal support they expected. Sir George Brown and the commander of our Engineers were united in the opinion that our troops should at once move forward. 'Of this,' wrote Lord Raglan, 'I am quite certain that, if the troops had remained in our trenches, the French would have attributed their non-success to our refusal to participate in the operation.'

It is easy enough to find fault with the painful decision to which Lord Raglan was driven ; and, indeed, if left free to determine on grounds strictly military, he himself would have flatly condemned it. But no such freedom was his ; and, to judge the question with fairness, a critic ought to be armed with not only extended knowledge, but also an imagination so powerful as to be able to apprehend the grave consequences of withholding our infantry at a time when the French were undergoing discomfiture and suffering cruel losses. We have been learning again and again that, to meet the full exigencies of modern war, more especially one carried on by allied Powers, a commander must needs be a statesman ; nor, since generals are, after all, men, and sometimes men of noble quality, can they always be forced, in even the business of war, to repress every generous impulse.

The moment had come when, deferring to the mandates of policy, and yielding too, one may own, to the sway of a chivalrous nature, Lord Raglan would surrender his judgment on that purely military question which formed part—yet still only a part—of the more complex question involved.

¹ Private letter to Lord Panmure, 19th June, 1855.

² Ibid.

Under this stress of motives, Lord Raglan determined to accelerate the execution of those plans for using his resolve. his infantry which, down to about nine o'clock on the previous evening, had been fixed for a later time, and not only at once to invade the enemy's territory in the direction of the Péressip, but also—and this was the graver resolve—to assail the Redan from a distance of between 400 and 500 yards without having first conquered its fire by duly using his siege-guns.

VIII.

The arrangements contingently made for assaulting the Redan at its salient, and supporting any capture of the work which our troops might effect by a movement (under General Barnard) from the right of the Woronzoff Gorge, were not destined to come into use; so that what we need see in detail of the measures against the Redan includes only the attack by two columns — one directed against its western or (proper) right flank under General Sir John Campbell; the other against its eastern, that is, its (proper) left flank, and commanded by Colonel Yea.¹

Sir George Brown had been placed in the immediate command of our troops set apart to attack the Redan; but Lord Raglan — not being called off to any other part of the field — was destined to be watching the conflict with his own practiced eyes. From the first to the last of the combat before the Redan, we shall see him in the line of the fire directed on Colonel Yea's column.

IX.

The column intrusted to Campbell drew its troops from the 4th Division, and the several components of the force were to move in this order:

A covering party of 100 Riflemen extended in open line;

Twelve Engineers, bringing with them their implements, and various warlike appliances;

Fifty soldiers carrying wool-bags;²

Sixty soldiers and sixty sailors bearing, all of them, ladders;

¹ Acting as a Brigadier. For some time Colonel Yea had commanded the First Brigade of the Light Division.

² For filling the ditch.

The 'main column' or 'storming party' with a strength of 400 men drawn from the 57th Regiment.

Thus, besides its attendant Engineers and bearers of woolbags and ladders, the force comprised 500 bayonets.

The 'reserve,' under Colonel Lord West, drew its men from the 21st Fusiliers and the 17th Regiment, and had a strength of 800.

The commander, General Sir John Campbell, placed himself at the head of his 'main column,' or 'storming party,' and directed that the so-called reserve should follow in close support.

The Engineer officer trusted to pilot the column was Lieutenant Murray, and the one at the head of the 'ladder-party' was he of whose growing fame we spoke in an earlier page—the then young Lieutenant, now General, Sir Gerald Graham.

Supposing the Great Redan and its neighboring batteries to be still in the crushed, silenced state to which our great guns had reduced them on the previous evening, the bulk of the column thus organized might perhaps have been able to traverse the interval of 470 yards which divided it from the object of attack without ceasing at the end of the march to be a highly fit instrument for carrying the western flank of the Great Redan by escalade and assault; but under existing conditions, the climbing, the fighting, the conquering efforts required formed, after all, only a sequel to the heaviest part of the ordeal; for not even the straitening shortness of a midsummer night had shorn the besieged of their power to retrieve, under cover of darkness, the havoc on havoc inflicted by a great cannonade. When the enemy had made good his repairs, the plan of attack as transformed by Pélissier's abrupt change of counsel could afford no solution at all of the now foremost problem which asked how a body of troops in full daylight, and moving besides very slowly—because encumbered with ladders—could traverse without being shattered 470 yards of open ground beneath the unassuaged fire of not only the Great Redan, but also all the other strong batteries that guarded this approach to the Faubourg.

However, before break of day, the components of Sir John Campbell's force had assembled under the parapet on the western side of the 'Quarries;' and when afterwards the concerted signal was given

No means enabling the column to reach its chosen point of attack.

Advance of the covering party, the Engineers,

and the bear- by a flag three times waved towards their right,
 ers ; the hundred Riflemen, followed by the Engineers
 and the sack and ladder parties, but not, as had been planned
 but not of by the 'main column,' began to move forward under
 the 'main the storm of grape-shot and musketry-fire that
 'column.' presently opened upon them from the western face
 The fire en- of the Redan, as well as from the Barrack Battery,
 countered. and this with a force unimpaired by the bombardment of
 the previous day. With before them Sebastopol in all
 its strength at a distance nowhere less than 400 yards,¹ and
 trained to take advantage of ground, the Rifles, getting to-
 gether, hung back for a while under such little shelter as was
 afforded by the westward slope of the spur. Thence they
 plied the Redan with a fire that seemed to produce no ef-
 fect. Of course this halt of the Rifles forced Murray also
 to halt with his few Engineers ; but Graham had still work
 The ladder- to do in bringing up his wool-sack and ladder par-
 party. ties. Already he had lost several men. It was
 found that the soldier—foot soldier—seemed averse more
 or less from the service of carrying burdens across a vast
 space under torrents of fire without having his hand on the
 weapon—the weapon beloved and trusted—which in fights
 of the kind he is most accustomed to contemplate forms al-
 most a part of himself ; but the sailors proved dauntless.
 The vast stature of the young Engineer who di-
 rected their energies made him strangely conspic-
 uous in the field, and it was on Gerald Graham and
 the sailors that the praises of observers converged.

Gerald Gra-
ham and the
sailors.

Murray
mortally
wounded.

Murray at this time was mortally wounded, and
 the command of the Engineers devolved upon
 Graham.

Then the brave, the hot-tempered Colonel Tylden (whom
 so often we have seen night and day in the thick
 of the siege-fights) came up impatiently fretting
 at the check he had observed, and saying, 'What
 'are you stopping for? On, men, on! forward!' he shout-
 ed, waving his sword over his head. Graham ran up to him
 and asked if, the attack on the flank of the work being im-
 practicable, he should lead his men on the salient.
 The Colonel said : 'Anywhere, so long as you get
 'on,' and again he began to cheer on the men then
 moving towards the salient. If any conjoined band of men
 had come up alongside him, it must needs have encountered

Interposition
of Colonel
Tylden ;

resulting in a
move towards
the salient of
the Redan.

¹ The distance from the 'Quarries' to the salient of the Redan. The distance from its re-entering angle—the chosen point of attack—was 470 yards.

a fate scarce short of what one calls massacre ; for to use the eyes, any moment, was to see the ground ripped up and torn by missiles descending in swarms ; and so thick came the flight of the grape-shots that together whilst rushing, and hissing in storm through the air, they gave out mighty crashes of sound not oftentimes heard by mortals who have lived to speak of such trials. As might well be expected, Colonel Tylden was quickly struck down, and, indeed, so cruelly wounded that he never again would be able to resume the valiant part he had taken in the siege of Sebastopol.

First devoting some moments of care to the honored chief thus lying wounded, Gerald Graham hurried after his men and drew up his ladders on ground he chose for the purpose. This he did by the aid of only the sailors and a few sappers ; for of the 120 soldiers who had been carrying wool-bags and ladders there were then few or none to be seen.

Gerald Graham, with his sappers and sailors, and the ladders they had borne, remained for some time in advance of our trenches ; but the covering party of Rifles had already disappeared from his front, nor again, if he looked to his rear, could he see the ‘main column’ approaching. Where the Rifles and the ‘main column’ were we shall by and by see ; but their absence from this part of the field annulled, of course, for the time any prospect of thence undertaking an onslaught against the Redan. What Graham had with him in readiness for any assault were only the mechanical implements, and not the armed forces required.

He therefore withdrew what remained of his valiant sailors and sappers from their position outside, and wisely brought them all back to await their next opportunity beneath the sheltering parapet.

What had separated the infantry from the bearers, and stopped the intended attack, will now be seen.

At the outset of the advance we saw made by the ‘covering party’ and ‘bearers,’ the ‘main column’ under General Campbell in person was duly preparing to follow in the wake of the ladder-men, and already indeed its officers were, some of them, over the parapet, when the rest of the body was stopped and even turned from its course by an unforeseen kind of obstacle.

What arrested the column was a throng of English soldiery belonging to various regiments, and even to several Divisions, who, although not on duty, were nevertheless so eager to take part in the attack that they had stolen away from their camps to this part of the 'Quarries,' and now crowded in on the trenches with a weight that intercepted the column and prevented its clearing the parapet. Thus obstructed the men of the 57th (who formed the 'main column') filed off to their left, moved westward until they had come to the end of the unfinished parapet, then abandoned the shelter, and confronted the fire that was instantly awakened against them from not only the whole western face of the Great Redan, but also from the guns further west that guarded its re-entering angle—the guns of the Artakoff Battery.

The column, when thus it emerged, was far removed from the ground that it needs must have traversed if advancing, as directed by orders, in the wake of the ladder-party; and accordingly we see that the troops meant to form a single body united under General Campbell were in a dissevered state.

Evolving themselves as they were from the thin trailing column in which they had marched along the sheltered side of the parapet, and then all at once facing the open, and confronting great batteries, the 400 men of what was called the 'main column' began to undergo a hard trial. For any attempt at formation they needed some little time. They besides needed firm and swift guidance not only in order to face the trying conditions to which we now see them exposed, but also to determine their course; for on the one hand men looked towards the re-entering angle of the Redan which was understood to be their true goal, yet at this time it seemed that the Rifles and ladder-party were operating towards its salient.¹

The decision was one to be taken at a critical moment, and under a converging fire of grape-shot and musketry that seemed to threaten destruction.

When the young Engineer Gerald Graham reported himself on that morning to the chief now commanding this column in person, he had found General Campbell so glowing with that warlike ardor that comes with the blood of the Scots as to be almost impatient of thoughts concerning

¹ See *ante*, p. 118.

the 'how,' and the 'where,' and the 'when' he could most fitly strike at the foe, and he even, in his usual gay vein, spoke joyous words which imported that he 'understood the fighting part best.' But in face of the Great Redan, with its batteries brought once again to a perfect state of repair, and at a distance of 400 yards from the nearest part of its counter-scarp, the pastime of 'fighting' was one that the enemy's great Engineer did not mean to allow. It was mainly to ward off all fighting of the hand-to-hand sort that he plied his great Art. He might and he would cause his adversaries to die or fall wounded, but not under those conditions of reciprocal action which men call a 'fight.' On the contrary, he would strike down assailants with his favorite resource of 'mitrail' before they could come to close quarters.

General Campbell was very soon killed. His authority devolved on Lord West (then on duty at the head of the reserve), and the next in command on the spot was Colonel Shadforth, the chief of the 57th men. At nearly the same time, however, Colonel Shadforth was killed; and this simultaneous loss of not only the chief, but also of him who—at least on the spot—had stood the next in command was of course such an accident as—if not even causing discouragement of a serious kind—might well break asunder the thread of any settled design which till then had been guiding the troops.

These men of the proud 57th might soon find death under the fire that began to be greeting them from the moment when, turning the parapet, they emerged on the open ground; but, to satisfy the exigency of their great Albuera tradition, they needed to be at close quarters with an enemy so as not to be dying like saints, but rather fighting like men; and, approachable as it was by low ground not altogether unsheltered, whilst also guilty, they knew, of assailing them with its heavy cross-fire, the Artakoff Battery seemed to be the sort of foe they might challenge. The position of the work, too, was such that, to attack it would be virtually to attack the Redan at that same re-entering angle which, as

¹ An allusion to the famous command, 'Fifty-seventh! die hard!' which was addressed to the regiment at Albuera by its chief, Colonel Inglis. It was in elucidation of young Stanley's apostrophe to the regiment at Inkerman when he said, 'Men, remember Albuera!' that I once before referred to the long-cherished words. *Ante*, vol. iii.

people understood, was the goal pointed out by authority. Troops acting in the contemplated direction would be able to avoid the Abattis by turning its flank.

These men of the 57th, however, had not yet taken their course when they all at once found themselves joined by another small body of men.

The covering party of Riflemen who had led the advance became aware before long that they were not supported by troops in their immediate rear, but afterwards on ground further west perceived the 'main column' emerging from below the end of the parapet, and with this force determined to act. They came, and formed up alongside of the 57th men, now also joined by soldiers from other regiments, who perhaps were the lawless intruders of whom we before had to speak. Having with them their new chief Colonel Warre and also Major Inglis, the men of the 57th and the other troops now acting with them advanced against the Artakoff Battery; and—within thirty yards of its Ditch¹—established themselves upon ground which offered something like shelter to men lying down.²

To use the position thus gained by a handful of men as a stepping-stone for the seizure of the battery, Colonel Warre would of course be in need of additional troops; and, none as yet having come up, he sent back Major Inglis to ask for reinforcements;³ but meanwhile held fast to the ground he had won, and thence, as before, went on firing into the battery.

When afterwards Colonel Warre learned that he must not expect reinforcements, he reluctantly withdrew his small force from the vantage-ground it had won, and effected the retrograde movement in an orderly way with a loss of only three men.⁴

When apprised of his accession to the command, Lord

¹ 'Within twenty or thirty yards.' Colonel Warre, *ubi ante*.

² Major, now General Inglis, who at Inkerman, when young Stanley fell, succeeded to the command of the regiment and brought it out of action. I now know with certainty that General Inglis is the son of the Colonel Inglis who at Albuera addressed to the regiment his immortal apostrophe.

³ Whether the application was addressed to General Bentinck (who commanded the 4th Division and had a brigade in hand) or to Sir G. Brown, Colonel Warre does not say.

⁴ From 'They came,' *ante*, down to this point, my statement closely follows the Report of Colonel Warre to General Bentinck.

Lord West
acceding to
the command.

West was not cognizant of the advance of the Rifles and the 57th men on the Artakoff Battery ; and nowhere discerning those troops, he apparently thought that the fire—the merciless fire—they encountered when facing the open had altogether destroyed or dispersed them.

The resources
at his dis-
posal.

All the organized force that he knew of was, first, what remained of the valiant body of sailors with their ladders which along with a few of the sappers remained under Graham's command, and next, a string of several hundreds of infantry (composed of what was called the 'Reserve,' and of stragglers from other bodies) which, to use the chief's words, had 'deployed, as it were, into 'an extended line behind the parapet, seeking cover from the 'furious fire wherever it could be found, and disorder and 'confusion prevailed.'

His reluc-
tance to be-
lieve that he
was powerless
to execute an
attack.

Lord West, perhaps, in cool blood would hardly have judged that the power—the severed, the decomposed power—which chance had thrown into his hands was such as could make it his duty to protract an abortive attempt, still less to begin a new onset with plainly inadequate means.

It was natural, however, that one who could act with the vigor and zeal we saw him exerting at Inkerman should resist a conclusion importing that the moment of his accession to extended command must be the very one to be chosen for giving up all further effort. A covering party, he thought, might again be formed and thrown forward, to be followed again by the ladder-men, whilst he himself, in their wake, would bring up the body of troops then sheltering under the parapet, and strive to push home an attack on the flank of the Great Redan.

His direction
to Gerald
Graham.

State of the
'ladder-
'party.'

Lord West accordingly, saying that he meant to throw forward a fresh line of skirmishers, requested Gerald Graham to take out his ladders once more. For this task such of the sailors as had not been killed or disabled stood, all of them, ready and eager ; but the soldiers who had constituted one half of the 'ladder-party' were no longer to be seen in their places. Lord West strove to make good this void by assigning for the task other soldiers ; and his efforts were not all in vain. Still, Graham found, on the whole, that he could only muster four bearers for each of his ladders instead of the right number—six.

Its numerical
strength.

¹ Lord West to the author, Dec. 23d, 1863.

The promised covering party had not been thrown forward when Graham nevertheless brought his ladder-party brought out over the parapet, and at once met the fire reopened on him and his people from the batteries of the Great Redan. With their ladders beside them, our men lay down on the grass, and there—although still sought and found by too many of the enemy's missiles—awaited the promised advance of the men charged to cover their front.

When after a while it was seen that the 'covering-party' of skirmishers had not begun to advance, the sailors eagerly wished—making only an exception for Graham—to dispense with the aid of all soldiers. They had lost their naval commanders (Lieutenant Kidd killed, and Lieutenant Cave gravely wounded), but Mr. Kennedy, mate, still remained to them; and—delighted with their pilot, Gerald Graham—a giant intent on his work as though proof against grape-shot and fear—they wanted, if he would but lead them, to go and attack the Redan without asking any one other landsman to share in the bliss of the enterprise. Their 'pilot,' of course, could not humor them in this wild desire; and, on the contrary, he soon brought them back to find shelter under the parapet. There he kept them together in readiness for any renewed advance that Lord West might think fit to direct.

It was for his service with the 'ladder-party' in this, and in the earlier part of the day, that Gerald Graham received the high honor of the Victoria Cross. This honor was awarded to Graham for what the royal warrant described as his 'determined gallantry at the head of a ladder-party,' and the words, unless I mistake, are blended by him in his memory with the heroism of the sailors who shared his labors and perils.

'I wish,' wrote Lord West—'I wish I could do justice to the daring and intrepid conduct of the party of sailors. . . . Lieutenant Graham of the Engineers who led the ladder-party evinced a coolness and a readiness to expose himself to any personal risk which does him the greatest credit.'

Lord West, however, meanwhile was far from having the means out of which he could form a new column with any semblance of power to go and attack the Redan. The body of men we saw acting

¹ Lord West to Lieutenant-General Bentinck, *ubi ante*.

against the Artakoff Battery was not by him known to be anywhere gathered ; and of troops really under his orders there simply were none, except the string of mixed soldiery we saw sheltered under the parapet—an unorganized gathering of men not either so placed or so circumstanced in other respects that they could be wielded like a battalion drawn up on open ground by any magic words of command. Nor to these could Lord West really offer the sometimes alluring temptation of what our people mean by a ‘ fight ;’ for the men knew by this time that, if once over the parapet, they would still be divided from their adversaries by a zone of open ground—several hundreds of yards in breadth—which they could not even hope to be crossing except under torrents of grape-shot that needs must shut out every prospect of closing with the distant enemy, or even drawing near to his counterscarp.

Still, when applying his energies to this or that given His vain efforts. part of the distended line, Lord West, nobly seconded by his officers no less than by the spirit of the men, proved here and there able to get men out over the parapet ; and he judged that, if this friendly barrier had been levelled beforehand along a good part of its course, he perhaps would have found himself able to lead out his troops in a body through the gap so laid open, and to execute what at the least might have proved to be a bold ‘ rush ’ on the flank of the Great Redan ; but, as it was, though engaging his people by fractions in forward movements, he could not make their spring simultaneous—could not bring them to be climbing the parapet—climbing over from Life to Death—at one and the same time.¹

After consulting with Colonel Cole of the 17th Regiment, Orders sought and obtained; Lord West sent an officer to Sir George Brown with directions to ask for orders and for fresh troops.

Brown’s answer directed Lord West to re-form the attacking column, and not without further instructions to make any fresh advance.

In a pencil-written note, Lord West replied to Sir George, from Sir George Brown. informing him that any attempt to re-form the column would be hopeless, and earnestly begging for fresh troops in order to renew the attack.

Sir George Brown told the messenger that to this last note from Lord West there was no answer.

¹ Science recognizes the difficulty of executing a simultaneous advance of troops under such conditions, and recommends the “*Coupure blindée*,” the expedient adverted to by Lord West.

Thus ended the abortive endeavor to push an attack against the west flank of the Redan.

From the moment when it appeared that—in even one brief summer night—the enemy's batteries had recovered their broken strength there was seemingly no ground for hoping that the column intrusted to Campbell would ever traverse the space that divided the Quarries from the counterscarp of the Great Redan without undergoing such slaughter as must either destroy the force utterly, or at all events render it powerless—at the end of the long, bloody march—to undertake an assault; and it was fortunate for our people that accidents arrested the course of the enterprise in so early a stage, as to save them from the consequences of becoming more deeply committed.

The accidents which marred the advance of the column saved our troops from great sacrifices.

There is no such dissection of the Returns as would enable one to give the numbers of the sailors and Royal Engineers who fell whilst making this effort against the western flank of the Redan; but in killed, wounded, and missing, that Division (the 4th) which had furnished all the rest of the strength lost 193 altogether, of whom 16 were officers, including one major-general, that is, as we saw, Sir John Campbell.

X.

Amongst those of the Royal Engineers who found themselves kept in reserve near this part of the field there was one young lieutenant who painfully, bitterly chafed at what he thought the hard lot of being withheld from the action; and, when hearing that—at least for a time—the vain onset we witnessed had ceased, he not only assumed that our people were going to renew the engagement, but also made sure that—because succeeding to Murray, or rather to Murray's successor—he now at last would be summoned to take a part in the enterprise. He therefore eagerly sought to know what was the duty awaiting him, and addressed his question to Graham, then newly come out of action. Graham answered somewhat lightly—in words which imported that the engagement had ceased, and that there was nothing for the inquirer to do. Thereupon the young lion was wrought into a frenzy of disappointment and rage, the rage, indeed, being so hot that there followed something like an estrangement between the two friends. This impassioned lieutenant of Sappers was a soldier marked out for strange

An impatient lieutenant of Sappers.

Allusion to his subsequent career.

destinies, no other than Gordon—Charles Gordon—then ripening into a hero sublimely careless of self, and a warrior-saint of the kind that Moslems—rather than Christians—are fondly expecting from God.

XI.

Before daylight, the troops set apart for assaulting the Redan on its eastern flank were collected in those lines of trench-work which, till wrested from the enemy on the 7th of June, had formed the counter-approaches established on his left of the ‘Quarries’; and the same triple wave of a flag that unleashed, as we saw, Campbell’s force on the west of the Redan was also the recognized signal which threw forward Colonel Yea’s column against the eastern flank of the work.

With—foremost of all—its ‘covering party’ of 100 Riflemen in open order; with next its 12 Engineers, followed by some 180 soldiers and sailors bearing wool-sacks and ladders; with next again the ‘main body,’ or ‘storming party,’ of 400 men drawn from the 34th Regiment; and with finally, though held back at first, its ‘reserve’ of 800 men, furnished by the 7th or Royal Fusiliers and by the 33d Regiment—this column intrusted to Colonel Yea was almost exactly a counterpart of the one we saw led by General Campbell on the opposite flank, comprising, therefore, a strength of 1300 bayonets, and, in all, nearly 1500 men.¹ But Colonel Yea did not direct (as did General Campbell elsewhere) that the so-called ‘reserve’ should come up at once in close support to the storming column, and accordingly the whole of the infantry yet empowered to move with the chief comprised only 500 bayonets.

The piloting Engineer officer was Lieutenant A’Court Fisher, and Lieutenant Graves headed the ladder-party. When the signal was given, the 100 Riflemen from the foremost trench and the rest of the force from the other trench in its rear sprang swiftly over the parapets, and then at once fairly confronted that part of the Sebastopol defences which was formed by the eastern face and flank of the Great Redan, by the chain of works thence trending northwards, and again by those further east extending home to the Malakoff.

¹ Viz., with the 12 Engineers and 180 bearers, 1492.

These works, as already we know, had been restored under cover of darkness to the giant strength they could wield before the opening of the bombardment, and were not only amply garrisoned by artillerymen and bodies of infantry, but also put on the alert by the French attacks further east.

So, the moment our men showed their heads above the two parapets, they were greeted by a storm of mitrail that seemed more than searching enough to prevent even Fortune herself from cleaving a way for her favorites betwixt the paths of the grape-shot. Yet, although many fell, the men remaining unstricken did not cease to advance—to advance, one may say, on Sebastopol, for what our people, this time, assailed (by an onset they strove to maintain across an unsheltered zone of from four to five hundred yards in breadth) was—not (as on the 7th of June) a mere outwork, or counter-approach, but—the glorious fortress itself, fully armed, fully manned, and expectant. It chanced that Lord Raglan, a veteran in war, and accustomed to measure his words—was all the while standing himself in the line of that torrent of fire that greeted Colonel Yea's column, and he wrote of it thus: 'I never had a conception before of such a shower of grape as they poured upon us from the Russian works. Some of them must have been thrown from very heavy guns.'¹ But great as it seemed from the first, this crushing fire of artillery was about to be now reinforced by another arm of the service. Our string of 100 Riflemen thrown out in front had been formed as a 'covering party,' which, if only the anterior bombardment had not been omitted in deference to General Péliissier, might perhaps have kept down any fire attempted from what in such case would have hardly been more than the ruins of Todleben's Great Redan. As it was, our foremost hundred of men, advancing under daylight across open ground on a fortress at the height of its power, were quickly mown down in great numbers, and, the unwounded survivors still continuing their forward movement, still keeping their place in the front, became rather what we mean when we speak of a 'forlorn hope' than a 'covering party' endowed with anything like a real power to keep down or check the fire of either the mighty guns which were hurling torrents of grape-shot on the advancing troops, or

¹ To Lord Panmure, Private Letter, 19th June, 1855. The extraordinary intensity of the fire is described in not less strong terms by Sir George Brown and by Admiral Lushington.

even that of the infantry industriously driving their missiles from over the top of the parapet.

These blasts of mitrail reinforced by the rifle and musketry met the very ideal of Todleben; for his fixed belief was, as we know, that a fortress whilst girded by fire of this enormous power, must be proof against any assault undertaken across a broad zone.

For any mortal advancing in the teeth of the storm it was hard to see how it could happen that, unless by some mystic protection, he still might remain alive; for the air all around him was boisterous with the rushing flight of war missiles, whilst the ground in his front did not cease to throb under the impact of grape-shot, and the lighter touch of the bullets that came thickly pattering down to swell the leaden torrent. A man moving steadily forward under a fire of this kind when only in quest of the means by which to begin a fair fight, and unheated as yet by the rapture of striking at him who strikes may loftily use his sheer reason, and tell himself that the moment is one fit enough, after all, for that assured meeting with death which can never be finally shunned; or perhaps he may find it more simple to suspend for a while the dominion of his reasoning faculty, and borrow a lesson from beings which rather are governed by temperament. Some, for instance, moved forward, head down, and 'butted,' as though in hot wrath, at the storm of iron and lead.

A time at last came when what remained of the covering party made good its advance to the verge of the Abattis—an outwork of sharpened branches which covered the Redan at a distance of some 80 yards from its front.

The natural irregularities of the ground in this part of the field, and the hollows dug out by the impact and explosion of shells, gave here and there some little shelter to any survivor of the covering party; if lying down closely, and ensconcing himself within the limit of the partial cover thus formed. But, standing up on the top of the parapet with a boldness that our people admired, Russian infantry quickly saw down into all the slight hollows, and searched each with a power not only increased, but increasing; so that what little shelter there had been became less and less every minute.

The commanding Engineer, A'Court Fisher, had come unscathed through the fire, and being now close to the Abattis, he knew, of course, that in virtue of his position as commanding Engineer, he might

The remains
of the Rifle-
men coming
up to the
Abattis;

and clinging
to the ground
they had
won;

under a
searching
fire.

'The Engi-
'neer officer'
at the
Abattis.

have to give counsel. He found that, on being examined, the Abattis showed scarce a sign of having been damaged at all by the yesterday's bombardment, and also saw plainly that no such engineering operation as that of opening the work by grapnels was feasible under the torrent of grape-shot and musketry-fire pouring down from the Great Redan; but, on the other hand, he found here and there in the work some gaps, or, rather, weak places, through which men might push their way.

His next thought turned to the ladders. Of these not one could be seen in course of being brought up. They were, all of them, lying on the ground, some close to the Abattis, others less far advanced. There were some that had no bearers near them. Others had at their sides men sitting or lying on the ground, and towards one of these ladders—a ladder manned by sailors—A'Court Fisher made his way. Accosting one of the three sailors he found either sitting or lying down near the ladder, he said, 'Come along, Jack, let us have that ladder to the front,' and then learned that those who had carried it were, all of them, men killed or wounded. The rest of the sailors' division was in similar plight, there remaining not even one ladder with bearers still able to carry it.

A'Court Fisher, though only a lieutenant in rank, being nevertheless, as we know, the commanding Engineer with this force, was entitled, was even required, to consult at fit times with the Chief. And the Chief was approaching. At the head of what remained of his storming party, Colonel Yea—sword in hand—came up to the verge of the Abattis; and, addressing him, A'Court Fisher said: 'I am the Engineer officer, sir; shall I advance?'¹ In the moment that followed, Yea fell backwards, shot dead.

Accosting Captain Jesse of his own—the Engineer—corps, A'Court Fisher said: 'Well, Jesse, what's to be done?' Before Jesse could answer, he staggered under a shot received in the head and was killed.² Then to several others successively A'Court Fisher spoke; but—as though his charmed life had been given him on some

¹ Meaning, of course, 'Shall the Engineers make what arrangements they can for the advance of the column?'

² Captain Jesse was not originally on duty with the Engineers in this part of the field, but he 'left the general officer to whom he was attached to see 'himself that the orders given were carried out.'—The Commanding Engineer to Lord Raglan, June 19, 1855.

A like fatality overtaking others.

fell condition importing that all he accosted must die—it so happened that those he addressed were stricken, one after another, before they could answer his words.

A'Court Fisher made an endeavor to collect the troops, but they proved to be so few in number—scarce exceeding, he thought, 150 (¹)—as to be disqualified—until reinforced—for any assault on Sebastopol; and, in expectation of a time

Order given by 'the Engineer officer.'

when fresh troops would come up in support, he ordered the men to do what we saw done before by the scant remains of the covering party, that is, to get under such cover as could be gained by lying down and ensconcing themselves within the slight hollows that here and there marked the ground on the outer side of the Abattis. In his efforts thus firmly maintained under raging fire, 'the Engineer officer' was aided by the exceeding zeal and valor of Sergeant Landrey, one of his sappers.

Our few men, lying down on the verge of the Abattis, and under a mighty fire delivered now at a range of only some 80 yards, might well enough yearn to be told that supports were at last coming up; but the actual conditions were such—our ladders having all 'stranded'—that a large dispatch of fresh troops pushed forward through storms of mitrail must have hugely augmented the sacrifices already made by our people without opening, perhaps, after all, any clear, or even dim prospect of seizing the Great Redan.

Be that as it may, no fresh troops could be seen coming up; and any officer acting in command of the men here engaged might well have felt it his duty—his bounden, his sacred duty—to save them from the ugly alternative of either perishing uselessly, or lapsing into retreat without an order to warrant it; but who, since the fall of its chief, was entitled to withdraw the small force?

For want of the needed command, our people remained lying down under a powerful fire that—despite the half shelter they had gained—was steadily thinning their line.

The 'Engineer officer' happily had preserved a cool head; and as a first step towards useful action, he sought to learn who was entitled—or, rather, perhaps, who was bound, under painfully adverse conditions—to take up the vacant command. He strove to see or hear of some still undisabled officer, with at lowest the rank of a captain, but finding none such, whilst also re-

A'Court Fisher;

the course he took.

membering that he was of higher standing than any subaltern of the line—he reluctantly found himself driven to a painful conclusion—one importing no less than that he—himself—though only a lieutenant, must be the senior officer present; and, once forced to see this, he did not delay the accomplishment of what, however distasteful, was still a clearly marked duty. He called out to our men: ‘Retire ‘into the trenches the best way you can.’

Withdrawal of the remains of the troops. The troops then began to withdraw, and—all the way under a fire that still exacted its victims—fell back on our most advanced trenches.

In the course of the retreat A’Court Fisher himself, and many of the people obeying him, laid hold of yet one more occasion for the exercise of their daring and firmness by toiling protractedly—toiling under strong fire—in order to save wounded men.

Just praise bestowed by the authorities on A’Court Fisher. Lieutenant A’Court Fisher’s chief reported him as one who had ‘displayed great coolness, judgment, and decision under very trying circumstances.’¹

The loss of Colonel Yea; When, after the peace that had lasted scarce less than forty years, our new generation of islanders took up the great tradition, we saw Colonel Yea on the Alma at the head of his Royal Fusiliers; but also we afterwards saw him encountering the stress of ‘the winter troubles’ with a rare force of will that protected his cherished regiment from no small share of the hardship endured by other troops; and to his power so exerted, no less than to his ‘gallantry’ in action, Lord Raglan in terms referred when—in sorrow—announcing to England the loss of this resolute chief.²

In their choice of the moment ordained for the end of his life, whilst advancing at the head of his stormers and already on the verge of the Abattis, the Fates, one may say, proved kind. He was still in the pride of attack, yet so closely approaching misfortune as almost to touch its brink. Any answer from him to the question of the piloting Engineer must needs have been either one owning his persistent attack to be hopeless, or else an answer enjoining some wild, frantic act of the kind that is rather sacrificial than warlike. Opportune, under such conditions, may have well

¹ General Harry Jones to Lord Raglan, 20th June, 1855.

² Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, 19th June, 1855. A published Dispatch.

been the shot which, before he could open his lips, laid on him the silence of death.

Except as regards the storm column (from which clear duty compelled him to exact heavy sacrifice) Colonel Yea had been chary of the lives of his men; for, though holding an extended authority, he did not direct that the bulk of the troops he commanded should come up—encountering slaughter—in close support to the lesser body of men with which he acted in person. In that smaller body, however, as may well be supposed, the proportion of loss was huge. Irrespective of the Engineers and the sailors, our infantry sharing with Yea in his onset against the Redan on its eastern or (proper) left flank lost no less than fourteen of their officers, and more than three fifths of their strength;¹ whilst there also unhappily fell a distressingly large proportion of the few Engineers and of the sixty seamen who had taken part in the enterprise. Of these other losses no separate return is before me; but we know that of the three Engineer officers engaged in this part of the field, one only, that is, A'Court Fisher, came out of the action alive; and that of the six naval officers there engaged with the ladder division, no less than five were struck down.

It was at an early moment that Captain Peel, the commander of the sailors, the heroic, the radiant Peel, received the wound which disabled him.

Whilst (before they had been ordered to retire) the scanty remains of the 'covering party' and of the 'storming column' were still confronting Sebastopol, the supports, though unseen by our people then lying down, as we saw, on the verge of the Abattis, had already begun to advance. Colonel Lysons commanded these troops. The 400 men of the 7th or Royal Fusiliers moved the foremost in open column of companies, and were followed by a like number drawn from the 33d Regiment. The blasts of mitrail and of musketry pouring down from the Great Redan soon destroyed the formation of the Royal Fusiliers, but did not arrest their advance, though converting it nevertheless into a fierce onward rush. 'The fire,' writes one of their officers—the able and brave Colonel Hibbert—'was so tre-

¹ Out of the 100 men furnished by the Rifle Brigade and the 400 by the 34th Regiment, making together 500 bayonets, with, besides, some soldiers acting as bearers, there fell 313 either wounded or killed.

'mendous, one could only put one's head down, and run on 'as fast as possible.'

The supporting force, under this trial, maintained its advance until the remains of our troops engaged near the Abattis were seen to be at last falling back. The supports then began to retire, but already they had suffered, and still were suffering, loss.

XII.

Of that fire from the Great Redan which Colonel Yea's column provoked no small part found its way to our trenches, occasioning losses of men; and especially it poured on the Mortar Battery of the 3d Parallel, where Lord Raglan had taken his stand. There, leaning over the parapet in order to see all he could of the English attack, and of the general tenor of the French operations against the Malakoff and the Gervais Battery, Lord Raglan kept at his side the commander of our Engineers (General Harry Jones), but directed that all the rest of his staff, and the orderlies with them, should sit down, obtaining all the shelter that was possible, and take care not to attract the enemy's attention by looking over the parapet.

Yea's column had not long moved forward when the general commanding our Engineers was torn from the side of Lord Raglan by a grape-shot striking his forehead; ⁽²⁾ and from time to time afterwards, when officers and men bringing messages or having other business in hand came up from different parts of the field and stood upright in the battery they were, some of them, wounded, some killed. Though incessantly watching the combat from over the parapet, Lord Raglan himself was not struck.

The conditions did not prove to be such that any attack on the salient of the Great Redan could at this time be usefully made; and, no change in this respect happening at a later hour, it resulted, of course, that the measure was not carried into effect.

General Barnard's ulterior operations had always been meant to depend on the fate of the attacks directed against the Redan. His troops, therefore, were stayed in the advanced position they had won on the right of the Woronzoff Gorge, and were afterwards duly withdrawn.²

¹ Colonel Hibbert to Mr. Kinglake, November 23, 1869.

² General Barnard to Sir Richard England, 18th June, 1855.

XIII.

When the onsets of his infantry against the Redan had come at last to a close, Lord Raglan caused his siege-batteries to exert their full power against both the Redan and the Malakoff, thus not only making it certain that the enemy's glad sense of relief from attacks of foot-soldiers would be followed within some five minutes by the trial of suffering bombardment amid scenes of havoc and slaughter, but also tearing open the way for any renewed assault he might afterwards choose to deliver.

This bombardment proved so effective that, after scarce more than three quarters of an hour, the batteries it assailed were all but silenced.

Yet, to mark the ascendant thus swiftly obtained by our gunners was, under one aspect, distressing; for how could our people help thinking of what might have been the result, if the right order of operations—the order which placed bombardment first, and next assaults by our infantry—had not been reversed in the way we observed by the exigencies of what we called ‘policy’?

These two onsets against the Redan cost our people not only the lives of the two commanders who led them—Colonel Yea and General Sir John Campbell—but also in killed and wounded 62 other officers, and more than 700 men.¹

XIV.

The ascendant thus promptly obtained by the guns of our siege-train opened room for the hope that another attack with infantry might soon be launched against batteries no longer in that prime condition to which the enemy had restored them in the course of the night, but, on the contrary, crippled by artillery-fire; and, having in hand the column—still fresh and untouched—that had been formed for an attack on the salient of the Redan, Lord Raglan proposed to unleash it, if the measure should seem to harmonize with the state of Pélissier's operations on the other side of the gorge. Communications accordingly passed between the two commanders, and at first were effected by message; but afterwards Lord Raglan determined to confer with his colleague in person. He accordingly rode off with

¹ Viz., 717, a number including 52 (out of only 120) sailors. The ‘62’ includes six naval officers.

his staff to the Lancaster Battery, where Pélissier had established himself, and there, standing apart, the two chiefs conversed for some time. They apparently determined at first that, Pelissier undertaking to support and drive home General d'Autemarre's onslaught, Lord Raglan on his part should renew his endeavor to carry the Great Redan; but it seems that the conference between the two chiefs was from time to time interrupted by message after message brought in from General d'Autemarre, and that the latest of those communications determined Pélissier's course.

XV.

When last we observed the operations of General d'Autemarre's troops, the heads of his column, that is, the battalion of the 5th Chasseurs at one point, and the little body of some 80 Engineers at another, were, each of them, holding what each had daringly seized when breaking in at two places through the enemy's lines of defence; but, on the other hand, although striving hard to reinforce their victorious comrades, the main body of General d'Autemarre's Division had as yet been striving in vain.

This balanced condition of things had a lengthened duration; for both the battalion of Chasseurs which had conquered its way into a part of the Faubourg and the little body of 80 Engineers which had seized the Gervais Battery held what they had each of them won with persistent valor; and on the other hand, General d'Autemarre's efforts to reinforce the bold men thus maintaining themselves in the fortress were defeated one after another by the severity of the fire poured down on his troops from the enemy's powerful batteries.

The motives that needs must have urged him to effect the reinforcement attempted were beyond measure strong; for, to compass the object pursued, was not only to support his brave Frenchmen then holding all they had seized within the lines of the fortress, but also by that very act to gain means of operating effectively (because from within the defenses) against the flank and rear of the Malakoff; whilst, to fail in sending down reinforcements would be to abandon the victors who had lodged themselves in the fortress, and also to surrender all hope of seeing the day end in victory.

Whilst striving, though vainly, to succor those of his men who had torn their way into the Faubourg, General d'Autemarre's

marre likewise was praying to be himself reinforced ; and Pélissier met his appeal by calling up from his reserve the whole regiment of the Zouaves of the Guard ; but these troops had a lengthened distance to traverse before they could come into action, and the occasion first offered by Fortune, then valiantly seized by the brave Engineers and brave Chasseurs, might not much longer endure.

When the French battalion of Chasseurs had planted itself in the Faubourg it was assailed by General Khrouleff in person with at first only a few score of men of the regiment of Sevsk, but presently also with one of the Pultawa battalions.¹ There ensued an obstinate conflict, the Chasseurs intrepidly doing their best to strengthen themselves in the houses, and the Russians, on the other hand, striving to press, as it were, a small siege against each of the occupied buildings. All this while, too, the 80 Engineers, unaided by infantry, were still holding fast the battery which they had wrested from the enemy's troops.

Yet, if left unsupported, the struggles of a few gallant men who had lodged themselves in an enemy's fortress could be hardly much longer maintained ; and on the other hand, though hitherto baffled in all the efforts he had made to accomplish the object desired, General d'Autemarre was still trying hard to reinforce the invaders.

The conflict thus drew to a crisis. If only the reinforcements should move down and join their comrades, there well might follow a conquest involving nothing less than the fall of Sebastopol. If not, the brave men who had broken through the Russian defenses, and long held the ground they had won, would, perforce, be all sacrificed or driven out of the fortress ; and, there being no other path open for even attempting assaults on the works of the Karabelnaya, it followed that the crisis of the conflict undertaken by d'Autemarre's troops would be also nothing less than the crisis of the whole day's engagement, excepting only that part of it on the skirts of Sebastopol town where General Eyre was commanding.

A time at last came when, no reinforcements arriving, the men of the Chasseurs battalion were forced to abandon the ground they had seized in the Karabelnaya, and when also fresh bodies of men—men drawn from the Jäkoutsck regiment—assailed and recaptured the Gervais Battery, driving

¹ The one under Captain Born which had been driven out of the Gervais Battery by the 80 French Engineers.

out what remained of the little body of 80 French Engineers which had gallantly seized and long held it. Their commander, the brave Major Abinal, who had led the attack, and remained to the last in the battery, was one of those mortally wounded.¹

The battalions of the Zouaves of the Guards that had been called up from the somewhat too distant reserve appeared at length on the ground, but by that time the crisis had passed, and they never were brought into action.

XVI.

Pélissier had not yet reached the end of that interval, eight days in length, during which he seemed not to enjoy the full command of his powers; and those who have studied his character will say, unless I mistake, that, if even he judged aright (as indeed he apparently did) when determining to abandon the struggle, he nevertheless in so doing was strangely unlike himself.

It would be a mistake, and altogether unfair, to base any estimate of Pélissier's capacity upon what he either did or omitted to do in the course of that unhappy interval.

Pélissier, so far as I learn, gave no account to his Emperor or to any one else of the main, the governing facts which brought about his discomfiture; did not—even indirectly—confess that by breaking loose from the engagement made with Lord Raglan on the 17th, he had caused the troops, French and English, to fling their strength on a fortress at the height of its power instead of one shattered anew (after all the repairs of the night) by a wisely designed cannonade.⁽³⁾ Pélissier spoke indeed of one phase—the phase next about to be mentioned—that marked the engagement in its latter stage, and assigned it as a reason to justify his final decision; but this phase, after all, was a simply direct result of his wayward mistakes, and not an originating cause of the step we shall now see him take.

Moved, he says, by the fact that d'Autemarre was without support on either flank, Pélissier—at least for the day—abandoned all hope of breaking through the defenses, and at seven o'clock in the morning, or perhaps somewhat later, he withdrew his troops from the front.² The retrograde movement was made without being gravely molested by troops sent out in pursuit.

His resolve to
abandon the
struggle.

¹ Niel, p. 318.

² The Russians assign 7 o'clock as the time, and are probably near the

XVII.

The movement on the Tchernaya.

The movement on the Tchernaya resulted in no operations that need, as I think, be recorded.

XVIII.

The attack led by General Eyre.

The only onset this day that ended victoriously was the one undertaken against ground skirting Sebastopol on the eastern side of the town, and intrusted to General Eyre with a single brigade that numbered some 2000 men. The general was to descend the ravine that took its name from the Piquet House there held by the French, to attack the line of rifle-pits established below, and finally to endeavor to occupy some ground in advance whence ulterior operations might be advantageously effected, and this more especially if the great attacks to be made in other parts of the field should be happily crowned with success. The troops destined to oppose this attack were all the battalions of the Okhotsk, and some portions of the Tomsk regiment.¹ Both these regiments had encountered our people at Inkerman, and might not perhaps now prove disposed to show themselves much in the open, but rather to take advantage of shelter.

General Eyre began his march at about half-past one in the morning. When approaching the rifle-pits and preparing to attack them in front, he all at once found himself anticipated by a body of French Chasseurs posted near, which cleverly took them in flank.² Then—as though under some precise order—the share our allies were thus taking in the early part of the onset came all at once to an end.

General Eyre, still however advancing, soon found in position before him some Russian troops strongly posted, their right resting on a Mamelon, their left on a cemetery, the ground between being intersected, and the road barricaded with stone walls. The Russians were ensconced behind cover, and General Eyre could not estimate their number. In rear of the stone walls were houses occupied by the enemy, and yet further in rear troops held in reserve could be seen.

The position was strong, and being under the guns of the fortress, including those of the Péressip, could hardly be taken without incurring serious loss; but it seems to have

truth, but Pélissier puts the time later, that is, at 8.30 A.M. He, however, perhaps referred to the time when his people regained the trenches.

¹ Todleben, vol. ii. p. 375.

² The 10th Chasseurs.

been judged that the object was worthy the sacrifice. Despite the fire thinning their ranks, our troops advanced with great gallantry, pulled down the stone walls, soon carried the whole position, and then, pushing on, seized and occupied numbers of houses, some in front, some on the right, some under the Garden Wall Battery.

The question whether all or how much of the conquest thus made should be permanently retained by our people was dependent at first on the course of events in other parts of the field, but afterwards on the judgment of our Engineers, the men best able to say what part of the newly won ground was likely to be of use to the besiegers; and therefore the commander resolved to hold all he had seized until the time when authority should be ready to determine the question. This he accordingly did, and it was only at five o'clock in the evening that he made any change. Then—unmolested by the enemy—his troops were withdrawn from that part of the conquered ground which our Engineers did not wish to retain, whilst in that other part which it seemed expedient to keep, strong posts were duly established. By this time, computing from daybreak, when the firing is believed to have opened, the action had lasted scarce less than fourteen hours. The ground General Eyre retained was afterwards fortified under the direction of our Engineers.

From one of the enemy's missiles, in the early part of the day, General Eyre had received a blow in the head which, though heavy, still did not for some time disable him; but afterwards, the wound, or its consequences, became so far incapacitating as to force him to give up the command. This accordingly he handed over to Colonel Adams of the 28th Regiment.


Eyre's conquest of ground in this part of the field might have proved to be a gain of great moment, if the other and main operations of the Allies had been blest by good-fortune; but, the contrary event having happened, it cannot be said that the gain achieved by this little victory was sufficient to weigh in a balance against the heavy loss it entailed. The loss was grave, comprising in killed and wounded no less than 562 (of whom 31 were officers), and this, too, out of a body that was only some 2000 strong.⁽⁴⁾



XIX.

According to official statements, the losses in killed,



YARDS 100 50 0 100 200 300 400





Losses sustained in the engagements of the 18th of June.

wounded, and missing sustained on this day by the Russians were 1500; ¹ by the French, about 3500; ² by the English, 1505. ³ General Todleben received a wound in the head, which, however, he treated as slight.

It proved that the 'missing' comprised in the returns of the Allies were, some of them, prisoners in the hands of the enemy, whilst others were men killed and wounded who could not be all at once found. Of prisoners other than those who died of their wounds in Sebastopol, the enemy took 287 Frenchmen, including 17 officers; and from the English only six, including one officer. ⁴ Even of those six, all, or some, if not all, when made prisoners, had been probably wounded.

Of the six French and English commanders who led the six attacks no less than four were killed, whilst also a fifth one received a wound that disabled him. ⁵

XX.

By the high-couraged energy with which they had restored their batteries to perfect efficiency in the night of the 17th of June, the Russians acquired or regained priceless means of defense; and when afterwards engaged in the action, they went through the easier task of using their recovered power with a steadiness, spirit, and vigor which, with only the exception we marked—one not destined to alter events—prevented all the attacks attempted against the enceinte from being pushed home, or even carried so far as to be closely approaching the counterscarps.

The whole scheme of the great Engineer defending Sebastopol was—not to maintain, but prohibit what Englishmen mean by a 'fight'—to baffle all attempts on the part of the besiegers to come to close quarters by the fire he poured down from his ramparts; and this object he so well achieved that (except in the instance adduced) the counterscarps of the Karabelnaya de-

The high merit of the Russian defence.

Prince Gortchakoff's statements.

¹ Todleben, ii. p. 380. The whole loss of the Russians in the *two* days, 17th and 18th, is stated, *ibid.*, p. 379, at 5446, but of those casualties no less than 4000 were sustained, as before shown, under the bombardment of the 17th.

² Niel, p. 319. The exact number there given is 3551, but that return included a few score of men killed or wounded the day before.

³ Official Returns, including those from the Navy.

⁴ Todleben, ii. p. 381.

⁵ See in the Appendix a highly interesting private letter from Lord Raglan on the subject of these engagements of the 18th of June. (5)

fenses from the west of the Great Redan to the easternmost end of 'the Point' were never once reached, were never once closely approached by any assailants. Yet in face of this truth—now well shown and recorded by Russians, French, and English alike—Prince Michael Gortchakoff allowed himself to represent that his troops had been fighting, as it were, a grand battle, had fought it, too, at close quarters, and had won it by bayonet-charges! To make the fable consistent with itself, the inventor ascribed to the assaulting columns of the Allies a degree of initial success which—unhappily—they never attained, declaring that they had come up with their ladders to the works of defense and were scaling the parapets when they found themselves met by 'the points' of the Russian bayonets and were thrown back into the Ditches;⁽⁶⁾ the truth, we know, being that—always shattered by fire in some earlier stage of their marches—the columns never were able to close on the Russian defenses, except when a brief inadvertence enabled the battalion of Chasseurs, with besides the 80 French Engineers, to evade the enemy's cannon, and that those little bodies of men—far from meeting any 'bayonet-points'—overcame with great ease the spiritless resistance attempted, established themselves in the fortress, and there, although unsupported, long held their ground against numbers.¹

XXI.

When endeavoring to account for his discomfiture, Péliissier laid a great stress on the several mishaps of the early morning which had prevented his three great attacks from taking effect simultaneously, and cast blame on the two commanders—General Mayran and General Brunet—who both had been killed in the action. It is true, perhaps, that those accidents gave the enemy a little advantage by interposing some time between the onset of Mayran and those of Brunet and d'Autemarre; but the all-governing cause of the repulse sustained by the Allies was that wild change of purpose of the preceding evening which enabled the garrison to confront the besiegers at dawn with the whole of the vast ordnance powers they had wielded before the bombardment. In that very part of the ground (at and near the Gervais Battery)

Péliissier's explanations.

The real cause of his failure.

¹ It is right to say that in time Prince Gortchakoff's curious fiction was suppressed by the Russians themselves, or not, at all events, suffered to have any place in the great official account which recorded their defense of Sebastopol.

where artillery seemed for a moment to fail in repelling assailants, its almost insuperable power was quickly proved with great clearness ; for, when (owing to some inadvertence on the part of the enemy's gunners) the band of French Chasseurs and the 80 French Engineers had been suffered to reach the defenses on the western flank of the Malakoff, and then to break their way through, all those troops in their rear that formed the bulk of the column were so peremptorily stopped or fended back by the enemy's restored batteries as to be debarred from performing what must otherwise have proved the glad task of moving into the fortress by paths already laid open, and there reinforcing the men who had brilliantly shown them the way.

The sudden change of design which brought General Pélissier to send infantry encumbered with ladders across distances of several hundreds of yards in the teeth of great batteries restored to their full power of destructiveness was an error on so huge a scale that, when once it had taken effect, no skill unaided by Fortune could well have averted discomfiture. Fortune once—only once—seemed to smile. First, lulling the enemy's gunners, she gave her hand to brave men thus enabled to move down unscathed, and carried them into the fortress, where, after overthrowing their adversaries, they long maintained a firm hold of the ground they had won ; but—perhaps from no fault of either—General d'Autemarre first, and then the French Commander-in-chief, proved unable to seize their occasion by reinforcing the victors. Not interposing again, Fortune thenceforth abandoned the Allies to what was the natural consequence of Pélissier's fatal resolve.

Except in that one chosen quarter where Fortune had seemed—for a while—to take part, there was never from the first to the last any trustworthy basis for hope that either the French or the English could even so much as begin an assault on the enemy's works. The French troops confronting defenses from the Battery of the Point to the eastern face of the Malakoff, and the English on their part confronting the batteries of the Great Redan, gave themselves with unsparing devotion, and at large cost of life and limb to their several tasks ; but, encumbered with ladders, and striving to traverse long distances under fire of great might from the ramparts, they were always so rudely mown down long before coming up to the counterscarps as to have no means at all left them for carrying the defenses by storm.

With respect to Péliissier's failure, the comment of Todleben is that he attempted what (after the repairs effected at night) was virtually impracticable, and omitted to do what was perfectly feasible—that is, to attack the town front.¹

On the efforts our people directed against the Redan, the published comment of Todleben is to the effect that they attempted the enterprise with troops too scanty in number;² but none knew better than he that any increase of the numbers thrown forward beneath his storms of mitrail must have entailed a proportionate increase of slaughter; and he certainly did not believe that even after all imaginable sacrifices, the English surviving this ordeal would have come up to the counterscarps of the Work in such strength as to be able to storm it. Standing with me years afterwards on the site of the Malakoff, he pointed out to me the lines of the Redan, and showed that, so long as the Malakoff batteries were exerting their power, troops assailing the Redan could not live.

It can hardly be said that from the moment when he launched his columns by signal to the one when he gave his last order, the mind of Péliissier was brought to bear on the action with any telling effect. He indeed drew some troops from his great reserve with which to reinforce General Mayran, but did this too late; and again, he dispatched other forces—the Zouaves of the Guard—to the support of General d'Autemarre; but before they came into action he ordered a retreat, and put an end to the conflict. It would seem that that last step, however, was a step rightly taken; for—because not supported in time by the accession of any fresh troops—the occupation of a part of the fortress by the brave Engineers and the Chasseurs had come at last to an end.

XXII.

Undertaken to meet a contingency that did not occur, and involving a grave loss of men, the attack we saw General Eyre drive through the 'Garden-wall' skirts of Sebastopol must be deemed on the whole to have ended in a dearly bought victory and a dearly bought conquest of ground.

Costliness of General Eyre's victory in proportion to the advantages gained.

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 381, 382.

² *Ibid.*, p. 383.

CHAPTER VIII.

SEBASTOPOL AFTER THE ENGAGEMENT.—GENERAL TODLEBEN
WOUNDED.—HIS DEFENSE OF SEBASTOPOL.

I.

The veil between warring armies ; BETWEEN any two modern armies opposing each other in war, though not, for the moment, in battle, there always hangs more or less thickly a dim, confusing mist, which neither the one nor the other can all at once lift by aid of deserters or spies ; and, because excluding sound knowledge whilst also leaving free room for the play of conjecture, this ceaselessly interposed veil must often, of course, have its share in determining the will of commanders, forcing each, after all, to depend a good deal on his powers to divine things unknown ; so that neither perhaps will attack, unless he proves strong at imagining the unhopeful state of his adversary.

between Sebastopol and its besiegers. If, when our siege-guns ceased firing on the morning of the 18th of June, the baffled and troubled besiegers could only have looked through the 'veil,' they perhaps might have taken Sebastopol before the close of the day. Yet, if at that very same time, a glance through the 'veil' had been only vouchsafed to the then dispirited garrison, they would promptly have seen that their efforts were proving successful, and would earn them a long time of respite from any determined attack.

The garrison. Its achievement. By repulsing all five of the columns which the French and the English had launched against their works of defense, and yielding to only one force—the force commanded by Eyre which did not attack their enceinte—the garrison had earned a good right to rejoice in the general result of their whole morning's work ; Its actual state of feeling towards the close of the engagement. but strangely enough it occurred that, for want of a glance through the 'veil,' their hour of real deliverance was to them an hour of deep gloom, and of even some approach to despair.

Coming after the terrible losses inflicted upon them by siege-guns, not only in the earlier days of June, but before,

in the month of April, the sacrifices made by the garrison—not so much whilst encountering infantry on the morning of the 18th, but rather when exposed, as they had been on the previous day, to the mercies of the Fourth Bombardment—had brought about in the Army a feeling of something like horror not unmingled with grave indignation against a plan of defense which so ruthlessly exacted its victims.¹ This was only too natural. The best battalions there are might well betray a want of contentment when doomed—not to fight, as brave men would be ready to do, but—to stand—standing idle—under the fire of siege-batteries, upon one chosen pittance of ground, and there submit to be torn by round-shot and shell, lest their presence by chance should be needed in order to repel some assault.

This necessity of keeping troops ready for imagined contingencies under the fire of siege-batteries, without any shelter from casemates or other appliances, was, of course, a weak point in the plan of defense. It brought wounds or death to several thousands of men, and on all the troops so employed inflicted the moral torture of having to stand simply passive under the fire of great guns without being able themselves to strike a blow in return.

However, if not with good grace, and not without signs that the endurance of the brave Russian soldiery had been strained to nearly its utmost, the torture of the Fourth Bombardment was borne by the Army in Sebastopol on the 17th of June; and Péliissier's infatuation prevented its being renewed in the earlier hours of the following day; but when, after the baffled assaults of the 18th of June, our siege-guns opened once more, and the Russians again underwent a havoc and slaughter renewing their yesterday's trial of fortitude, the feeling that appears to have seized on a part of the garrison was one of bitter, angry discouragement, approaching with some to despair, and with many, indeed, it would seem that the feeling ran into panic. According to the accounts of deserters, the soldiery in great numbers ran down to the shore of the Roadstead, and fought with their own fellow-countrymen for the boats and the rafts they there found, wildly striving to escape from Sebastopol, and gain the peaceful 'North-side.'²

This despair, or approach to despair, on the part of troops well entitled to exult in their happy achievement, was not destined, of course, to be lasting; but the garrison did not

¹ Calthorpe, ii. p. 350.

² Ibid., ii. p. 355.

The Czar's infantry in grave need of encouragement ;
 cease all at once to stand in grave need of encouragement ; and perhaps a requirement so pressing may have led men to frame in great haste such accounts of a glorious infantry battle as they thought would best cheer the dispirited soldiery, thus supplying material for the strange fabrication which substituted mere hollow fable for the truth known to thousands, yet purported to draw its authority from the Russian Commander-in-chief.¹

The Russians—navy and army, engineers, artillery, infantry—having all, or nearly all, done their duty with valor and steadiness down to almost the close of the action, and having repulsed every column attempting to storm the enceinte, might have well been rewarded and cheered with perfectly well-founded praise ; yet, because, when our siege-guns reopened, a part of the garrison faltered and began to lose heart, some restorative better than truth was apparently thought to be needed. The garrison was gravely told that it had fought at close quarters with the hosts of the besiegers, and defeated them with our old Russian friend, ‘the too often fabulous bayonet !’

A more legitimate way of restoring heart to the troops was found with the aid of the priests who—made sacred in the eyes of the Russians by their sacred costumes⁽¹⁾, and carrying their time-honored implements of worship—came out on the morrow of the action to the lines of defense, and there led the chants of Thanksgiving for the ‘mercy,’ as our Cromwell would call it, vouchsafed on the previous morning.

With any such pious acknowledgments a little fair self-gratulation is always compatible ; and the brave survivors of those who had undergone the dreadful bombardment of the 17th of June, who had toiled through the night in repairing their shattered batteries under vertical fire, who, next day, manning their ramparts, had stood—had stood firm—against five advancing columns, who had endured the bombardment which followed without giving way to despair, were able to indulge a just pride, not only in what they had done, but yet more in what they had borne.

¹ See *ante*, chap. vii. p. 141 *et seq.*

II.

Ill-omened, however, this time, were the public thanksgivings! On the very next day General Todleben was wounded by a ball in the calf of his right leg; and his surgeon, observing the symptoms, strongly pressed him to leave the town in all haste. This in absolute terms the general refused to do. The commander-in-chief of the garrison then came to the side of his couch; but it was only after strong persuasion that he prevailed upon Todleben to retire to the home of M. Sarandansky—a country-house on the Belbec.¹ There—because inflammation set in—he long remained prostrate, and too often enduring great pain.

Thus passed away from Sebastopol its mighty defender. It is true that the cares of war followed him, that reports which imparted more or less freshly, and more or less accurately, the ever-varying phases of the siege and defense, were day by day brought him, and that from his bed of suffering, too often, indeed, during moments when the pain he endured was severe, he showed those who came how to meet the then newly extant conditions, doing this, it is said, with all his old clearness, and with that strong, that sure grasp of mind for which he was famed amongst those who long had toiled under his orders.²

But we know that Todleben's method of bringing brain-power to bear on each problem coming before him had rested much more than is common on his own actual bodily presence. By scanning reports, and penning or dictating orders, other men have made themselves conquerors, and few, I suppose, would disparage the mode they have found well adapted for giving effect to their plans. But not such was this great soldier's way of bringing his power to bear. It was not at table or desk, but on that black charger of his which our people used to watch with their glasses, that he mainly defended Sebastopol.³ It was always with his very own eyes that he liked to fasten on knowledge, with his very own voice that he liked to give special orders, with his very own presence that he carried from rampart to rampart the passion of a warlike resolve.

The withdrawal of a power long wielded in this special,

¹ Ernshoff, Part VII. leaf 79 of the MS. translation I have.

² Ibid.

³ The interesting identification at Woolwich, to which Todleben's black charger contributed, is mentioned, I think, in an earlier volume.

The difference caused by his removal.

No thanks-givings thenceforth for the Russians;

but approaching defeat in the field.

personal way was not, of course, one to be compensated by any such notes or messages as a wounded and suffering patient might send from his couch miles away in the Belbec valley; and, although I have no right to say that, so soon as this leader of men—suffering under his wound—had been carried away from his Fortress, the famous defense of Sebastopol began to decline, it still must be owned that thenceforward no other day meet for Thanksgivings awaited the garrison; nor less is it true that, when no longer met by his presence amongst the defenders, rash counsels began to prevail. The Czar's army, wildly attempting to dispute with the French and Sardinians for the banks of the lower Tchernaya, was soon to receive at their hands a calamitous defeat in the field.

The position of Todleben in Sebastopol;

The more narrow-minded men of the Czar's Army, and even, whilst Nicholas lived, the confused Czar himself, would have thought they sufficiently described the real defender of Sebastopol by calling him an 'Engineer Officer,' with perhaps superadded some epithet such as 'excellent,' or 'able,' or 'good;' and it is true that his skill in that 'branch' of the service enabled the great volunteer to bring his power to bear at a critical time; but it would be a wild mistake to imagine that, because fraught with knowledge and skill on one special subject, his mind was a mind at all prone to run in accustomed, set grooves. He was by nature a man great in war, and richly gifted with power, not only to provide in good time for the dimly expected conditions which it more or less slowly unfolds, but to meet its most sudden emergencies. When, for instance, we saw him at Inkerman in a critical moment, he, in theory, was only a spectator on horseback; but, to avert the impending disaster, he instantly assumed a command. He seized, if so one may speak, on a competent body of troops, and rescued from imminent capture the vast, clubbed, helpless procession of Mentschikoff's retreating artillery.

He was only at first a volunteer colonel, and was afterwards even, no more, in the language of formalists, than a general commanding the Engineers in a fortress besieged; but the task he designed, the task he undertook, the task he—till wounded—pursued with a vigor and genius that astonished a gazing world, was—not this or that fraction of a mighty work, but simply the whole defense of Sebastopol. Like many another general, he from time to time found himself thwarted, and too often encountered obstructions; but,

upon the whole, even after the 'heroic period,' when the glorious sailors were mainly his trust and his strength, there glowed in the hearts of the Russians withstanding foreign invasion a genuine spirit of patriotism which not only brought them to face the toils and dangers of war with ready devotion, but even in a measure kept down the growth of ignoble jealousies directed against this true chief.

The task of defending Sebastopol was a charge of superlative moment, and drew to itself, before long, the utmost efforts that Russia could bring to bear on the war.

Since the fortress—because not invested—stood open to all who would save it, and only closed against enemies, the troops there at any time planted were something more than a 'garrison,' being also, in truth, the foremost column of troops engaged in resisting invasion; and, moreover, the one chosen body out of all the Czar's forces which had in charge his great jewel—the priceless Sebastopol Roadstead.

The invaders and the invaded alike had from time to time fondly dwelt on plans for deciding the fate of Sebastopol by means of action elsewhere; but the Russians, deterred from 'adventures' by the terrible Inkerman day, had since given up all recourse to field operations attempted with any such object; and, on the other hand, General Péliissier, by his great strength of will, had substantially brought the invaders to follow a like resolve. From this avoidance on both sides of serious field operations, it resulted, of course, that hostilities became, as it were, condensed on the Sebastopol battlefield.

There, accordingly, and, of course, with intensity proportioned to the greatness and close concentration of efforts made on both sides, the raging war laid its whole stress.

On the narrow arena thus chosen, it was Russia, all Russia, that clung to Sebastopol, with its faubourg the Karabelnaya; and, since Todleben there was conducting the defense of the place, it follows, from what we have seen, that he was chief over that very part of the Czar's gathered, gathering armies which had 'the jewel' in charge; and, moreover, that, call him a Sapper, or call him a warlike dictator, or whatever men choose, he was the real commander for Russia on the one confined seat of conflict where all the long-plotted hostilities of both the opposing forces had drawn at last to a centre.

To appreciate the power he wielded, and distinguish him

from an officer defending an invested fortress, one again must recur to the peculiar nature of the strife on which France and England had entered. Though maintained in great part with the kind of appliances that are commonly used by the assailants and defenders of fortresses, the conflict was so strongly marked in its character by the absence of complete investment as to be rather a continuous battle between two entrenched armies than what men in general mean when they casually speak of a 'siege.' Each force, if thus lastingly engaged, was likewise all the while drawing an equally lasting support, the one from all Russia exerting the strength of the Empire in her own dominions, the other from what was not less than a great European alliance with full command of the sea.

The commander of a fortress besieged in the normal way, cut off from the outer world, must commonly dread more or less the exhaustion of his means of defense; but no cares of that exact kind cast their weight on the mind of the chief engaged in defending Sebastopol; for being left wholly free to receive all the succors that Russia might send him, he had no exhaustion to fear, except, indeed, such an exhaustion affecting Russia herself as would prevent her furnishing means for the continued defense of the fortress.

The garrison holding Sebastopol, and made, one may say, inexhaustible by constant reinforcement, used in general to have such a strength as the Russians themselves thought well fitted for the defense of the fortress; and, if they did not augment it, this was simply because greater numbers for service required behind ramparts would have increased the exacted sacrifices, without doing proportionate good.

But, in truth—because constantly drawing fresh accessions of strength from the rear—this peculiarly circumstanced garrison represented both a power and a sacrifice that could not be measured by merely counting its numbers at any one given time. The force was so privileged as to be exempt from the weakness of armies with dwindling numbers. The garrison was ever young, ever strong, ever equal in numbers to what were considered its needs. It was constantly, indeed, sending off great numbers of men sick and wounded to hospitals over the Roadstead, and was always contributing largely to 'the grave of the hundred thousand' in the Severnaya;¹ but the wounded, the sick, the

¹ On the Severnaya, or North Side, there is a sepulchre (sanctified by a church) called grandly by Russians 'the tomb of the hundred thousand.' The real number of sailors and soldiers sacrificed at Sebastopol, and laid in

dead were constantly replaced by fresh troops ; and even a plague of downheartedness in the soldiery, such as showed itself on the 18th of June, was an evil that the commander of the garrison knew how to shake off by marching away the dispirited regiments, and promptly filling their places with troops in a more warlike mood.

Great, of course, was the power, though not to be told by arithmetic, of an ever-fresh body of troops thus peculiarly circumstanced, with Todleben's mighty defenses to cover their front ; but proportionately great was the strain that Sebastopol put upon Russia by continually exacting fresh troops for a garrison that was fast losing men, yet—on peril of a fatal disaster—must always be kept in due strength.

Because he defended the fortress under all these conditions at a time when the forces on each side were avoiding grave field operations, General Todleben, I think, must be said to have virtually held the command in that protracted conflict which we have almost been ready to call 'a continuous battle ;' and, indeed—since the Inkerman day—to have virtually wielded the power, the whole of the power, that Russia opposed to her invaders on the Sebastopol theatre of war.

III.

The glory—true glory—attaching to the defense of Sebastopol in its earliest and grandest period was kept veiled from the Russians themselves by, in some things, the misleading utterances, in others, the misleading silence, if not, indeed, by the ignorance of their own unfortunate Czar.

How this happened we easily learn. To appreciate the glory there was in battling with that dark sea of troubles which confronted Korniloff and Todleben, the first condition, of course, is to know, in a general way, what the troubles they faced really were ; and this, as it happened, was knowledge of exactly that kind which a man in the station of Nicholas might very well fail to acquire, or, if acquiring it, choose to withhold from the ears of his people ; for where could the Czar find informants brave enough to acquaint him, in full, with the reign that sprang up in Sebastopol on the 25th of September, and how could the man tell his people of that collapse of his Government and of his Army which had opened occasion for lawless, volunteered services ? how bring himself to see and ac-

this 'tomb' was not quite so great as the 'round number' imports, but great enough (speaking poetically) to warrant the tragic surname.

knowledge that the intrepid defense of Sebastopol in its earlier and noblest epoch was achieved, so to speak, by—as though they were dare-devil English, or dare-devil Anglo-Americans—a little commonwealth of brave men, exempt for the time from all imperial governance, and deserted by the Emperor's army? Above all, how confess that men for the moment cast loose from the rule of the Czars, knew how to do what was essentially an Emperor's work—knew how to find a great general?

The truth is, that that very period which was one of great glory for the people of Russia, was also, as we have seen, one of shame for not only the Czar, but the Czardom; and, the light of knowledge in those days being under official control, Russia could not learn much at the time of the heroism with which a few thousands of her people, when fairly cast loose from their Government, stood up against the Invaders.

As in France, when the long war had ended, schoolmasters taught little children that the battles of Marengo and Austerlitz had been gained—after prayers to his saint—by the pious and valiant King Louis; so Nicholas—blind to the truth, or trampling it down under foot, ignored the superb interregnum that began in Sebastopol towards the close of September, and wildly claimed for his 'Army,' that is, in a sense for himself, all the glory that had been won in the interval by a man and by men for the moment cast loose from Imperial rule, and taking that place of danger which the 'Army,' as we saw, had left vacant.

When Nicholas died, the Government of his successor dealt wisely enough with the fact that there had been at Sebastopol a brief interregnum, when the glory achieved by brave Russians contrasted with the plight of the Government. They adopted, if so we may speak, the great volunteer; and, although not apparently strong enough in the face of known army prejudices to give him—to give him ostensibly—a wider command than that of general officer commanding the Engineers in a fortress, they yet duly provided, or suffered Prince Gortchakoff to provide, that he who had conceived, had begun, had maintained the glorious defense of Sebastopol, should still have the power required for going on with his task.

That, whilst the war lasted, the Government of the new Czar should aid in bringing to light the true history of 'the interregnum' was hardly to be expected; for no man, when

dealing with the events which began towards the close of September, could well give a just meed of praise to the heroes of that trying time without confessing the facts—facts shaming of course to the Czardom—which gave them the occasion they seized; and it seems to have resulted that, at the time of the war, the Russians in general were kept ill acquainted, or not acquainted at all, with what, in those days, was so gloriously achieved by their people.

If allowed at the time to have full acquaintance with what seems to me a great page in their history, the Russians might perhaps have inferred that their uniform discomfiture in the open field, their overthrow in every battle attempted against the invaders, was, after all, rather traceable to their system of government, than to any inherent defect in the quality of their race. That, of course, was a kind of discovery which their rulers might desire to avert.

To know, if only a little, of that strange time in Sebastopol when the guns on the Alma were heard; when, with what seemed strange suddenness, the sounds of battle all ceased; when afterwards—met riding southwards, alone or almost alone, bent down by fatigue and misfortune, Prince Mentschikoff gave from his saddle the order—perhaps well conceived, but hideous nevertheless—the order to sink men-of-war across the mouth of the Roadstead;

When he and his army retreated into Sebastopol; when—in secrecy and at night—with his army the Prince retreated again, retreating, this time, into what was nothing less than sheer exile from the then narrowed seat of war;

When Prince Mentschikoff not only ceased to know anything of the enemy from whom he was flying, but even for several days gave up intercourse with the 18,000 sailors of the now landlocked fleet under Admiral Korniloff, and all the other brave men he had left to their fate in Sebastopol.

When suddenly officers gazing from the Belvedere top of the Naval Library saw our red-coats in march for the road which descends from Mackenzie's Farm, and so by swift inference learned that Sebastopol was about to be assailed from the south—assailed on its unprepared front;

When all at once, shifting his energies from the north to what now might well seem the doomed side of an inchoate fortress, the volunteer Colonel of Sappers came over the Roadstead, came forbidding, repressing despair, and replac-

Words re-
calling the
early de-
fense of
Sebastopol.

ing it by the healthy alternative of work, work, work, immense work; so that under his guidance the people of all sorts and conditions who had been left in Sebastopol—people having, it is true, for their main strength and main hope the superb 18,000 sailors of the landlocked fleet, commanded by their heroic Korniloff, addressed themselves to no less an object than that of defending Sebastopol against the victorious armies of England and France, entered therefore at once on their task of constructing defenses and pursued it under the eyes of the enemy;

When, adding political courage to warlike valor, the heroic, devoted Admiral and the volunteer Colonel of Sappers proved able to form a resolve which to Russians a few days before would have seemed to overpass all the limits of human audacity, and without any sanction at all from their Czar or his Government, with none from the commander, Prince Mentschikoff, went on to break up for State reasons a vast imperial structure—a structure no less than that of the whole Black Sea Fleet, and then promptly applied it, applied it material and men, applied it body and soul, to the work of fighting on shore;

When at dawn on the 10th of October the joy of the defenders rose high, because they saw that the enemy had been opening trenches, and learned that, far from seizing the place, he was going instead to besiege it; and next, eight days later, when having bombarded Sebastopol with their fleets and their land-service batteries, the Allies proved content to abstain from completing their work by assault—to

Inferences to be drawn from the early defense of Sebastopol. know, I say, if but a little, of this stirring epoch of only some twenty-eight days, is to have an idea of the perils which Korniloff and Todleben faced; is to see that the Russian people, if ennobled by a training like that received by their sailors instead of being crushed by excessive land-service drill, may prove themselves greater in war than they have seemed to be under their Czars; is to learn that, although he had remained undiscovered by their Government, and was only a volunteer officer, they knew when they had in their midst a born commander of men, and hastened to make him their leader.

After the 17th of October, when Todleben's great undertaking had passed its desperate epoch, and the fortress every day growing stronger became and for some time remained an at least equal match for its foes, he who still carried on the defense under new conditions, who oppressed, almost mocked the besiegers with his

Defense of Sebastopol after the 17th of October.

counter-approaches; who still pursued month after month his steadfast design, and brought it to a climax victoriously on the morning of the 18th of June, was he who, if armed in the spring—some months after the fitting time!—with a share of official authority, still remained the same man as the volunteer Colonel of Sappers, whose greatness began in that interval when the Czardom for the moment had ceased to exercise sway in Sebastopol, leaving room in its stead for heroic, spontaneous action adventured by resolute men.

And what Todleben achieved, he achieved in his very own way. Never hearkening apparently to the cant of the Russian army of those days which with troops marshalled closely like sheep professed to fight with the bayonet, he made it his task to avert all strife at close quarters, by pouring on any assailants such storms of mitrail as should make it impossible for them to reach the verge of his counterscarps. That is the plan he designed from the first, and the one he in substance accomplished.

From the day when he made his first efforts to cover with earthworks the suddenly threatened South Side to the time, more than eight months afterwards, when his wound compelled him to quit the fortress, he successfully defended Sebastopol; and, as we have seen, to do this—after Inkerman, or at all events after the onset attempted against Eupatoria—was to maintain the whole active resistance that Russia opposed to her invaders in the southwestern Crimea.

Confined as it was to one narrow tract of ground, the strife involved nevertheless a trial of strength between great powers—powers no more sparing of blood or of treasure than if the war thus compressed were raging over vast territories.

One may say of Todleben and the sailors, and the other brave men acting with them, that by maintaining the defense of Sebastopol, not only long after the 20th of September, but also long after the 5th of November, they twice over vanquished a moral obstacle till then regarded as one that no man could well overcome.

‘If a battle undertaken in defense of a fortress is fought and lost, the place will fall.’ This, before the exploit of the great volunteer, was a saying enounced with authority as though it were almost an axiom that Science had deigned to lay down; yet after the defeat of their army on the banks

his super-
lative part in
the war.

The maxim
twice over
refuted by the
early defend-
ers of Sebas-
topol.

of the Alma, after even its actual evasion from the neighborhood of Sebastopol, he along with the glorious sailors and the rest of the people there left to their fate proved to be of such quality that, far from consenting to let the place 'fall,' as experience declared that it must, he and they—under the eyes of the enemy—began to create, and created that vast chain of fortress defense which, after more than eight months, we saw him still holding intact. And again, when—in sight of the Fortress it strove to relieve—an Army gathered in strength fought and lost with great slaughter the battle of Inkerman, sending into the Karabelnaya its thousands upon thousands of wounded soldiery, the resolute chief and brave garrison did not therefore remit, did not slacken their defense of the place; so that—even twice over—by valor they refuted a saying till then held so sure that, receiving the assent of mankind, it had crystallized into a maxim.

Yet, so far as I know, these brave men never vaunted in print or in speech the peculiar distinction they had won. Their triumph over the axiom, twice superbly made good, could only be shown by first telling of the defeats sustained in the field by their Czar's unfortunate armies, and that last condition, apparently, the loyal, generous men never cared to fulfil.

For other Russians the glory of having defended Sebastopol until the time we have reached was, after all, a forerunner of approaching defeat; but for Todleben personally, whilst still he toiled in the Fortress, no such reverse lay in wait. The time when he quitted it (wounded) was for him more than ever a time of victory, following close, as it did, on his crowning achievement made good on the 18th of June.

If the Czar had come down to Sebastopol, or rather to the Karabelnaya, at the close of the engagement on the morning of the 18th of June, he might there have apostrophized Todleben, as he did long years after at Plevna, when saying: 'Edward Ivanovitch, it is thou that hast accomplished it all!'

His personal
glory dis-
severed from the
subsequent
reverses of
Russia.

CHAPTER IX.

PÉLISSIER AFTER HIS DISCOMFITURE.

At the close of the assaults he had hazarded on the 18th of June, Pélissier must needs have endured a more than common load of distress. He had chosen to follow a course so flighty and wayward that, in order to be ever condoned, his conduct seemed to require nothing less than the shield of a victory; yet after exacting from his army deplorable sacrifices, he had only encountered discomfiture. He had fiercely resisted his Emperor, had set at naught all the counsels (including those of Lord Raglan) which moved him to assail the Flagstaff Bastion then ripe for attack, had driven his foremost general from all command on the Heights for the crime of discerning with clearness what he himself failed to see; he had—why none can tell—broken loose from the engagement deliberately made with Lord Raglan on the morning of the 17th, and had ended by ruthlessly ordering that, next day, at dawn, three divisions of infantry should move forward across broad spaces of ground under the ruinous fire of batteries no longer shattered and silent, but restored to their original strength, thus bringing down on his people the natural consequences of action so lawless and wild in the shape of repulses endured by all his attacking columns, and painful losses of men; whilst also, by the very discomfiture thus wildly incurred, he wrung from the English commander those unsparing endeavors to support him which proved to be not only vain, but destructive to numbers of our men. And again, whatever the cause (whether temporary lessening of his accustomed brain-power, or simply want of good opportunity), it was not Pélissier's fate to be able to display in the action any signs of warlike ability.

Under all these conditions, the Emperor Louis Napoleon now found himself armed by events with better means of extinguishing his fierce, contumacious general than any he had wielded before, and he quickly began to exert the augmented power that thus had come into his hands; first harshly demanding with a dry, grave reserve, explanations, and full,

The distress-
ing position
in which Pé-
lissier stood.

Increased
means of
acting against
him acquired
by the
Emperor.

plain accounts from the baffled, yet still proud commander, and afterwards even proceeding—though not with sustained perseverance—to remove him or try to remove him from the command of the army.

But Pélissier was a man very strong in adversity; and it even would seem that, although his full use of the powers which Nature had given him might be interrupted during several days by what are called ‘worrying’ troubles, his mind was so constituted as to be able to rise in its strength, so soon as he found himself challenged and put on his mettle by grave misfortune. He not only came to the end of that brief, ill-omened interval of eight days during which, as we saw, his capacity appears to have failed him, but disclosed a great force of character, well supported by adroitness, audacity, and fertile resource, with besides, one must own, a return to his old, clever wiles, no longer now marred by a palpably scornful tone, and to even professions of suppleness which only some five days before, when not yet coerced by misfortune, he seemed to have proudly renounced.¹

And, at this time, the English Government had happily done a good deal towards sheltering the French and Pélissier from the dangers of their sovereign’s wild dictation; for they had made an agreement with the Emperor, which Lord Panmure thus described: ‘We have agreed with the Emperor ‘that neither from Paris nor London shall any ‘orders for operations be sent which are not mutual from our respective Governments;’² and they also took another wise step, that of sending General Torrens to Paris as their military commissioner, with instructions to keep them informed on the subject of the war, and to endeavor to smooth the anxiety of the Emperor.³

These well-designed measures produced a wholesome effect, and perhaps may be said to have had no small share in determining the course of events.

There is ground for conjecture that the merit of taking these steps belonged in the main to Lord Palmerston.

I have not learned that Pélissier, under the discipline of

¹ See *ante*, p. 95.

² Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, 18th June, 1855. The words may be ‘hard to construe,’ but not to understand; for they must have meant, I suppose, that neither of the two Governments should send out orders for operations without first apprising the other Government of its intention.

³ *Ibid*.

misfortune, confessed his mistakes to others in either writing or speech ; but by action, so far as he could, he retracted no less than two of the several false steps he had taken. On the second day after the engagement he brought back General Bosquet to that wide command on the Heights from which, on the 16th of June, we saw the Chief thrusting him out.¹

Pélissier went even further on in the same right direction. Having wreaked his anger on Bosquet but a few days before for differing from him in judgment, he now adopted Bosquet's opinion, and freely abandoned his own. He acknowledged at last to himself, and — by deeds, though not words — to all the rest of the world, that, whilst armed with their powerful batteries in a state of efficiency, the defenses of the Karabelnaya were not to be assaulted again by troops advancing against them across lengthened distances of unsheltered ground ; and accordingly, as Bosquet had counselled, he determined, at the cost of huge sacrifices, to sap up almost close to the opposite counterscarps before he again would confront them with his infantry columns.

Against a heap of adverse conditions which, if only the whole rugged truth had been known at St. Cloud, must have seemed almost too hard to face, the undaunted Norman maintained himself in the confidence of Marshal Vaillant, War Minister, and still fended off the dictation attempted by Louis Napoleon.²

If I part from the interesting subject thus touched in only two sentences, it is because the pursuing it home would be passing the bounds of a narrative that professes to have a fixed limit.

Kept alive by the presence — the irritating presence — of Niel at the French Headquarters, the angry conflict maintained between Louis Napoleon and Pélissier was long a source of grave danger to the cause of the Allies ; and I must not omit to acknowledge that the all-important duty of laboring to keep the strife within limits was discharged by a Minister of State with sound wisdom, good feeling, and skill.

Marshal Vaillant, the Minister of War, had never, it

¹ Niel, p. 320.

² The 'whole truth' would have confirmed that 'escapade' of the 17th of June which was the proximate, and quite sufficing, cause of the discomfiture Pélissier had suffered.

The happily
exerted qual-
ities of Mar-
shal Vaillant.

seems, been regarded as amongst the most gentle of beings, nor as one born to soothe angry men ; but the efforts he made to keep peace between the Emperor and Pélissier, or, rather, to avert any violent, destructive explosion, were in all respects admirable, being animated by a loyal, patriotic desire to see well upheld the honor of the French arms, whilst also brought to bear with effect by a judgment and tact of the kind that perhaps might be hopefully looked for in an accomplished diplomatist, yet, this time, were found in a veteran soldier who had shared in the Moscow campaign.¹

Marshal Vaillant, too, wielded a power that aided his endeavor to mediate. The 'feeling of the army' in France was then a partly occult, yet always dominant, force understood to be day by day ruling the fate of Louis Napoleon ; and this force Marshal Vaillant was not only able to gauge, but also in some sort to sway. His words, therefore, acted with cogency on the mind of the Emperor, and in that direction accordingly he was able to press mediation with the weight that belongs to authority.

To Pélissier, on the other hand, the Marshal addressed himself in calming, persuasive words ; and, although it is true, the fierce general was entreated to be more deferential to the Emperor, and even, in some things, more yielding, he yet found himself loyally sustained by the Minister of War. Nay, unless I mistake, one can read through the diction employed something like an assurance that, despite the sheer letter of the law, Pélissier's tenure of the command was resting, after all, on a basis—not sure, but still—rather more stable than the whim of Louis Napoleon. Pélissier was told that he had the full confidence of the French impersonal 'On ;' and the circumstances were apparently such that this 'On' really meant something more than the personal Emperor—meant something, indeed, not unlike what men call 'the State,' so that, virtually, the sovereign could hardly withdraw his general from the field and from the enemy's presence without first obtaining some sanction of a higher kind than his own unsupported will.

It is true, indeed, that the Emperor once came to a decision dismissing his contumacious general, replacing him by General Niel, and ordering his Minister of War to communicate this change to Pélissier ; but he only, after all, gave occasion for one of those pranks which honest men, acting

¹ Rousset ; and I may add that the high praise he bestows is fully sustained by the correspondence he has disclosed.

for the good of their country, are accustomed to play upon despots. Marshal Vaillant did so far obey as to dispatch a letter to Péliissier in the terms commanded by the Emperor; but, instead of sending it by telegraph, as he had been ordered to do, he committed it to the railway, thus gaining a good deal of time for the object on which he was bent. Then, supported by General Fleury, he persuaded the Emperor to revoke his decision, and did this so quickly as to be able to stop—at Marseilles—the further flight of the letter he had sent off by mail to Péliissier.¹

Success of
Vaillant's ef-
forts to pre-
vent a rupt-
ure.

On the whole one may say that the too often threatening rupture between the Emperor and his general at the seat of war was always fended off by the Minister in time to avert public mischief.

Whilst thus achieving an object of vital moment to France, and, through France, to the whole Alliance, Marshal Vaillant, moreover, found time and gracious, considerate words, as from comrade to comrade, with which, in so far as he could, to soothe the wounded feelings of Niel whilst suffering under the treatment remorselessly inflicted upon him by a furious Commander-in-chief.

His endeav-
ors to solace
and pacify
Niel.

However foolishly wielded, a Government of the sort called despotic in form may long maintain an appearance of something like competency by the simple expedient of selecting facts meet for disclosure, and hiding all its worst nonsense from the eye of the world. It was only after the fall of the second French Empire, and even, indeed, of Thiers (who was averse from disclosures he thought detrimental to France), that the antagonistic relations which long had severed the Emperor from his general in the field became known to more than a few.

Long conceal-
ment of the
truth by the
French Gov-
ernment.

Without casting even one glance beyond the set bounds of this narrative, we have been able to see that the resolute Norman, Péliissier, was a man of other mould than the one in which France, since the Great Revolution, has commonly shaped down her people.

No man, even in our own rugged Isles, ever held his own better against effacing tendencies than did this strong, willful Norman. His idiosyncrasy bristled with a sharpness

Péliissier;
his distinct
individuality;

¹ Rousset, ii. pp. 292, 293.

incessantly proving that he was Pélissier, intensely Pélissier, Pélissier plainly abounding with faults and gifts all his own.

What, however, we here have to mark is his wealth in those qualities—honor, wisdom, the half-divine faculty of entering into the motives of others—which make a loyal ally. As was natural, he on some questions differed from Lord Raglan; but, except during one little interval of twelve or fourteen hours, when the torments inflicted upon him by the electric wires had impaired for the time his self-command and his judgment, he always, so far as I know, was doing his best to maintain the great Alliance. From the miserable state into which the Alliance had fallen before his accession, Pélissier raised it to one of real cordiality, and thus gave signal proof that he had some at least of the statesmanship which we have seen to be more or less needed for the guidance of commanders in almost all great modern wars.¹

And again, in a very different way, Pélissier found himself called upon to take the main part in a strife which, though falling to the lot of a commander in the midst of raging war, was still in its nature a strife between statesmen—between a sovereign claiming full right to direct a campaign from afar, and a general in the enemy's presence declining to be bound by any such godlike prerogative. It was in resistance to this pretension that Pélissier served France, served her army, and served the Alliance with high courage, with unfailing resources of mind, and, above all, immense strength of will.

From almost the time of its opening in the last century, the undying French Revolution had often enough been presenting some new and strange phase to the eyes of astonished Europe; and the last of these novelties was a man on a throne called 'the Emperor,' neither bred to arms, nor gifted, so far as men knew, with any warlike capacity, yet not only enabled by letter of law to command the commanders of his armies and fleets, but determined to use his power in the Eastern war, and possessed, besides, with a notion that, acting in person, he could victoriously direct a campaign; or, if prevented from joining his army in a far-dis-

¹ The Prussians, in 1870, gave outward expression to this belief when they brought with them into the thick of the war their king, their war minister (Von Roon), and their Bismarck. Have the French any Bismarck in readiness to send with head-quarters in their next campaign?

tant region, could still give it sure means of conquest by sending out his commands in letters and messages from the West to the East of Europe.

Whatever alarm might be raised by the prospect of a Louis Napoleon appearing in the Crimea, there seemed to be fair ground for hope that his contact with realities, the influence exercised over him by his surrounding generals, and his natural awe of Lord Raglan, would so far awaken him as to check his pursuit of dreams.

And again, when abandoning his project of going out to the Crimea, he resorted to the plan of conducting the war by letters, the French army, as we know, was in some sort protected from its sovereign by intervening distance; since lapse of time passing between the writing and the arrival of his missives allowed room for such change of circumstances as might warrant or excuse disobedience to imperial mandates.

But when, in the beginning of May, electricity overcame distance, and thenceforth the unfortunate Canrobert on the Chersonese began to get pelted with orders dispatched the same day by his master, the peril became acute, and was followed at once—not, indeed, by an actual and disastrous defeat in the field, but—by that recall of the expedition to Kertch (when already near the end of the voyage) which brought what the French call ‘a Ridicule’ on France, and, through her, on the Great Alliance.

The cup was then full; and General Canrobert, in confusion and misery, withdrawing from the command, his successor (Pélissier) entered on that task of steadfast resistance to a dangerous sovereign which we have seen him maintain with high courage, though not without being so harassed by the difficult strife as to lose for a while the full command of his judgment.

With respect to Pélissier's power as a commander in war, one, of course, must beware of founding conclusions too general on the merits and faults he disclosed within the time spanned by a narrative which ends with the 28th of June; for he then, as all know, was only in mid campaign with a critical future before him.

From the moment of his acquiring an extended authority—and this occurred some weeks before his becoming the Commander-in-chief—he brought an immense strength of will to bear on the course of the war.

Far away from the Crimea in the autumn of 1854, he had never, of course, shared the counsels which nailed victorious

As a commander in war.

armies to ground on the south of Sebastopol, and his sense of not having created the wondrous predicament which, coming out some months later, he found closely fastened upon them, may have made it the easier for him to study with coolness the problem demanding solution.

Of all solutions, the ugliest was the one asking France and England, after hugely increasing their forces, to incur the needed sacrifices of life, however appalling, and carry the South Side by storm. To this conclusion, however, Pélissier came. He considered that the 'siege'—if so called—of an uninvested fortress was substantially a protracted battle with Russia, and that to march troops away from the fight with instructions to begin and to execute another campaign in another region would be to run after 'adventures,' and violate the recognized principles which govern the art of war.

He acted up to his faith with a terrible energy.

In the last days of April and the beginning of May, whilst still only commanding a corps, and again three weeks afterwards, when placed at the head of the army, he attacked, as we saw, the Town counter-approaches, and carried them after incurring heavy losses of men. On attaining the supreme command he hastened to wipe out the ridicule which Louis Napoleon's telegrams had brought on the Allies, and at once, in due concert with Lord Raglan, renewed the expedition to Kertch. Then he and Lord Raglan, co-operating, attacked the counter-approaches of the Karabelnaya, and carried them all; but the losses of the English were great, and those of the French enormous. Soon—brought about by the plague of Louis Napoleon's messages—there followed that interruption of Pélissier's sounder judgment which led him into several errors, and directly brought down on the Allies—French and English alike—the misfortunes of the 18th of June, quickly followed, however, by proof that the Norman was strong in adversity.

Pélissier in war did not seem to be a man caring at all for stratagems, 'diversions,' or feints. Revering the ascertained principles of the warlike Art, and keeping his mind in a state which insured its consent (if his judgment so willed it) to terrible sacrifices, he instinctively sought to prevail by direct means, and by sheer force of character. His reluctance to bend aside from any design once formed had a tendency, of course, to prevent him from showing in action any nimbleness of mind; so that hardly on the spur of the moment would he seize newly found opportunities with the requisite

promptitude, or alter at once any project, because of a sudden confronted by grave though unforeseen obstacles.

Men disposed to believe that the key to Pélissier's character was a firmness so rigid as to be verging on blind, mulish obstinacy, will find their theory met by the changes we saw him effect when under the schooling of adversity. But he even then clung to one of his errors—that of declining to assault the Flagstaff Bastion—with a sinister tenacity, not improbably sustained by the fact that Niel on that question held strongly an opposite opinion; and it still may perhaps remain true that the paramount quality of this fiery commander was, after all—strength.

It was after the period covered by this account of the war that Pélissier won his renown—renown due to one who, if only reducing by siege-work one part of a fortress, had still done enough by great qualities to govern events, and bring a bloody war towards its close.

CHAPTER X.

LORD RAGLAN: HIS (OF LATE) SMOOTH RELATIONS WITH THE HOME GOVERNMENT.—THE AFFLICTION HE SUFFERED FROM THE DISAPPOINTMENT AND LOSSES SUSTAINED ON THE 18TH OF JUNE.—HIS VITAL STRENGTH APPEARING TO GIVE WAY.—HIS GRIEF AT THE LOSS OF GENERAL ESTCOURT.—A SLIGHT AILMENT AFFECTING THE CHIEF.

I.

No tortures at all like in kind to those that Pélissier suffered under the attempted dictation of his Emperor had of late been afflicting the English Commander-in-chief; and, indeed, one may say that, since the time when our War Minister abandoned the favorite object of obtaining Lord Raglan's assent to a change in the Headquarters Staff, our Home Government and their General in the field had been thinking and acting together in friendly, harmonious concert. (1)

Whatever his faults, Lord Panmure was not an ungrateful, was not a cold-hearted man; and having pointed out his offense of the 12th of February in the way that I did, I now gladly open some glimpses of the altered spirit and tone in which he afterwards used to address the English Commander: 'I have just received your telegraph of yesterday.

The Home Government co-operating harmoniously with Lord Raglan.

'It gives me the greatest satisfaction, and I am sure we owe it to you and Lyons that our expedition against Kertch has sailed. The scheme from Aloushta I hold to be visionary, but I shall have full confidence in your decision.'¹

'I cannot help being alarmed lest the indecision of the French should cause some serious outbreak here. Hitherto, our press has behaved better in that respect than we were warranted in expecting, but there is a limit to forbearance, and we are approaching to it.'²

'He [Lord Ellenborough] will fall foul of you and all of us for certain, and we must try and meet him with an effective fire.'³

'You shall find me strictly honest in taking all my own responsibility, and backing you and your army with all the *esprit* of a quondam *soldado*. . . . The resolve of the country is for war, or an honorable peace, not such as Lord Grey and Milner-Gibson advocate, and for which I regret to hear Sir James Graham and Mr. Gladstone are to speak and vote.'⁵

'I begin to incline to your opinion of the advance from Eupatoria. That from Aloushta I always held to be visionary.'⁶

'You cannot imagine how pleased every one is with the bloodless success at Kertch, and in the Sea of Azof. . . . I am longing for your dispatch about the Bath, so that I may Gazette the batch at once. . . . You shall hear no more from me as to your Staff. I have told my colleagues that I acquiesce in your reasons for not submitting to a change, and that I will press it no further.'⁷ The complete success in the Sea of Azof has given immense satisfaction, and I am glad to find that you do not intend occupation by French or British troops.'⁸

'The Emperor is too much bent on commanding his army from Paris, and has, I learn, ordered the recall of his troops from Anapa, but which, I trust, may not be listened to by his new Commander-in-chief in the Crimea. We are generally of opinion here that you and Omar Pasha are right

¹ Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, 4th May, 1855.

² Ibid., 7th May, 1855.

³ Ibid., 11th May, 1855.

⁴ Underscored in the original.

⁵ Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, 21st May, 1855.

⁶ Ibid., 28th May, 1855.

⁷ Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, 1st June, 1855. The last sentence, though quoted in a former volume, is here intentionally repeated.

⁸ Ibid., 4th June, 1855.

'as to the movement from Eupatoria. . . . Would any of your Major-Generals wish to go to Malta? If so, send me a telegraphic message, and I will try and manage it for them.'¹

'You spoil us by giving us a victory almost daily, and your last exploit in taking so many outer works from the enemy is indeed most gratifying. I may, however, tell you privately that I suspect these actions of the French, attended as they are by serious loss, are far from giving the Emperor the satisfaction which they ought. . . . I have no doubt that you know far better than he or we do how to take Sebastopol in the shortest time, and with the least sacrifice of our precious men. . . . The subject of Cholera, on which you have no notion how I have been pestered by every description of bore. Between ourselves, Palmerston is naturally nervous for the army, and listens too much to people. Then come those who think they are entire controllers of cholera, and every other disease under the sun. Then the homœopaths insist on their nostrums. In short, all are alarmed, and insist on sending advice.'²

'The rapid tide of success which has poured in upon us has put down grumbling. . . . The papers sent home by you, and dating from 7th May, have given us an insight into your own proceedings, which you have done yourself injustice by withholding so long. I appreciate your good-natured motives, but I think you ought to consider yourself a little more, and your associates a little less. Make your communications as secret as you choose, but hide not your own light under a bushel. . . . However, it is easy to wage war on paper, and I rely on your local resolves as being by far the best for action. . . . He [the Emperor] will press Péliissier to invest [Sebastopol], and may soon issue such stringent orders as shall place Péliissier in the dilemma of having to choose between his master's orders and his own conviction. We shall do all we can to prevent this.'³

'The result of this failure on the part of the French will have very bad effects on the Emperor, and lead him, I fear, to issue some fettering orders to Péliissier which may annoy him and embarrass the future plans of both of you. He is singularly low⁴ at present; and as he has a tendency to

¹ Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, 8th June, 1855. ² Do., 11th June, 1855.

³ Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, 18th June, 1855. The date is a sermon against premature exultation. A defect in the working of the electric telegraph made it possible for Lord Panmure, when he wrote, to be congratulating instead of condoling.

⁴ Underscored in the original.

‘depression of spirits, you can make allowance for his style of communication when in that condition.’¹

More and more, indeed every day from almost the first, Lord Panmure felt the safety, the comfort, the happiness of moving in the light of that guidance that reached him with every mail, with every electric message from the English Headquarters—guidance not, it is true, often given in the actual, set form of advice, but rather conveyed or instilled by the general tenor of the dispatches and letters. To be receiving communications of this priceless sort twice in every week, and besides—since the first days of May—to be hearing from Lord Raglan with the frequency and the speed insured by an electric telegraph, was to have the surest clew there could be for dealing not only with the business of war, but also with those anxious questions which touched, or bordered on touching, the state of our relations with France.

The Home Government was more impatient of French shortcomings than their general in the field; but his wise and moderate dispatches brought them always into accord with his own judgment. They seemed to hang on his words.

II.

Resulting in painful losses, and the blank disappointment of hopes which at one time, we know, had run high, the engagement of the 18th of June laid so heavy a weight of grief on the mind of Lord Raglan that for once he failed to throw it aside, and even confessed to our Government the bitter affliction he felt.²

Lord Raglan afflicted by the disappointment and losses sustained on the 18th of June.

So accomplished a soldier as he, knew of course that assaults on strong places are always regarded as tentative, may have to be often repeated, and, when failing, are only ‘repulses’ far enough from importing ‘defeat.’ And again—at least under one aspect—he might comfort himself by reflecting on the admirable conduct of our troops.

Having witnessed the advance of Yea’s column with his own eyes, Lord Raglan was free to indulge a just pride when observing the valiant devotion of his officers and his men under what was a heavier trial than soldiers commonly meet; but every thought of this kind must have carried its sting; for in proportion to the gallantry and devotion of

¹ Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, 23d June, 1855.

² Private letter to Lord Panmure, 19th June, 1855.

the troops and the sailors advancing against the Redan, was the anguish of seeing men of so high a quality mown down without power to reach the enemy, and—unhappily—mown down in vain.

Men entitled to speak of the effect produced on Lord Raglan are wont to agree that under this latest trial, more visibly than ever before, his vital strength seemed to give way. They, some of them, however, believe that this trial, though heavy, was still only one out of many that long had been straining his powers of endurance, and straining them so much the more since he had always held in horror the notion of showing depression, or seeming to harbor care.

And, great in truth was the sum of what within less than a year Lord Raglan had borne and achieved.

The task of firmly, gently discomfiting St. Arnaud's early intrigues; the Cholera and the other fell maladies so fastening on our troops in Bulgaria that even of those out of hospital none remained, it was said, in full health;

The dubious orders from Paris, the positive orders from London to cross the Black Sea, and at once invade the Crimea; Lord Raglan's reconnoissances of the enemy's coast, and his choice of the landing-ground;

The embarkation; the protest in writing of French officers; divided counsels at sea; Lord Raglan on board the 'Caradoc' obeying his Government, and (with Lyons) forcing on the invasion; the Armada off Eupatoria and the coast further south;

The landing; the Cholera with all its fell company of maladies still pursuing our army; the march, grand to see, but performed by troops still more or less suffering from bodily weakness, and not indeed regarded as strong enough to be charged with the weight of their knapsacks;

The Alma, with at first for the Chief troubled, anxious, and harassing messages from French commanders; but then the strange inspiration which gave him—and within a few minutes—his sudden control of the battle;

The wounded, the dead, the too plenteous sorrows that gather in even the hour of victory;

The Heights overlooking the Belbec, overlooking the North or Star Fort, and beyond, nothing less than Sebastopol;

The valley of the Belbec, alluring to the eyes of the weary, with its gardens, and vineyards, and groves, but unhappily

Lord Raglan's vital strength seeming to give way.

The strain that had been put upon him.

What within less than a year he had endured and achieved.

there, and in numbers appallingly great, our troops falling stricken by Cholera ;

The French army brought to a halt with the Star Fort before it, and, owing to St. Arnaud's illness, left palsied for want of a chief ;

Lord Raglan undertaking the, if faulty, yet romantic Flank March, involving a farewell forever to the Western coast of the Crimea and a movement, guided by compass, over uplands and forests and plains all still in the enemy's power, and thence on to the southern shores of the Peninsula, where also the enemy was holding full sway ;

Lord Raglan by sheer chance impinging on the ill-guarded rear of what proved to be a whole Russian army led by Prince Mentschikoff in person, and then easily taking possession of the Mackenzie Heights—Heights afterwards coveted with the passionate desire of great nations, yet never again to be reached by the invading armies ;

The descent to the Tchernaya, and the march next day for that desired Southern Coast which people only knew of by maps ; the march over a plain that seemed bounded southwards by a vast wall of hills with a small pool of water beneath them, but no visible sea, no visible opening, and soon, a highly perched fort, making bold to assail Lord Raglan with discharges of shell ; then, however, mighty ships' guns heard roaring from behind the hills, and making all know that not only the sea, but Lyons himself must be there ;

Pernicious dreams bringing the invaders to 'besiege' the then defenseless Sebastopol, instead of picking it up as a prize fairly won on the Alma ;

The beginning of siege-work ;

The 17th of October, a day fraught at one time with glowing hopes, and destined to exhibit not only the spectacle of French and English fleets striving to aid the land-service attacks, but also the ruin of Todleben's defenses in the Karabelnaya broken up by our siege-guns ; all turning, however, to naught, because a French magazine had before been blown up by a shell, and Canrobert required a postponement that was only to last two days, yet lasted several months ;

The battle of Balaclava, resplendent and tragic, including Scarlett's great charge with the Heavy Dragoons—an achievement still growing in fame—and the wild mistake that laid open a path of self-destruction and glory for the Light Brigade under Lord Cardigan ;

The great battle of Inkerman, famous for the ascendancy

of the resolute few over hugely gross numbers—a battle mightily swayed, and (according to Mentschikoff) won by a measure which, though called ‘impossible,’ Lord Raglan proved able to execute ;

The storm of the 14th of November and all its distressing results ;

The ‘winter troubles’ that followed—troubles even comprising the ill conduct of two successive English Governments, and almost of England herself, towards their general in the field ;

General Canrobert disclosing a spirit that seemed to threaten disunion ; General Airey’s negotiation and its results in change of plan, and changed positions of troops ;

The vigor of the enemy beginning his counter-approaches in the teeth of the French ;

General Canrobert, after one baffled effort, submitting to these bold aggressions with unexhausted patience ;

The French army held back by a clog not plainly discerned at the time ; but, as now we know, fastened upon it by Louis Napoleon ;

During several months, the Emperor and the Emperor’s plan sitting heavy as heaviest nightmare on the Allies, and staying the advance of the siege ;

The April bombardment, a mighty and well-executed preparative for ulterior action, not, after all, destined to follow ;

Caused in part by the Emperor’s pressure, and in part by a too anxious temperament, the faltering of Canrobert carried to strange extremes ;

The First Kertch Expedition ; and, in sight of astonished Europe, General Canrobert (under torture applied by Louis Napoleon) recalling his troops and his ships from off the Kertchine Peninsula ;

Lord Raglan’s indignation, his sternness, his venturesome grant of authority empowering Sir George, if so minded, to remain unaltered in purpose by the secession of the French, and go on with his English alone ;

The now rising authority of Péliissier, and his fiercely war-like resistance (rather suffered than authorized by Canrobert) to the latest of the counter-approaches ; the resignation of Canrobert, and Péliissier in command of the French ;

Péliissier inaugurating his accession by hard, victorious fights ; his entire accord with Lord Raglan ;

A renewal of the Kertch expedition, resulting in the conquest of all the lands worth occupation in the Kertchine Peninsula, in the conquest and opening of the Cimmerian

Bosphorus, the establishment of full dominion in the previously closed Sea of Azof, and the expulsion of the Czar from his two last remaining strongholds on the Circassian coast;

The Emperor and Pélissier directly opposing each other, one commanding again and again with dogged persistence, the other meeting dictation with flat disobedience supported by a fierce strength of will;

The victorious attacks of the 7th of June;

The discontent of the Emperor still 'galvanically,' as the victim expressed it, tormenting his distant general, and then the ill-omened 'eight days' interrupting Pélissier's command of his warlike faculties, and fraught with the mischiefs that followed in simply natural order;

The fell return of Cholera—striking down the brave Admiral Boxer, assailing too General La Marmora¹—and of dysentery and fever to the camps of the Allies;

And, always meanwhile going on from October to June, the siege, the siege, the siege—to remember the course of events brought back, as it were, by the sound—the once familiar sound—of mere loosely strung words such as these, is to have some idea, though a faint one, of the strain undergone by Lord Raglan within the last year.

Yet, this campaign—brilliant and troubled—was, after all, only one epoch in a glorious life that, during the eight closing years of our war against France and Napoleon, the then youthful Lord Fitzroy Somerset had passed at the side of Wellington—a life that 'bore 'on its colors' (as soldiers say of a regiment) the names of Roliça, Vimieira, Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes d'Onoro, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, Salamanca, Vittoria, Pyrenees, Nivelles, Nive, Orthez, Toulouse, and Waterloo.

There is therefore in known outward circumstances some part, at the least, of a basis on which one might rest a belief that, long before Lord Raglan encountered the disappointment and losses sustained by Pélissier and himself in assaulting the works of the Karabelnaya, care—the care of the war—had been sapping his vital strength. True, one does not at first very easily learn to believe that he who ever had seemed to be meeting the trials of war with a nobly buoyant spirit, he who only a few hours before had—almost blamably—chosen to plant himself—at first with one other, and then all alone—within the scope of that torrent of grape-shot and balls which

Yet this only
one epoch in
a glorious life.

The belief
that care had
been sapping
his vital
strength.

¹ The brother of the Sardinian Commander.

Colonel Yea's column was meeting, should all the while have been one on whom care had fatally preyed; but the animating emotion of combat may have naturally masked for the time any symptoms of undermined health; and besides, it is hard to understand how the Chief, if indeed what he had seemed, and therefore strong as strong iron whilst confronting the enemy's fire, could presently, at the thought of his losses in killed and wounded, become all at once a changed man—a man not indeed stricken with illness of any ascertained kind, nor even so heavily grieving as to be robbed of the power to maintain his grand air of cheerfulness; but losing, nevertheless, that inner, that subtle force which is the mainspring of health and of life.

On the whole, one, I think, may agree that care had long since been weighing on the mind of Lord Raglan and slowly undermining his strength.

A change in his outward appearance was remarked at Head-quarters;¹ but it is evident that a change in the appearance of the Chief might less strongly impress those observers who were constantly with him than one who only saw him at intervals. Soon after the day of the action an officer of the Coldstreams came to Head-quarters and transacted business with the Chief. After quitting him the Colonel found himself in company with some of the staff, and what he said to them will convey an idea of the impression his mind had received. He said: 'Do you not see the change in Lord Raglan? Good God! he is a dying man.'²

III.

A fresh sorrow awaited the Chief. His Adjutant-General —Estcourt—a man greatly loved by Lord Raglan, by all his friends at Head-quarters, and, indeed, by all who knew him, had been seized by Cholera on Thursday, the 21st of June, and on the following Saturday, until evening came, he lay in a critical state; though the able medical officer (Dr. Fowle Smith), who had watched him with ceaseless care, was entertaining strong hope that the remedies employed would bring on the reaction desired. Then, however, there broke from a summer sky, not observed to be angered before, the extraordinary thunder-storm of the 23d of June, carrying with it

Lord Raglan afflicted by the death of General Estcourt.

¹ Letters from Head-quarters, i. p. 351.

² I quote from memory of what the Colonel told me; but—having been much impressed—I can hardly be wrong as to the main purport of what is given in the text.

great torrents of rain ;¹ and the swift atmospherical change implied by an outburst so violent extinguished at once every hope of bringing about a reaction in the state of the patient. Estcourt died the next morning.

The grief of Lord Raglan was excessive, and his undermined bodily strength prevented him from keeping his feelings under rigid control.

Some who knew what Lord Raglan suffered from the loss of his friend have even said that his grief was, in some sense, the cause of what followed ; but perhaps they rather meant that the death of General Estcourt was the last of many unnumbered sorrows which, taken together, had sapped the vital strength of their Chief.

IV.

On the 23d—the day of the singular storm—Lord Raglan was unwell, but not prevented from transacting laborious public business. Thus, on the same day (the 23d), he addressed to the Secretary of State four dispatches, comprising altogether a great amount of careful, elaborate statement, and besides wrote to Lord Panmure a long private letter dealing with several matters of business, and, amongst others, with the subject of recruiting. On the same day he visited his troops in the front, inspected the hospitals, looking specially to the wounded men, and performed a great deal of the labor that would have fallen to the lot of the Adjutant-General if he had not been struck down by illness. Towards evening, also, he went to the hut of General Estcourt, and saw him for the last time.

On Sunday, the 24th, Lord Raglan twice wrote to Pélistier, arranged with him for a meeting on that same day, and in answering an expression of regret caused by hearing of Lord Raglan's indisposition, assured the French commander that the ailment was nothing serious.²

On the 25th Lord Raglan was preparing to attend the funeral of General Estcourt, when he found himself so much overcome—not by illness, but grief—that—not perhaps thinking it fit to show emotions so strong in the presence of troops—he abandoned his intention ; but he afterwards visited the tomb. On the same day he reported the death of

¹ These, by suddenly flooding ravines, caused, it seems, several deaths.

² 'Rien de grave.'

General Estcourt to the Secretary of State, and not only advised the Government on the choice of a successor, but stated the grounds on which he recommended Colonel Pak-
enham for the vacant post.

After the arrival on the same day (the 25th) of a dispatch from the Secretary of State of the 11th of June, Lord Raglan dealt keenly with a suggestion it contained, and wrote with his own hand a minute recording the judgment he had formed.

Thus the circumstance of Lord Raglan's having been somewhat unwell on the 23d and 24th of June did not either prevent him from attending to public business or confine him to the house. His indisposition appeared to cease; and the statements before me do not seem to connect it at all with the illness that soon after followed.

CHAPTER XI.

CONTINUING SIEGE OPERATIONS.

FROM the engagement of the 18th of June to the close of the following ten days (when this narrative comes to an end) the Allies and the Russians alike went on with their works of—respectively—siege and defense, continuing much as before to repair, to improve, to augment their respective batteries; but soon the toils of the French began to take such a shape as to disclose Pélissier's intention of sapping up more and more closely to the enemy's ramparts in the Karabelnaya, whilst also showing him minded to establish new batteries on ground commanding the Roadstead, and so prevent the enemy's war-vessels from renewing attacks of the kind we saw made on Mayran's Division.

Amongst the toils of the English was that of fastening on part of the ground we saw conquered by General Eyre on the 18th of June; and they did this with skill, maintaining their full control of the graveyard forming part of the conquest, yet not there keeping their troops under the fire of the place.

The great efforts made by the enemy to recover the ground he had lost in this part of the field seemed to show that Eyre's conquest was of greater moment to the de-

and afterwards handing it over to the charge of the French.

fense than our people had supposed it to be. Towards the close of the ten days that followed the 18th of June our people handed over to Pélissier the charge of the ground they had won.¹

Continuance of the mining and counter-mining operations.

From the days when the mining and counter-mining began in the way we observed, and thenceforth down to the time which at last has been reached by this narrative, the subterranean warfare undertaken by the French and the Russians was maintained on both sides with great bravery, devotion, and skill; so that near me—pathetic, and teaching the vanity of human affairs—there stand or lie down (as they have stood or lain down through long years) grand folios, and—ampler in number—grand quartos, achieved with mighty labor and skill, and not only laying before me minute and authentic accounts of the battles that ranged underground during several months, but elucidating the proffered lessons by numberless elaborate plans, and by illustrations—some of them colored—so apt for their purpose as to have in them a kind of beauty budding out amidst things strictly technical.

But after that day in April when the French miners opened three chasms in front of the Flagstaff Bastion, and so provided the rudiments of a new parallel, the subterranean fights did not have such a visible and physical bearing on the course of events that they well can send down a narrator to the shades below in search of facts thought indispensable for a merely lay account of the siege.

The Russians, however, imbued with full knowledge of what they achieved in these arduous struggles, and trusting, besides, to the abundant and continuous accounts they received from French deserters, have maintained with full confidence that the energies of the counter-miner produced a moral effect which altogether upset the counsels of the French, drove them hurriedly into false paths, and long shielded the fortress from danger in what was its most tender part.

The moral effect attributed by the Russians to their vigorous counter-mining.

Why the French, having sapped their way up to close quarters with the Flagstaff Bastion, did not, after all, choose to assault it—this was naturally a question soon asked, and—till after the 19th of May—very easily answered by alleging the irresolution of Canrobert; but when the fiery Pélissier, having acceded to the command, was in this respect

¹ On the 27th of June.

found to be following Canrobert's example, and when, after a while, he not only declared his resolve to abstain from assaulting the work, but even conducted himself with strange violence against a general officer who ventured to submit a contrary opinion, the question that before had seemed easy became one much harder to answer. We saw the solution of this lasting mystery which Lord Raglan accepted—one importing that, if the French soldiery should break its way into the town, it might become uncontrollable—but another explanation has been always preferred by the Russians. What they have said is, that the energy, the skill, the success of their counter-miners soon fastened on the minds of the French soldiery a full conviction that the Flagstaff Bastion had been carefully mined, and that the dread thus felt by the men forced its way upon the counsels of their chiefs.

CHAPTER XII.

LORD RAGLAN'S INSISTENCE ON CHANGES IN THE PLAN OF THE SIEGE.

WITH a keener sense than all others of the danger that lay in such paths, but seemingly urged by convictions which forced him to encounter the risk, Lord Raglan had already insisted on changing the plan of the siege.

Memorandum of the 21st of June.

Sent to the French Head-quarters.

It was under the form of a memorandum prepared for Lord Raglan by our Chief-Engineer, and then 'forwarded to the French Head-quarters,' that, so early as the 21st of June, the changes in question were broached.¹

First suggesting that the counsels submitted to the Generals-in-chief for the taking of Sebastopol should be examined anew, the paper proposed nothing less than that the French should revert to their old design of pushing determined assaults against the town front of Sebastopol, and, moreover, declared that the English must at length give up as impracticable their only too long pursued task of besieging the Great Redan. The writer used very plain words, going even so far as to say: 'As an attack upon the Redan 'must be considered as abandoned, it remains to be decided 'what shall be the active part which the British troops shall

¹ Journal of the Royal Engineers, vol. ii. p. 330.

‘take in the forthcoming operations;’¹ but there is ground for believing that what Raglan desired, and meant to press home on Pélissier, was only an engagement providing that if the English Chief should consent to go on as before with his measures against the Redan, the French on their part would assault the town front, and, in particular, the Flagstaff Bastion.

Even when thus reduced and confined in its scope, the English demand plainly clashed with Pélissier’s latest designs, but was based, nevertheless, on good grounds.

Since the time when Sebastopol—under the eyes of the besiegers—had become a strong place, no reasoning strictly warlike could well have supported a scheme which directed against the Redan any real attack;² and although it is true that the English undertook, nevertheless, to assail it, this was always, as Niel fairly owned, on the plain understanding that French attacks of the Flagstaff Bastion should go on hand in hand with the task assumed by our people;³ so that, when Pélissier chose to abandon all the French part of this twofold undertaking, there remained, of course, no ground at all for asking that English troops should fling their strength from a distance against the Great Redan, whilst not only covered on its left by the still defiant Malakoff, but also on its right by a work which, although ripe for seizure, was not to be even assailed.

It is true that when Pélissier announced his determination to abstain from assaulting the Flagstaff Bastion, and, nevertheless, had persisted in desiring that our people should assault the Redan, Lord Raglan had yielded, and, accordingly, on the 18th had attacked it in the way we observed; but, experience painfully failing to justify the concession, he, of course, was unwilling to renew it.

And Pélissier’s latest resolve afforded yet one other reason against condemning our troops to adventure against the Redan any second assault. The ground in its front—rock thinly coated with soil—was of such a kind as to offer the English no prospect of ever proving able to drive their approaches close up to the Work; and therefore any endeavor to go on toiling against it was out of all harmony with the new French design—a design which, despite the huge losses en-

Objection to plans involving attacks on the Great Redan;

more especially if the Flagstaff Bastion were not to be also assailed.

Assaults on the Redan from a distance out of harmony with the new French design.

¹ Journal of the Royal Engineers, vol. ii. pp. 330, 331.

² On account of the nature of the ground, as long before shown.

³ Niel’s acknowledgment of this will be found, *post*, p. 181.

tailed by such a resolve, aimed at pushing the siege-works close up to the counterscarps, before renewing attempts to carry the defenses by storm.

Dispatch of the 23d of June. In one of the dispatches addressed to the Secretary of State on Saturday the 23d—the one marked ‘Secret’—Lord Raglan said: ‘General Péliissier has not yet announced to me his ultimate intentions as regards the assault of the place, and I fear he may still contemplate confining the attack to the faubourg, leaving the town itself unassailed, notwithstanding that he is fully aware that his own Engineer officers, as well as those of the British Army, are satisfied that the more certain and readier way of success would be by assailing the whole of the enemy’s front.’

‘I shall take an early opportunity of conferring with General Péliissier, and will inform your Lordship on Tuesday what course he is disposed to take.’

‘On Tuesday;’ but then, on the Tuesday, would this faithful servant of the State have strength to write what he thus promised?

The ‘early opportunity’ indicated by the foregoing dispatch was taken by Lord Raglan on the morrow—that is, Sunday, the 24th of June. Then, at his instance, the two Chiefs agreed to meet. Péliissier had heard that Lord Raglan was indisposed, and the note he addressed to his colleague was couched in most friendly, in even affectionate terms. He engaged to hold himself at Lord Raglan’s disposal on that same day, Sunday, the 24th, and asked Lord Raglan to fix any hour after 11 o’clock that he might choose for the interview.

Abrupt cessation of the light shed by Lord Raglan’s dispatches. The light hitherto thrown on my path by Lord Raglan’s dispatches and letters here, all at once, ceases to shine;¹ and I offer no account of the conference in which the two Chiefs were to meet.

The Chief French Engineer, General Niel, to whom the Memorandum of the 21st had been addressed, imagined that the paper invited him to join with his English colleague in framing a set of counsels for the enlightenment of the Commanders such as that of the 10th of June, and he plainly did not think himself bound to communicate the mission to his Chief, or to answer it in a way that Péliissier could be expected to approve.

¹ See *post*, p. 183.

Niel's answer was dated the 26th of June, and—speaking so far with authority, because he had been privy to the arrangements of the 2d of February—he frankly made this acknowledgment: 'It has always,' he said, 'been understood that the attack of the Redan was to proceed with that of the Flagstaff Battery, so that the two sides of the valley can be held, and that if the French were to abandon their attack, the English, in accordance with the previous conventions, would on their side be free to abandon the attack of the Redan.' On the other hand, he insisted that, to propose the withdrawal of the English from their attacks would be almost the same as proposing to raise the siege.

The combined result of his two opinions imported that, if the siege were to be continued at all, the English must go through with their measures against the Redan, and the French, on their part, must resume their former design of visiting the Flagstaff Bastion and its neighbors with determined attacks.

Thus, as far as it touched the special question in hand, Niel's counsel was all in accord with the object pursued by Lord Raglan.¹

Niel did not, however, speak hopefully of any measures applied to what, in his judgment, was an enterprise wrongly conceived; and very soon wound his way back to professions of that rooted faith which still warned him against ever assaulting Sebastopol without first investing the Place. 'Does,' continued General Niel—'does a new attack offer sufficient chances of success to be tried? This is a question to be resolved by the Generals-in-chief, and which we have not to examine here.'²

The French Commander, if learning the purport of this Memorandum, would have been more prone to put the writer under arrest than to follow his counsels; for the tendency of the paper, if heeded, was to shatter Pélissier's plan of confining all attacks to the faubourg, and greatly to favor the attainment of Lord Raglan's object. It is true, as we have seen, that General Niel had personally less than no weight with the head of the army; but he was still, after all, the commanding Engineer of the French, and, besides, closely linked with the Emperor in his efforts to subjugate Pélissier—efforts now to be made once again when the baffled Chief, no longer blessed with the

¹ As shown, *ante*, p. 178 *et seq.*

² Journal of the Royal Engineers, ii. p. 178.

power to answer a complaint with a victory, was under the curse of ill-fortune.

On the whole, one can learn from papers of the 26th of June—the best indication before me—that the negotiation commenced on the 21st had—at least in one quarter—made way.

The negotia-
tion making
way;

And, moreover, we know with full certainty that, till after the 28th of June, the negotiation, whether prospering or not, was still remaining on foot.

and on foot
till after
the 28th.

All imbued with a knowledge of Lord Raglan's fixed opinion on the peril of 'discussions' with the French will agree, I suppose, in believing that he would never have pressed, nor have suffered any other to press, these sweeping demands on Péliissier unless he had seen reason to think that they either were certain, or else, in a high degree, likely to produce a result; and one even, indeed, must surmise that, when taking the step, he had either received some encouragement in that direction from his friendly, impetuous French colleague, or else had determined to be peremptory in requiring that, if ever his troops were to hazard another march under the batteries of the Great Redan, the French, on their part, must be ready to storm the Flagstaff Bastion.

Presumption
that in this
matter Lord
Raglan must
have seen
his way.

To act, and act cogently in that last direction, had, after the recent engagement, become a measure more clearly within the power of Lord Raglan than at any earlier time; for our Government and our people, when disciplined by the painful experience of the 18th of June, might be safely expected to support him in requiring that any new assault undertaken by our devoted infantry should take place under fair conditions; and, on the other hand, Péliissier, weakened by his recent discomfiture, and the reckless outbreaks of will by which he had brought it about, whilst also ill-regarded by his Emperor and by many of the generals under him, stood more than ever in want of the shield he had so often used—the shield he always extended against unwelcome advisers, when able to meet them, by saying: 'Lord Raglan and I are agreed.'

Circum-
stances now
enabling
Lord Raglan
to act on Pé-
liissier co-
gently.

Having learned, on good grounds, to infer that Lord Raglan could not have brought himself to press forward his

Circumstances tending to show that Lord Raglan in this matter had before him a fair prospect of success.

object unless having before him a prospect so good as to warrant the venture; and considering that the halo of personal ascendancy which distinguished him in the eyes of Pélissier from all other then living men could scarce fail to give him great weight when undertaking persuasion; whilst remembering too, on the other hand, that, if forced to speak or act cogently, he, at all events, had the command of a powerful lever, with, besides, all the knowledge and qualities enabling him to use it with skill, one may rightly incline to believe that his continued persistence in the course already begun would have compassed the object he sought.

On the other hand, we know well that none other than Lord Raglan himself could or would, for a moment, go on with the measure on which he had ventured;¹ and accordingly all hope that our troops would be either relieved altogether from their wrongly allotted task of attacking the Great Redan, or else find themselves enabled to attack it under fitting conditions, depended on the life of one man.

But not (in his place) any other.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN.

PURSuing his labors as usual, Lord Raglan, on the 26th of June, addressed a dispatch to the Secretary of State on several matters of military business. He spoke with great satisfaction of the excellence of the Hospital arrangements. Announcing the death of an officer who had succumbed to Cholera, and of another killed in the trenches, he furnished the Government with a statement of their respective merits and services. He spoke with natural sorrow of the increase of maladies affecting the troops, but treated the matter objectively, saying nothing of his own health. He framed this—the last—dispatch with all his accustomed grace and perfect clearness of style.⁽¹⁾

The last dispatch of Lord Raglan.

This 26th of June was the ‘Tuesday’ which Lord Raglan had announced as the day when he meant to acquaint his Government with the result of the promised conference between himself and Pélissier; but before fulfilling the task he felt unwell.

¹ Proved by experience, see *post*, p. 189 *et seq.*

His ailment was probably faintness ; for Dr. Prendergast advised him to lie down. He did not feel equal to the effort of appearing at his dinner-table ; but the doctor's report of his state was favorable.

The next day, the 27th, Lord Raglan's state not having improved, it was thought right to apprise the Home Government by telegraph that he was ill ; but in the evening a more favorable account was dispatched.

Lord Raglan passed a tranquil night, and at the consultation which took place next morning, the 28th, between Dr. Prendergast and two of our army surgeons, it was thought—at least by these last—that Lord Raglan was 'much better ;' and a telegram to that effect was drawn up ; but afterwards Dr. Prendergast caused it to be modified, and the message sent home reported that Lord Raglan had passed a tranquil night, and was no worse.⁽²⁾

At about half-past three in the afternoon Lord Raglan's servant came to Dr. Prendergast announcing that his master was not so well as he had seemed to be a few moments before, and the doctor, returning, soon found that an alteration for the worse had taken place, though still he apprehended no immediate danger.

At half-past four o'clock a sudden change came over Lord Raglan, and he was perceived to be sinking.

General Airey's affection for his Chief was deep, and at this dreadful moment strained anxiously into the future that lies beyond the grave.

Approaching Lord Raglan closely, he said : 'Sir, you are ill ; would you not like to see some one ?' Faintly and gently Lord Raglan answered, 'No.' General Airey still persisted, and said—said indeed, more than once—'Sir, you are very ill ; would you not like to see some one ?' but the faint, gentle 'No' was still all the answer he drew. Then altering a little the scope of his question, General Airey said to him, 'Sir, you are very ill ; whom would you like to see ?' Lord Raglan, gently answering, said, 'Frank,' meaning Lady Raglan's nephew, Lord Burghersh.

The foreshadow of death was then falling on the mind of the Chief, and he did not, I believe, speak again. Lord Burghersh presently came, but the consciousness of Lord Raglan had ceased.

Thenceforth, during some three hours, the commander lay breathing and tranquil on his narrow camp-bed ; but, when the descending sun had at last sunk low in the heavens, a

great life seemed to be waning with the waning of the day.

The Chaplain of the Forces was present;¹ and he has recorded what followed: 'At this moment,' he said and wrote, 'I have before me one whom I had learned to love, lying in his last moments upon a narrow camp-bed. The room was small and scantily furnished. Colonel Somerset and Lord Burghersh stood on one side of the bed, Dr. Prendergast at its head, Lady George Paget was seated at the foot, Colonel Steele and General Airey on the other side. I stood close to the dying hero. As I uttered the words, "Peace be to this house and all that dwell in it," all fell on their knees, and I proceeded with the solemn order for the visitation of the sick. At the close of the heart-searching service, I placed my hand upon the forehead and commended the departing soul to the keeping of God, and scarcely had the last word passed my lips when the great man went to his rest. Colonel Steele then asked me to kneel down and pray that those present might be strengthened. I did so, and heavy grief sat upon the hearts of all who joined in that solemn appeal to Heaven.'⁽³⁾

Many know, and some envy, the blissful look of content that lights on the face of a soldier when slain by a gunshot wound; but the toils of a commander are toils of the mind, of the heart.

Expression of his countenance after death. The expression that fastened on Lord Raglan's countenance in the moment of death seemed to tell of—not pain, but—Care.

Generals and Admirals next day in the chamber of death. On the morning that followed, the Commanders-in-chief of the four Allied armies, and the Admirals of the fleets, and, besides, General Canrobert (the late French commander), came up to the English Headquarters, and entered the chamber of death. Of these—all of course men of action, and nearly all used to encountering the painful scenes of war—there were none who without strong emotion could look on the face—now rigid in death—of him who but yesterday was their beloved, honored colleague. They yielded to grief. Both the late, and the then actual commander of the French army had been closely associated with Lord Raglan in the business of the war; and, as was natural, they all the more felt the anguish of seeing him lifeless.

¹ Archdeacon Wright.

General Canrobert, having felt towards the English commander a strong affection, now mourned him with all his heart. But the general who grieved the most passionately was he who had seemed to be emphatically the hard man of iron. Pélissier 'stood by the bedside for upwards of an hour, crying like a child.'¹

On the same day, and issued by Lieutenant-General Simpson, then the senior officer present, the 'Morning General Orders' announced in simple terms to our army 'the death of its beloved commander Field-Marshal Lord Raglan.'

From the structure of our administrative system as then constituted, it resulted that there were two high officers of State who, to meet an occasion like this, could legitimately give voice to the feelings of the Queen. 'I conveyed,' wrote the Secretary of State for our War Department—'I conveyed your sad intelligence to the Queen. Her Majesty received it with profound grief. Inform the army that Her Majesty has learned with the deepest sorrow this great misfortune which has befallen the army in the loss of its late distinguished Commander-in-chief. The country has been deprived of an accomplished soldier, a true and devoted patriot, and an honorable and disinterested subject.'²

The other high officer of State charged to speak in the name of the Queen was her Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards; and if men observe, as they will, that the Paper issued under his orders is not only written with power, and the kind of eloquence fitted for a warlike theme, but also with evident knowledge of the sway that Lord Raglan in person had brought to bear on the Alma campaign, they will remind themselves that Lord Hardinge was himself a great soldier of the Wellington days, and a conqueror in more recent times.

GENERAL ORDER.

'HORSE GUARDS, 4th July, 1855.

'The General Commanding-in-chief has received Her Majesty's most gracious commands to express to the Army the deep regret with which Her Majesty has to deplore the loss of a most devoted and able officer by the death of Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, the Commander of the forces in the Crimea.

'Her Majesty has been pleased to command that her sen-

¹ Letters from Head-quarters, ii. p. 363.

² Promulgated to the Army, 2d July, 1855.

'timents shall be communicated to the Army, in order that the military career of so illustrious an officer shall be recorded, not only as an honorable testimony of Her Majesty's sense of his eminent services, and the respect due to his memory, but as an example worthy of imitation by all ranks of her Army.

'Selected by the Duke of Wellington to be his Military Secretary and Aide-de-camp, he took part, nearly 50 years ago, in all the military achievements of our greatest commander. From him Lord Raglan adopted, as the guiding principle of his life, a constant, undeviating obedience to the call of duty.

'During a long peace, his life was most usefully employed in those unwearied attentions to the interests and welfare of the Army shown by the kindness, the impartiality and justice, with which he transacted all his duties.

'When war broke out last year, he was selected by his Sovereign to take the command of the Army proceeding to the East; he never hesitated—he obeyed the summons, although he had reached an age when an officer may be disposed to retire from active duties in the field.

'At the head of the troops during the arduous operations of the campaign, he resumed the early habits of his life; by his calmness in the hottest moments of battle, and by his quick perception in taking advantage of the ground, or the movements of the enemy, he won the confidence of his army, and performed great and brilliant services.

'In the midst of a winter's campaign—in a severe climate—and surrounded by difficulties—he never despaired.

'The heroic Army, whose fortitude amidst the severest privation is recognized by Her Majesty as beyond all praise, have shown their attachment to their Commander by the deep regrets with which they now mourn his loss.

'Her Majesty is confident that the talents and virtues which distinguished Lord Raglan throughout the whole of his valuable life will forever endear his memory to the British Army.

'By command of the Right Honorable General Viscount HARDINGE, Commanding-in-chief.

'G. A. WETHERALL, *Adjutant-General*.'

Private letter
of condolence
from the
Queen to
Lady Raglan.

So early as the next day but one to that of the Field-Marshal's death, the Queen was graciously pleased to address to Lady Raglan this letter :¹

¹ If I print this letter without having first asked for the writer's gracious

THE QUEEN TO LADY RAGLAN.

‘BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 30, 1855.*

‘DEAR LADY RAGLAN, — Words cannot convey all I feel at the irreparable loss you have sustained, and I and the country have in your noble, gallant, and excellent husband, whose loyalty and devotion to his sovereign and country were unbounded. We both feel most deeply for you and your daughters, to whom this blow must be most severe and sudden! He was so strong, and his health had borne the bad climate, great fatigues, and anxieties so well ever since he left England, that though we were much alarmed at hearing of his illness, we were full of hope of his speedy recovery.

‘We must bow to the will of God, but to be taken away thus on the eve of the successful result of so much labor, so much suffering, and so much anxiety, is cruel indeed! We feel much, too, for the brave army whom he was so proud of, who will be sadly cast down at losing their gallant commander, who had led them so often to victory and glory! If sympathy can be any consolation to you, you have it, for we all have alike to mourn, and no one more than I, who have lost a faithful and devoted servant, in whom I had the greatest confidence. We both most anxiously hope that your health and that of your daughters may not materially suffer from the dreadful shock. Believe me always, my dear Lady Raglan, yours very sincerely,
(Signed) ‘VICTORIA R.’

If her Majesty by the terms of her letter may seem to blend with her own some other opinion, and one by her deeply valued, it will be borne in mind that the Royal Consort was versed in military business, had applied great care and thought to the subject of the then pending war, and had adopted the wise, wholesome practice of putting himself in personal communication with officers newly come from the East.

But apart from sheer grief was the void. Relations between the Home Government and Head-quarters going on

permission, this is only because her Majesty at a former period allowed it to be published by Sir Theodore Martin. I may say that in this case I have not liked to render underscored words by a resort to italics. The words underscored by her Majesty are in the 1st line, ‘all,’ in the 6th line, ‘deeply,’ and in the 21st line, ‘we all.’

The void caused by Lord Raglan's death. without any Lord Raglan? The army without Lord Raglan? The Alliance without Lord Raglan? A letter, a note, or a message to the oftentimes raging Pélissier without a Lord Raglan to frame it? It is believed that, whilst Lord Raglan lived, and daily appeared in his saddle, no such painful casts of thought had been made—not made at least in grave earnest by any of our Generals, still less by the army at large, which had toiled and suffered and fought with unswerving devotion to its Chief, and had never so far looked beyond—not even for argument's sake—as to dwell on what might follow 'if ever 'the king were to die.'

None perhaps felt the void more acutely than did the brave, honest, unselfish officer on whom the command had devolved. The words he addressed to our Government are touching: After speaking of the troops and 'their beloved commander,' he added: 'His loss to us here is inexpressible. The sympathy of our Allies is universal and sincere. His [Lord Raglan's] name and memory are all that remain to animate us in the difficulties and dangers to which we may be called.'

Immediate evil to our army resulting from Lord Raglan's death.

Even then, whilst he spoke from the heart, he also could speak from experience—experience showing that England, by the death of her General, had been all at once robbed of her weight in the Anglo-French Councils of war.

We learned what hope there was that, in compliance with a demand addressed to the French on the 21st of June, our troops would be either relieved altogether from their wrongly allotted task of attacking the Great Redan, or else find themselves enabled to attack it under fitting conditions, but also saw reasons for judging that the prospect of this happy change depended on the life of Lord Raglan.

The event of the 28th of June was pursued by its apprehended consequence with astonishing promptitude, for—even within a few hours of the English commander's death—our people gave up their demand, and submitted once more to that distribution of siege-work which was fated, as it had been before, to become a cause—plainly foreseen—of fresh disappointments and losses.⁽⁴⁾

Unable to divine other reasons for the extraordinary step of not only abandoning the resolve announced to General

This acutely felt by the officer who succeeded to the command.

Abrupt abandonment of the negotiation he had opened with Pélissier.

Niel on the 21st of June, but allowing themselves to declare this abandonment on the very morrow of Lord Raglan's death, I am led to believe that our military authorities must have acted in haste, whilst still suffering under the shock occasioned by the loss of their chief, though also perhaps from a sense that, without him, they could not well even try to pursue any further the question—admittedly anxious and difficult—which he had ventured to raise.

For our people this break wrought by death in the whole-some, accustomed relations between their chief and Péliissier was a grave and lasting misfortune. The prospect awaiting our army depended, of course, on its having a rightly allotted share of the great warlike business in hand; and the exigencies of the Alliance made it plain that every such needed apportionment of combatant tasks must be concerted with the French Chief. Yet he who alone among men had proved able in council to deal with the fiery Péliissier, lay now in the chamber of death; and none coming after him knew how in treaty—in critical, perilous treaty—with the commander of 100,000 men to secure for our scantier numbers in the struggles to come a good, well-assigned fighting berth. In this way alone out of many, the death of the English Commander brought down all at once on our army, and therefore, of course, on our country, a grave and abrupt loss of power.

Our country, indeed, every day was growing in strength—in material strength of the kind that is needed for war; but material strength, after all, is only one part of greatness. Amongst those who remember the period, not one, I imagine, will say that from the heartrending sunset of the 28th of June to the close of our war against Russia, the England of that time seemed equal to the England of those prior days when she still had the honored commander of the Alma campaign to represent her in council, to represent her in arms.

One more year of life and of health vouchsafed to Lord Raglan must have seemingly altered, and altered in a happy direction, the subsequent course of events.

The sorrow of our troops was proportioned to the unswerving attachment with which they had regarded the chief. It was seemingly on him, him alone, that they formed their ideal of what the true leader should be. When the new commander had braced himself for the la-

Loss of weight in Anglo-French council, resulting from the death of Lord Raglan.

The sorrow of our troops.

bors before him, he frankly chose for his guidance the example of Lord Raglan. 'It will be the duty,' he announced, 'of the Lieutenant-General to follow in the steps of his great Predecessor.'

The example of Lord Raglan chosen as a guide.

In even our army there could hardly be found deeper grief than that which wrung the heart of our Admiral —Admiral Lyons—nor sorrow more true than that felt by the officers and seamen of our fleet, who had devotedly taken their part in effecting the descent on the coast near Old Fort, and in thenceforth pursuing the war both by sea and on shore with that joyous superlative zeal which few can even conceive unless they have seen naval officers with their men not only at work, but at work in the enemy's presence.

Grief of Admiral Lyons and our seamen.

The Sardinian army, we know, had been under Lord Raglan's direction; and the feeling of these highly valued Allies was expressed by General La Marmora in his Order of the day. Whilst announcing to his troops that there had yesterday died 'the illustrious 'Commander of the English army,' he spoke of the Field-Marshal's long career, the services he had rendered to his country, his 'heroic courage,' and his 'exemplary constancy' in times of trouble, and declared the loss of such a Commander to be a 'great calamity.'

Feeling of the Sardinian army;

Omar Pasha showed his feeling towards the memory of Lord Raglan in the way we shall afterwards see.

and of Omar Pasha.

We saw the frenzy of grief which mastered the iron Pélissier when he stood in the chamber of death; and afterwards, but on the same day, he issued this General Order—a paper long admired in the camps for its fervor and power:

Pélissier's celebrated General Order.

'ARMY OF THE EAST.—No. 15, GENERAL ORDER.

'Death has suddenly taken away while in full exercise of his command the Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, and has plunged the British in mourning.

'We all share the sorrow of our brave Allies. Those who knew Lord Raglan, who know the history of his life—so noble, so pure, so replete with service rendered to his country—those who witnessed his fearless demeanor at Alma and Inkerman, who recall the calm and stoic greatness of his character throughout this rude and memorable cam-

'paign, every generous heart indeed, will deplore the loss of such a man. The sentiments here expressed by the General-in-chief are those of the whole army. He has himself been cruelly struck by this unlooked-for blow.

'The public grief only increases his sorrow at being forever separated from a companion-in-arms whose genial spirit he loved, whose virtues he admired, and from whom he has always received the most loyal and hearty co-operation.

(Signed) 'A. PÉLISSIER, *Commander-in-chief*.

'HEAD-QUARTERS, before SEVASTOPOL,
'29th June, 1855.'

Apart from the principle of 'representation' which entitled Pélissier not only to speak for himself, but to speak, as he did, for the whole of his 100,000 men, it seems to be true—and the truth is one of high value in several questions of moment—that the bulk of the French army in the Crimea—and perhaps more especially its rank and file—had been long ago drawn towards Lord Raglan—at first with strong interest, and then—with a warm admiration, close followed by genuine trustfulness.

Amongst the French troops in the Crimea there had chanced to be none whose career carried back into the thick of the last mighty war; whilst in each of its eight latter years Lord Raglan, though not greatly older than General Pélissier, had had the good-fortune to be not only engaged, but engaged on the Head-quarter Staff, and at the side of Wellington.¹

Accordingly it was in the English Commander alone that the French army saw a Chief linking them with the days of the Great Napoleon. They had never been dull to the eloquence of the blue empty sleeve that told of the wearer's sword-arm lost at Wellington's side, lost even near 'La Haie Sainte,' and not far from the moment of moments when 'the bravest of the brave,' Ney himself, was victoriously storming the farm. Yet he who thus recalled to French troops the days of the great war was in no sense what people mean when they speak of a 'veteran.'

Not for him—ever busied with present duties—was there time or desire to dwell on the past. With his always sustained animation, his beaming attention to what others said,

¹ The difference of age between the French and English commanders was six years, but in point of activity Lord Raglan was immensely the younger.

his prompt, terse reply, his easy grace in the saddle, his ready hand-gallop, he had not only seemed like a man who (for purposes of warlike command) was still in the prime of life, but to have the air of an officer whose habitual activity of body and mind had been never at all interrupted by the languor of peace.

What soldiers now and then see of the bearing of Commanders observed to be conversing on horseback is not always without its significance; and when any such opportunities invited our Allies to form judgments of the quality of the English Commander, the keen-witted Frenchman could see that he held a great personal ascendancy, since other chiefs hung on his words, and seemed to be willingly governed, seeming also to be calmed and cheered by answers that fell from his lips.

But again, there is a spell in personal daring—where it chances to govern events—which carries the hearts of men. When Lord Raglan—not preceded, not followed, by troops, but having seaman's blood in his veins¹—cantered down to the Alma, and forded it, and rode on through the enemy's skirmishers, losing only two of his Staff, and at last crowned that knoll in the line of the Russian position where Fortune gave him her welcome, he was under the eyes of French soldiers.² It could not but be that the story of what these men saw would swiftly spread through their camp.

To Pélissier's troops, the late English Commander, of course, had been by nation a foreigner, had been also 'the ancient enemy'—had, moreover, been 'Grand Seigneur,' and therefore, they imagined, born foe of the Tricolor Flag; but—taught by the warlike Zouaves, who then used to govern opinion in the camp of the French—their rank and file—after debate—got to hold that, in spite of all this, Lord Raglan was the true man of men they would choose to lead them in battle.

And now, when, in mid-campaign, the hand of death struck down a Chief on whom they had thus set their hearts, the sentiment moving them harmonized with the judgment they had long ago formed of his prowess in strife at close quarters.

¹ His mother was the daughter of Admiral Boscawen.

² Not *the same* bodies of French soldiers; for those who saw him ride down to the river did not see him in the cover beyond, passing through the enemy's skirmishers; and again, those who saw him in the cover or fording the stream, could not afterwards see him on the top of the knoll.

The mortal
remains of
Lord Raglan
conveyed
with military
honors to the
Bay of Ka-
zatch.

The family of Lord Raglan, desiring that this warlike scion of their House should rest at the last with his ancestry, the Authorities determined to convey his remains for embarkation to the port of Kazatch; and, the Generals allied with our own all demanding for themselves and their troops that the removal should be attended with full military honors in which they might take their part, it resulted that he who in life had carried to even a fault his hatred of all forms and ceremonies attracting men's eyes towards himself, was in death to become the mute object—defenseless now against splendors!—of a homage bestowed by whole armies assembled for the purpose in strength, and assembled in the enemy's presence.

Many pageants have borrowed adornment from the presence of troops, without, of course, ever acquiring by any such shallow means the least semblance of true warlike dignity. Here, however, the war and the pageant seemed linked hand in hand; for the myriads assembling to honor the memory of the English commander were not only troops under arms, but troops in mid-campaign, troops acting beneath the rapt gaze they drew from the enemy's watch-tower. The whole movement from east to west, though solemn and mournful, was all the while, nevertheless, a movement slowly effected across the front of Sebastopol, and, of course, under such conditions, the pageant might lead to a battle.

In seizing the occasion that offered for an outburst of honorable sentiment, in giving to those martial honors which Circumstance seemed to enjoin their largely extended proportions, in bringing the design to completeness, and—more than all put together—in animating the outward form of the ceremony with the—partly, it may be, poetic, yet not less genuine—fervor of their many tens of thousands of troops, the French army took a main part.

The Allied commanders provided that before 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 3d of July, the whole road from the English Head-quarters to the port of Kazatch—a distance of about seven miles—should be lined on each side by double ranks of infantry; that at intervals on both flanks there should be posted not only other troops, but bands of regiments as well as field-batteries, and that the duty of escorting the movement along its whole course should devolve upon twelve squadrons of cavalry, with three troops of horse artillery. From the English to the French Head-quarters the infantry lining the road was to be furnished by a con-

tingent of officers and men told off for this honor from every one of our regiments, and beyond, along the remaining distance of six miles, by the Imperial Guard of the French and the troops of their First Corps. In the courtyard of what had been Lord Raglan's house there stood the Guard of Honor, one furnished by the Grenadier Guards, with the drums and regimental colors. In the vineyards adjoining were placed the bands of three regiments.

Making no other large exception than that of troops on duty in the trenches, or required for the safety of their camps, one may say that, to honor the memory of the English commander, the armed hosts of the Allies were assembled in all their martial splendor and strength.¹

Met first by the roll of the drums from the Guard of Honor, then emerging from the court of the house under the outburst of sound that opened the solemn Dead March, and thenceforth passing always between the serried infantry lines under the booming of minute-guns, the darkly palled bier, covered over with the Flag of the Union, having on it the plumed hat and sword of him who but lately had worn them, with also the garland of immortelles affectionately placed near the sword by the hand of Pélissier, was slowly moved towards the west on a nine-pounder gun; and beside the four wheels of the gun-carriage there rode the four commanders of the four Allied armies. Next—led by two mounted orderlies—there followed—saddled and riderless—Lord Raglan's favorite charger—the one, the brown bay, he had ridden in the battle of the Alma and throughout the dim Inkerman day.

After officers related to the Field-Marshal and the members of his personal Staff, the column of march included unnumbered Generals of the four Allied armies, with their respective Staffs, included the Staff of Head-quarters, included the officers chosen to represent every branch of the English land service, with also every regiment, and besides, the Naval Brigade and the Royal Marines. Further details are covered or merged by only saying once more that the bulk of the Allied armies was assembled, and assembled in strength.

Whilst the mournful solemnity lasted, the French and the English engaged with siege duties in front refrained from inviting by fire the fire of Sebastopol; and, whether owing to chance, or to a signal and graceful act of courtesy on

¹ Sayer's Collection, p. 229. The narrator, though official, still does not refrain from saying that the appearance of the troops was 'splendid.'

the part of General Osten-Sacken, the garrison also kept silence.

Received at the wharf of Kazatch by Admiral Bruat, by Rear-Admiral Stewart, and by a large concourse of officers from both the fleets, then placed in a launch—the launch of the English Flagship, which numbers of man-of-war boats lay ready to take in tow—then moved off from the shore under a salute of artillery, and borne thence with all naval honors, the bier at length reached the side of the vessel awaiting it, and was taken on board the ‘Caradoc.’⁽⁵⁾

On board the ‘Caradoc’! The sound, the bare sound of her name, carried with it a heartrending contrast between the past and the present. In those eager days, only ten months before, when Lord Raglan, in concert with Lyons, was forcing on the Invasion, it used to be from the ‘Caradoc’—men saw her then constantly signalling—that the Chief exerted his power; and now the same vessel, still ruled by the same devoted commander, was receiving Lord Raglan once more, but receiving him only in death.

Soon the ‘Caradoc’ moved, and was gliding towards the mouth of the bay, when a flutter appeared at her mast-head which showed her to be speaking once more. As though in imagined communion with the honored freight lying on board, beneath the Flag of the Union, she flew out the signal—‘Farewell!’

APPENDIX.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I.

NOTE 1.—*Allies of the Sultan*.—This was done by bringing about the dismissal of Riza, the Minister of War, who was believed to have been always intriguing against Omar Pasha.—Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, 5th June, 1855.

NOTE 2.—*Fearful to displease*.—There is nothing in history more certain than this. At the fatal Cabinet of July, 1870, the Emperor had actually congratulated his Ministers on the diplomatic victory that he had achieved by bringing about the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidate, and all seemed to promise both peace and contentment, when Lebœuf interposed, and pronounced that the avoidance of war (after all the excitement stirred up) would cause an ill-feeling in the army.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II.

NOTE 1.—*Once more recaptured the Work*.—That this was the ending of the fifth fight is asserted with precision by Niel (p. 254); and Todleben, with the statement before him, does not really and effectually deny it, nor substitute for it any narrative of a Russian victory. He, indeed, writes in one place as though he understood that the retreat of the French, a little before dawn, was a movement caused by their being 'worn out' (*épuisé*), but he elsewhere says in terms that the fifth fight resulted in a capture of the counter-approach; and, as he also shows that the fourth fight had left it in possession of the Russians, it follows that the fifth capture was a capture by the French.—Todleben, pp. 242, 243. On the whole, I can say that, with the accounts of Niel and Todleben before me, I entertain no doubt that the fifth fight resulted in a victory for the French.

NOTE 2.—*By first reducing the Malakoff*.—I base my account of the foregoing occurrences detailed in this chapter upon the dispatch of General Péliissier, and the official narratives of Niel, p. 250 *et seq.*, and Todleben, ii. p. 226 *et seq.*; and having said thus much, I consider myself entitled to disclaim responsibility for the accuracy of the three generals whose statements I follow. I don't overload the diction by saying in words at every sentence: 'according to Péliissier,' or 'according to Niel,' or 'according to Todleben,' but wish it to be understood that I do so in effect by means of this general indication.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III.

NOTE 1.—*Investing the place.*—This anterior purpose, as first declared by Pélissier, was only what one calls the ‘repression’ of the south side of Sebastopol. But he afterwards, as we have seen, insisted that its thorough conquest must be effected before resorting to field operations. After forming that last resolve, to which he always *in action* adhered, he once or twice *wrote* (inconsistently) as though the ‘repression’ might suffice.

NOTE 2.—*With scorn, and with victory.*—No one ought to forget that, in principle, resistance to lawful authority is an evil of formidable magnitude; but in that grave dilemma with which Pélissier dealt, the alternative was one that would hazard a hundred thousand French troops in what, as the wisest men judged, would have been a fantastic campaign, involving, perhaps, cruel sacrifices, not only of men, but also of warlike honor. See *post*, Appendix, Note 9, to chap. iv.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV.

NOTE 1.—*Destroyed them.*—Totleben agrees, vol. ii. p. 280, that out of the Kertch flotilla three vessels were destroyed—viz., the ‘Berdiansk’ (as mentioned in the text), the ‘Mogoutchy,’ and the ‘Jouets,’ but it might be inferred from his language (though he does not say so in terms) that the ‘Argonaut’ and the ‘Goëts’ escaped.

NOTE 2.—*For the protection of their lives and property.*—The word ‘Tartars’ must have been used by the deputation in a specific sense, indicating some known band or bands of men supposed to be bent on pillage; for the ‘Tartars’ in the villages generally were at this very time giving shelter and kindly help to the frightened refugees from Kertch.—*Ibid.* General Todleben nowhere calls the men ‘Tartars,’ but always ‘marauders.’

NOTE 3.—*The piteous screaming of women.*—I have rightly spoken of the irruption of mounted Cossacks into a room as a fact of not unfrequent occurrence; but, as regards one particular instance of it, my informant, Sir Edmund Strelecki (phonetically, Streleski), long the favorite of the London world, was one of those present. He was a lad at the time. After the famous retreat from Moscow, he was at an evening party going on upon the first floor when the Cossacks trotted up-stairs and rode into the drawing-room.

It was not without reason that the Cossacks used to keep their saddles when entering houses and rooms. They used to have plunder stowed on the backs of their horses, and feared that, if separated from them, they would be robbed of the spoil by their comrades.

In more recent times, the mounted Cossacks in the service of the State have been as much under control as the regular forces; and, although not yet famous for prowess in combat, they are made useful in numberless ways.

NOTE 4.—*Meant to defend the place.*—The summons demanded the surrender of—not the town, but—the Crown property. Whether General Krasnoff misread the summons, or only affected to have done so, I do not know.

NOTE 5.—*That that last vessel perished.*—Though accepted (through some in-

advertence) by General Todleben, the story of a serious fight, and of bayonet-charges, effected in defense of the stores, is altogether a fable.

NOTE 6.—*Harm to the town.*—The story accepted by Todleben, of allied attacks made on some vessels that had sought refuge in the Gulf, and of the assailants having been beaten off by Kostrakoff with his Cossacks, is fabulous; not one man of the Allies, on the 5th of June, was either killed or wounded.

NOTE 7.—*To refrain altogether from sending it.*—Rousset, who had access to the papers at the French War Office, imagined that the Emperor's telegram had miscarried or been made to miscarry; but that, as we see from the text, was not the case. From the blank at the French War Office, coupled with the actual result, my surmise, put out under cover of a 'perhaps,' may derive some support.

NOTE 8.—*His sovereign's imperious mandate.*—Rousset, who had access to the papers in the French War Office, states that the Emperor's telegram was inexplicably delayed in transmission from the 3d to the 8th of June. This, of course, was an error, because we know that Pélissier imparted the telegram to Lord Raglan on the 6th; but the statement, though erroneous in its conclusion, seems to show that down to the 8th no answer had come from Pélissier to the telegram of the 3d of June.

NOTE 9.—*Proved able to set him aside.*—The resistance of a general to the authority of the State is, of course, a grave matter, and cannot be justified on light grounds; but, as Pélissier retained his command, one, I think, may observe what passed, without being forced into the question of casuistry which presents itself when a general's disobedience breaks up his relations with the State.

NOTE 10.—*Protect against every such measure.*—'Je suis heureux qu'elle ait réussi; mais néanmoins je ne puis m'empêcher de considérer comme fatal tout ce qui tend aujourd'hui à disséminer vos forces.'—Emperor to Pélissier, 30th May, 1855. The underscoring of the word 'fatal' was an act of the Emperor.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V.

NOTE 1.—*Havoc and ruin.*—'Mais le comble du dommage auquel cet ouragisme était exposé lui venaient des batteries Anglaises qui savaient compenser la mesure un peu lente de leur feu par la précision remarquable de leur tir.'—Todleben, ii. p. 310.

NOTE 2.—*Accepted the Prince's bold story.*—The French say distinctly that after capturing the Work they spiked its guns (Rousset, ii. p. 235); and Todleben also admits this, as also that the embrasures were destroyed, saying that he himself ordered the guns to be unspiked and the embrasures to be repaired, ii. p. 330. I suppose Prince Ouroussoff would hardly maintain that the destruction of the embrasures and the spiking of the guns could have been coolly effected at the time of his 'bayonet' charge.

NOTE 3.—*Respecting Skariatine, see Note in the Appendix.*—Skariatine (who

had commanded the Selinghinsk Redoubt in February or March, and well knew the ground) was a Lieutenant in the Russian navy, and one of the most gifted of that superb body of men—the men of the Black Sea Fleet—who had gloriously defended Sebastopol in the early, the desperate time.

NOTE 4.—*Will attempt a recapture.*—When, long afterwards, he was borne off the field, his bearers trod on one of the ‘infernal machines,’ and the violent explosion that followed is supposed to have produced, by concussion, a permanent injury of the heart, bringing death very many years afterwards to the distinguished General Armstrong, then holding high office at the Horse Guards.

NOTE 5.—*To retake the counter-approaches.*—The Captain led five companies, equal, if the battalions had been at their average strength (which, however, was far from being the case), to about 935 men.

NOTE 6.—*Had been definitively won.*—On the morning of the 7th, Captain Dawson, R.E., was killed; and having been summoned to replace him immediately, Wolseley did not have the benefit of the arrangement which had wisely provided that those who were to attack the Quarries in the evening should be exempt from toil during the day, so as to enter fresh upon their work. Whilst speaking of Captain Wolseley, I may mention that for his services in the fights of ‘the Quarries’ he won twofold praise, from Colonel Tylden, commanding the Engineers, and from Colonel Shirley, commanding the combatants.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI.

NOTE 1.—*Nothing that the Emperor ordered.*—Pélissier’s method of resistance to his Emperor, at the time indicated, resembled the sustained contumacy of Lord Palmerston, when Foreign Secretary in the Governments of Lord Melbourne and Lord John Russell, as exhibited with great clearness in the Greville Memoirs.

NOTE 2.—*‘By orders of the English Government.’*—If the Emperor meant (as he apparently did) that the Kertch Expedition was dictated to the commanders by the English Government, he was mistaken. The measure, as I understand, originated with Lyons, and had been warmly supported by Lord Raglan, before the London Government took any part in it.

NOTE 3.—*Might be well carried into effect.*—There were many apparent advantages in the plan of an attack from Eupatoria directed against the rear of the enemy’s field-army:

1. Eupatoria was a seaport town, and operations thence proceeding could and would be supported in many ways by the power of the Allied Navies.

2. The town was already held by Omar Pasha with an Ottoman Army which for months had successfully defied the enemy, and might advance in due order from its base, confronting, of course, the fair perils of war, but without plunging into ‘adventures.’

3. The attack might be made without drawing any great body of infantry from before Sebastopol, Omar Pasha, indeed, declaring that he required no aid at all from the infantry arm.

4. What he mainly required was the assistance of cavalry, and that was a

species of force which—because not in use for siege purposes—could be easily spared by the Allies confronting Sebastopol.

5. Eupatoria had already been linked to the French and English camps on the Chersonese by the submarine telegraph, and by means of that powerful aid the movements of the field army advancing from the seaport town could be made to take place in close concert with the operations of the besiegers.

6. With the aid of the cavalry that could be easily spared from before Sebastopol, any defeat sustained by Omar Pasha might be made to result in an orderly retreat upon his fortified base; and there was no apparent reason why even misfortune, if visiting this kind of attack, would be likely to result in disaster.

NOTE 4.—*Of all the projected assaults.*—The ‘omission’ was this:

Bosquet had retained in his own hands a plan of the Malakoff which had been found in the pocket of a slain Russian officer, instead of forwarding it at once to Head-quarters. Pélassier did not content himself with a single remonstrance, but followed it up by another expressed in strong, angry language.

NOTE 5.—*Confined to only a few score of men.*—For want of separated returns I am prevented from giving the exact numbers, but, although not precise, the statement in the text is well based.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII.

NOTE 1.—*Scarce exceeding, he thought, 150.*—After seeing the statement of losses in text and foot-note (p. 133), and making large allowance for the number of those who may have moved off with wounded men, one may understand how it could have become possible that this rough estimate was not far from the truth.

NOTE 2.—*A grape-shot striking his forehead.*—Observers at first all imagined that a grape-shot wound in the head which hurled down the general, and deluged him with blood, must almost of course be fatal; but it proved to be otherwise, and the veteran before long was again at the side of Lord Raglan.

NOTE 3.—*By a wisely designed cannonade.*—This is substantially a negative assertion; but is still, I think, warranted, because M. Rousset, who had access to all papers of the French War Department, and used them with great care and skill, has remained unacquainted with what in the text are called ‘the governing facts.’

NOTE 4.—*Only some 2000 strong.*—General Todleben stated that the English led by General Eyre had been defeated; but what mainly seems to have brought him to a conclusion so far from the truth was an erroneous impression with respect to the *object* of the attack. He wrongly imagined that the object of General Eyre was to seize the Péressip batteries, and built on that idea a conclusion that the non-seizure of those batteries implied a defeat of the assailing force.

NOTE 5.—*These engagements of the 18th of June.*—The English Commander-in-Chief addressed to Lady Raglan a letter containing these words:—

'Before SEBASTOPOL, June 19, 1855.

'Yesterday we attacked a Russian work called a Redan, and the French attacked the works right and left of a tower called Malakoff; the object of both attacks being to possess ourselves of the Faubourg of Sebastopol. We had apparently subdued by the superiority of our fire the Russian artillery, and though the attacks could not be considered otherwise than formidable enterprises, yet the confidence of success was general, and I confess that I participated in that confidence.

'It had been determined that the attack should be made at five or half-past five in the morning, and that the interval between that time and daylight should be employed to bring as much artillery to fire upon the enemy's works as possible. Late, however, in the evening of the 17th I heard that General Pélissier had resolved to commence at three. I did not like the change, but it was too late to protest against it, and the necessary orders were given accordingly. The Redan was to be attacked by three divisions, and I gave Brown the command of them, each division furnishing men for one column of attack. I left home shortly after two o'clock in the morning, and met Brown in the trenches at three. The French were to commence the attack by signal, and I was to order our advance when I should think proper. Unfortunately the French officer commanding the right column mistook a rocket that was fired for the signal, and began before his time. The general officer at the head of the next column, knowing the mistake that had occurred, did not push his troops forward, and the French left column, of course, remained stationary until General Pélissier gave the signal agreed upon. When they were all engaged they seemed to make so little way, and to meet with such resistance, that I thought it right to order our advance. They did so at once; but such a heavy fire, particularly of grape, was brought to bear upon them, that few reached the Redan, and nobody got into it. In short, the operation failed, as well as that of the French; and we have to deplore the loss of many valuable officers and men. Other attacks went on at the same time, and loss was there incurred. We have to deplore the death of Major-General Sir John Campbell, an excellent officer, who has never given me one moment's trouble, and was always satisfied whatever I required him to do; of Colonel Yea, of the 7th Foot, who had devoted himself to his duty during the whole of the winter, and of many others, among whom is Lord Normanton's son, Captain Agar, of the 44th.

'You may imagine my disappointment at this failure—it is a great misfortune.'

NOTE 6.—*Were thrown back into the Ditches.*—'The number of troops they [the enemy] brought to the assault was 35,000, without counting their distant reserves. The French advanced on the right flank and centre, the English on the left flank. The besiegers, provided with ladders, fascines, and Sapper's tools, advanced rapidly to the attack. *Despite the heavy fire of grape and musketry we poured into them, their columns advanced, reached our Ditches, and commenced scaling the parapets.*

'But the line of the intrepid defenders of Sebastopol never swerved. *They received the daring assailants with the points of their bayonets, and threw them back into the Ditches.* The enemy's columns then threw themselves on the Gervais Battery, entered it, &c.'¹

The beginning of the new sentence above quoted shows that the narrator, in making his earlier statements, was not referring at all to the affair near the Gervais Battery; and this being so, I can state without any qualification

¹ Ann. Reg. 1855, p. 242.

at all that the above passages distinguished by italics are not only fiction, but fiction unmingled with any grain of truth.

The fabrication is rendered beautifully consistent with itself by deliberately pointing out General Khrouleff as the officer 'to whom the chief honor of the day is due as commanding the whole of the line attacked,' by withholding all mention of the Engineers (including even Todleben!), and by blending the day's losses with those sustained the day before under the fourth bombardment.

Prince Michael Gortchakoff had the misfortune to become—at least formally—responsible for this fabulous statement; but I have always believed him to be a man of honor, and have taken refuge in the faith that he must have been imposed upon. His Head-quarters, it must be remembered, were not at Sebastopol, but at some miles' distance from the town on the 'Old City Heights;' and this circumstance naturally may have made it the easier to dupe him.

It will be observed that I see grounds for tracing the origin of the fabrication to the panic which seized upon the garrison when our siege-guns reopened, see chap. viii. p. 147.

NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.

NOTE 1.—*By their sacred costumes.*—This is or was distinctly the case in Russia. There the sacredness of a priest used to begin when he put on canonicals, and to end when he took them off.

NOTE TO CHAPTER X.

NOTE 1.—*Harmonious concert.*—A difference of opinion on one Home question—that of merging the Ordnance Office in the War Department—did not at all affect the spirit in which the Minister and the General co-operated in the business of war.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII.

NOTE 1.—*Grace and perfect clearness of style.*—Of this any one acquainted with Lord Raglan's style may judge, for the dispatch was published (Sayer's Collection, p. 219). I may here mention that the contents of this chapter are based upon the above and other dispatches and official papers, upon the 'Letters from Head-quarters,' vol. ii., upon communications from Lord Airey, from Archdeacon Wright, and from Dr. Fowle Smith.

NOTE 2.—*Was no worse.*—It is stated that that day, the 28th, there issued a General Order in the name of the Commander-in-chief (Letters from Head-quarters, ii. p. 364), but I observe signs of mistake in the date; and at all events the act was not one that would require more than simple assent on the part of Lord Raglan.

NOTE 3.—*Appeal to Heaven*.—In a sense, others were present—that is the Chief of the Staff and other members of the Head-quarters Staff, and the whole of the personal Staff, and, besides, Lord George Paget; but the bedroom being small, these stood, it seems, outside its open door.¹

NOTE 4.—*Fresh disappointments and losses*.—See Memorandum by our Chief-Engineer, dated 'Head-quarters before Sebastopol, 29th June, 1855,' Journal Royal Engineers, ii. pp. 332, 333.

His words were: 'It is not desired to abandon the attack of the Redan if it can be done with a chance of success and without sacrificing the lives of men uselessly. It is therefore desirable to know whether the French will give any aid by directing a heavy and steady fire upon the batteries in the 'Jardin (of Bastion) du Mât and Garden batteries, whilst the English batteries in the Left Attack will assist in that important object, and at the same time bring a heavy fire upon the works on the right of the Redan and Barrack Battery; or in what way the French and English attacks can be combined for the success of the one grand object each have in view.'

Far from involving a return to determined attacks (*i.e.*, attacks culminating, if necessary, in assaults) on the town front, this request only pointed to assistance from the French artillery—a matter of course—and one is therefore well justified in treating our Engineer's consent to go on against the Redan as substantially absolute.

It is true that our Chief-Engineer some time afterwards tried, though in vain, to resume some part of the position he had taken up on the 21st, but that circumstance makes it so much the clearer that the surrender of the 29th was caused by feelings resulting from the death of Lord Raglan in the evening of the previous day.

NOTE 5.—*On board the 'Caradoc'*.—Still commanded by Derriman. Lyons was not present. The latter part of the mournful ceremony would for him have been hard to bear; for he was devotedly attached to Lord Raglan; but also he at this time had recently lost his son.

¹ Letters from Head-quarters, ii. p. 362. Private MSS.

ADDENDUM TO THE INKERMAN VOLUME.

TO BE INSERTED AT THE CLOSE OF SEC. 2, CHAP. VIII.

If Russians butchered the wounded, there were also Russians — wounded themselves—who, although lying prostrate, persistently fired on our troops ;¹ and at one time, in a part of the field, there were so many of them busied in this way that their fire seemed at first to proceed from an organized body of infantry.

Captain (now General) Charles Morris, R.A., commanded a battery of field artillery belonging to the Light Division, which was sent to take part in the fight on Mount Inkerman ;² and having in person moved forward between 10 and 11 o'clock with two of his guns to a position so chosen as to be almost over the crest of the hill, he was plying with 'case' a body of Russians advancing against the Second Division camp, when he found that his men were suffering under fire from another quarter — a fire that seemed to come from a distance of about 50 yards.

Thereupon, with only his trumpeter, Morris went to the ground whence the new fire had seemed to come, and soon discovered five wounded Russians who were coolly, yet busily, firing from under cover of the brushwood, upon the men of his battery.

Morris had his revolver in hand and advanced upon the offenders. They thereupon threw away their muskets, and prayed for mercy. Morris granted their prayer, and left them unhurt on the ground where they lay, but, of course, he took care to have their firearms broken.

¹ Supposing that they had not surrendered, these last Russians were not committing an outrage.

² Dispatch of Col. Lake, R.A., 7th November, 1855 — a dispatch awarding high praise to Captain, now General C. Morris.

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